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This study examines the implementation of Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that 
provided additional funding to hospitals located in counties with low Medicare per beneficiary 
spending, as a way to address geographic variation in Medicare reimbursement to hospitals. This 
study seeks to determine: 1) whether the hospitals that benefitted from this provision show any 
differences in the quality of care compared to hospitals that did not benefit from this provision, 
2) t if the hospitals that benefitted from this provision showed improvement in quality of care 
after receiving the additional compensation and 3) whether there is a relationship between the 
amount of money a Section 1109 hospital received and the change in quality of care. 
Improvement in quality of care is measured by changes in the 30-day hospital readmission rates 
and mortality rates for Medicare patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI), pneumonia 
and heart failure.   
This study seeks to add to the literature on whether there is a relationship between Medicare 
spending and quality of care and whether giving hospitals more reimbursement improves quality 
of care.   
Methods 
The study evaluates the three hypotheses using bivariate analyses, multivariate linear regression 
models, difference-in-difference models and propensity scores to compare performance on the 
quality of care indicators for Section 1109 hospitals and the comparison hospitals. The study 
uses Medicare quality of care measures and payment data based on Medicare claims.   
Results 
The results show that prior to receiving the additional funding, Section 1109 hospitals are 
different from non-Section 1109 hospitals with respect to the quality of care provided. Section 
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1109 hospitals had statistically significant higher (or worse) 30-day Medicare FFS mortality rates 
and statistically significant lower (or better) 30-day Medicare FFS readmission rates for AMI, 
pneumonia and heart failure compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals. However, after the Section 
1109 hospitals received their additional funding, there were no statistically significant 
differences in the change in quality of care for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to non-
Section 1109 hospitals.  Also, there was no relationship on the amount of money that Section 
1109 hospitals received and the change in quality of care.  
Conclusion 
These results can inform policymakers that Medicare paying more money to hospitals does not 
necessarily mean that patients will receive better quality of care.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview 
The Affordable Care Act that was enacted in March 2010 made numerous changes to the 
U.S health care system and was the largest piece of health care legislation enacted since the 
initial enactment of Medicare in 1965. While the Affordable Care Act is largely known for 
aiming to provide near-universal access to affordable health coverage, it also sought to reform 
most aspects of the health care delivery system including private insurance coverage, the 
Medicaid program and the Medicare program. The Affordable Care Act promulgated both short 
term and long term changes in the Medicare program in terms of coverage and reimbursement 
and it sought to create Medicare payment reform. During the development of the ACA, one area 
of contention in the Medicare hospital reimbursement program was the geographic variation in 
per capita Medicare spending wherein hospital reimbursement varied across the country for the 
same set of hospital services. Policymakers and researchers also showed that in addition to 
variation in reimbursement, there was unexplained variation in utilization and the types of cases 
treated across the country. There has been much research done to understand potential causes for 
the geographic variation of Medicare utilization and spending. Geographic variation in Medicare 
spending is also a politicized issue because the Medicare program annually sets hospital payment 
rates under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and Outpatient Prospective 
Payment System under a budget neutral model, to ensure that changes to the payment systems do 
not increase spending beyond a certain percentage each year.  Because there is theoretically a 
fixed amount of money, there is a tension where hospitals seek to maximize their Medicare 
revenue and obtain the largest proportion of that pool of dollars.  
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Under the Affordable Care Act, there were several provisions to evaluate geographic 
variation in Medicare spending, including provisions for CMS to submit a Report to Congress 
which could be followed by Congress acting to address geographic variation.  However, the 
Affordable Care Act did not contain many provisions to make immediate changes to the 
Medicare payment systems to account for geographic variation and those hospitals that were 
perceived to be under-reimbursed under the Medicare payment systems continued to complain. 
There was a last minute inclusion of Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act that sought to 
provide $400 million to hospitals located in the bottom quartile of counties with the lowest 
Medicare per beneficiary spending, adjusted for age, sex and race, as a short-term mechanism to 
address geographic variation.  
In 2010, CMS calculated county-level Medicare per beneficiary spending adjusted for 
age, sex and race and identified hospitals located in those counties with the lowest Medicare 
spending per beneficiary. Consistent with the law, CMS determined how to apportion the allotted 
funding to those hospitals in 2011 and 2012.  Approximately 400 hospitals received money 
under this provision. However, the distribution of the money surprised the hospital community 
because it was expected that much of the money would be distributed to so-called low cost or 
“efficient” parts of the country like Iowa or Minnesota, but rather the money was distributed to 
states known for their large metropolitan areas, but also having significant rural areas including 
Virginia and New York.  
The intent of the provision was to provide a bonus payment to hospitals located in areas 
with low per capita Medicare spending as a means to provide extra Medicare reimbursement. 
This study evaluates the results of the provision, examining the impact to the hospitals that 
received the money. The goal of the study is to assess whether the hospitals that benefitted from 
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this provision have any differences in the health outcomes of their patients with respect to 30-day 
readmission rates and 30- day mortality rates as compared to the hospitals that did not benefit 
from this provision. In addition, this study explores whether these hospitals have any differences 
in improvement in quality of care after receiving the funds under Section 1109. Ultimately, this 
study seeks to assess whether if Medicare pays hospitals more money, do patients receive better 
quality of care.  
Overview of the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System 
 As background, Medicare reimburses acute care hospitals for providing inpatient acute 
care services to Medicare beneficiaries under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). 
The IPPS was a major departure from Medicare’s previous system, which reimbursed according 
to a cost-based system. Under the IPPS, hospitals receive a payment on a per case basis for 
Medicare inpatient stays. The payment is no longer based on the length of stay or the cost of the 
stay.  Rather, payment for each inpatient stay is based on the patient’s diagnosis and the national 
average cost of the resources used to treat patients with a similar illness.   
Under this fee-for-service prospective payment system, Medicare sets the payment rates 
annually in advance of each year and determines the payments on a per-procedure basis. In 
general, discharges are assigned a diagnosis-related group (DRG), which is a classification 
system that groups similar clinical conditions or diagnoses and procedures. A patient’s principal 
diagnosis and up to 24 secondary diagnoses that reflect a patient’s comorbidities and 
complications and procedures determine the DRG assignment of the case.  
Since October 2007, Medicare uses a DRG classification system known as Medicare 
Severity DRGs (MS-DRGs) that were developed to better account for severity of illness and 
resource consumption based on severity. As such, there are three levels of severity for an MS-
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DRG, including a “major complication/comorbidity”, “complication/comorbidity” and “non-
complication/comorbidity”. Each MS-DRG is assigned a relative weight that reflects the average 
relative costliness for the average Medicare case. The MS-DRG base relative weight of 1.0 
signifies the cost of the services provided to the average Medicare patient. Illnesses that are more 
costly or more resource intensive receive higher relative weight values and illnesses with less 
costs or resource use receive lower relative weight values.  
The other component of the IPPS payment is the standardized amount, or payment rate to 
which the DRG relative weight is applied. Medicare reimburses through two payment rates- one 
payment rate to cover operating costs and another payment rate to cover capital costs. A portion 
of the operating payment rate is adjusted by an area wage index value that reflects differences in 
labor market prices and differences in hospital wage rates. Hospitals located in labor market 
areas with higher wages than the national average wage will have their payment rate upwardly 
adjusted while hospitals located in labor market areas with wages lower than the national average 
will have their payment rate downwardly adjusted. There are also rules that allow for hospitals to 
“reclassify” and receive a wage index for another labor market area. The wage index, which is 
based on differences in geographic labor market variation contributes to geographic variation in 
Medicare prices and spending.  
Finally, there are several policy payment adjustments that affect the IPPS payment. 
Teaching hospitals, or hospitals that train residents, receive an additional per-case indirect 
medical education (IME) payment, which reflects the indirect patient care costs of teaching 
hospitals relative to non-teaching hospitals.  In addition, hospitals that treat a disproportionate 
share of low-income patients receive additional reimbursement called a Medicare 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment, and more recently under the Affordable Care 
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Act, hospitals receive an additional payment based on their relative uncompensated care costs, 
on each inpatient claim payment. For cases in which the inpatient is transferred to another 
hospital, the originally admitting hospital receives a reduced payment. Outlier cases, i.e. cases 
that are extraordinarily costly, get a higher Medicare IPPS payment. For high cost new 
technologies that provide a substantial clinical improvement over existing treatments, an 
additional payment is provided to discharges that utilize that new technology.  
In more recent years, there are special payment adjustments to the IPPS established for 
hospitals in rural areas, in order to preserve access to care in those areas. Hospitals that are  
classified as rural can further be designated for special payments.  Sole Community Hospitals 
(SCHs) are in a rural area that are a certain distance from other hospitals, and can be paid the 
higher of either the IPPS payment or a hospital-specific cost-based rate. Medicare Dependent 
Hospitals (MDHs) receive additional payments which are intended for small rural hospitals for 
which Medicare patients make up a significant percentage of inpatient days or discharges. Lastly, 
hospitals that are 25 miles (FY 2011 through 2017 it was 15 miles) from another hospital and 
with few Medicare discharges can receive a low volume payment which is a percentage add-on 
of their total IPPS operating payment. 
In addition to the IPPS operating payment, Medicare also provides for an IPPS capital 
payment that is intended to reimburse for fixed capital costs for a hospital. The capital payment 
is similarly adjusted by the wage index, and teaching hospitals and hospitals that serve a greater 
share of low-income patients can receive an additional amount under their capital payment. 
Under the Affordable Care Act, there have been several payment polices that affect a 
hospital’s IPPS payment based on certain quality of care measures. The Affordable Care Act 
established the Hospital Value Based Purchasing Payment Program, effective in 2012, which is a 
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redistributive payment policy, in which hospitals can receive bonus payments or payment 
reductions based on their performance on a composite score of measures, including patient 
satisfaction, 30-day mortality rates and Medicare spending per beneficiary. The Affordable Care 
Act also established the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, effective beginning in 
October 2012, which reduces hospital payments for poor performance on 30-day readmissions 
for pneumonia, heart failure and AMI. Under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, a 
hospital is evaluated for its performance during a three- year historical period and if the 
hospital’s performance on readmissions for a particular condition is worse than the national 
average, all of the hospital’s discharges for the upcoming year will receive a reduction in 
payments. For both the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program and the Hospital Value Based 
Purchasing Program, the payment adjustment is applied to the hospital’s base operating DRG 
amount, or wage-adjusted DRG payment so add-on payments like DSH or IME are not affected. 
Lastly, beginning in October 2014, hospitals ranked in the worst performing quartile for hospital-





Example Formula of IPPS Operating Payment
 
 
 Nearly all of the inputs in the formula to calculate the hospital payment are hospital-
specific and as a result, it contributes to variation in Medicare prices across the country for the 
same services.   
Example of Variation in Price for MS-DRG 470 Major Hip/Knee Replacement without 
Complications in 2015 
Percentile Payment Medicare Reimbursement  
90th Percentile $17,763.21 
75th Percentile $13,145.50 
50th Percentile $11,726.20 
25th Percentile $10,657.02 
10th Percentile $9,900.55 
Base DRG payment without add-on factors $11,493.98 
IPPS Operating DRG Payment= [(Wage Index x Labor Related Standardized Amount + Non Labor 
Related Standardized Amount) x DRG Weight]  
Total IPPS operating payment= Operating DRG payment + (DSH payment percentage x DRG 
payment) + (IME payment percentage x DRG payment) + (readmission payment percentage x DRG 
payment) + (HVBP payment percentage x DRG payment)   
IPPS Capital DRG Payment= [(capital standardized amount x DRG Weight] x wage index 0.69  
Total IPPS capital payment= Capital DRG payment x (DSH payment percentage x Capital DRG 
payment) + (IME payment percentage x Capital DRG payment) 
If applicable: 
Final Total IPPS operating payment= (low volume percentage x total IPPS operating payment) + (1 
percent HAC reduction x total IPPS operating payment) 
Total IPPS Payment= Final total IPPS operating payment+ Total IPPS capital payment 
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This chart above shows that depending on the hospital’s location, relative wages, performance on 
quality indicators, teaching hospital status and level of indigent care provided, Medicare 
reimbursement can vary from approximately $9900 to $17700 for the same procedure. Without 
these adjustments, the Medicare hospital reimbursement would have been $11,493.98.  
Overview of Geographic Variation Provisions in the Affordable Care Act  
 The rapid increase in health care spending has long been an issue in the U.S health care 
system with concerns that health care spending is growing at a faster rate than the economy. 
Balancing the costs of a health insurance mandate was a major focus of the Affordable Care Act. 
However, it has been unclear what the most effective approach is to curb health care spending 
without impacting health outcomes and diminishing quality of care.  Furthermore, it has been 
unclear whether additional spending improves health outcomes or quality of care. During the 
drafting of the Affordable Care Act, there was attention focused on Medicare payment reform 
and how different parts of the country had different levels of Medicare spending, Medicare 
utilization and health outcomes.  
 The Affordable Care Act had a number of provisions to address geographic variation at 
the national level and within the Medicare approach to payment, which demonstrates the concern 
for variation in Medicare spending across the country. In addition, during the drafting of the 
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promised to have the Institute 
of Medicine submit a report on issues of geographic variation in Medicare spending. 
 Section 399HH established national healthcare priorities to be implemented by the 
Secretary. One of the priorities was to “reduce health disparities across 9 health disparity 
populations…and geographic areas of care.” Section 931 required quality measure development 
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by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality and required measure development for “the equity of health services and health  
disparities across health disparity populations… and geographic areas.”  
 There were several provisions to examine geographic variation in spending for 
physicians. Section 3102 of the Affordable Care Act required an analysis of “the current methods 
of establishing practice expense geographic adjustments”. Section 3137 of the Affordable Care 
Act required an examination of geographic variation in Medicare spending for hospital inpatient 
payments. The Act required the report to include an examination of the wage index, the 
geographic adjustment to Medicare inpatient payments, as well as an examination of other 
potential data sources to measure wage levels that better account for staffing differences and take 
into consideration within state and across state variation. Section 3001 of the Affordable Care 
Act, which established the hospital value based purchasing payment program, modifies 
hospitals’ inpatient payments (either bonus payments or penalties) based on their performance on 
specified measures.  This section also created the Medicare spending per beneficiary indicator 
which measures a hospital’s Medicare spending per beneficiary as an indicator of a hospital’s 
efficiency. The spending per beneficiary measure can be adjusted for factors such as age, sex, 
and severity of illness. 
 
Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act  
 Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act was a brief provision that directed CMS to 
distribute $400 million during FY 2011 and FY 2012 to hospitals located in the quartile of 
counties with the lowest Medicare Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary.  The provision 
required that the Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary by county be adjusted for age, sex 
and race.  The acute care hospitals located in those counties with the lowest Medicare Part A and 
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Part B spending per beneficiary qualified to receive the funding. The law required that the money 
be distributed based on a factor of the qualifying hospital’s Medicare IPPS payments relative to 
the total IPPS payments of all the qualifying hospitals. The intent of the provision was a short-
term benefit to hospitals that received less Medicare reimbursement. In addition, the provision 
was a short-term adjustment to alleviate perceived inequities in spending across the country. 
 In the August 16, 2010 Federal Register, CMS established its methodology for 
calculating the Medicare Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary at the county level measure. 
In addition, it identified the hospitals located in the counties with the lowest spending per 
beneficiary and it determined the distribution of the spending to the qualifying hospitals. First, 
CMS established its methodology for calculating the Medicare Part A and Part B spending per 
beneficiary measure in the same manner that it calculates the Medicare Advantage (the Medicare 
managed care insurance option for Medicare beneficiaries) capitation rates, which are also at the 
county level. CMS used historical claims data to determine Medicare Part A and Part B spending 
at the county level. In addition, CMS established an adjustment methodology that accounts for 
differentials in spending by age, sex and race. This was the first time CMS had calculated a 
spending adjustment for race, which was only done because it was required by law. Similar to 
the method for calculating Medicare Advantage capitation rates, the adjustments were 
determined using a linear regression model with age-sex regression categories. A linear 
regression model was also used to determine how to adjust Medicare Part A and Part B spending 
by race. CMS chose to categorize race into four categories, and beneficiaries were categorized 
based on self-identification. The four categories were White, Black, Hispanic and Other. The 
“Other” category primarily contained beneficiaries who identified themselves as Asian, Pacific 
Islander or Native American.  
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 CMS determined the county spending adjusted for age, sex and race and ranked the 
counties in order of spending. There were a total of 3142 counties in the country and 786 
counties in the lowest quartile of spending. CMS identified 400 acute care hospitals located in 
those counties as qualified to receive the bonus payments. CMS determined how to distribute the 
money to the qualifying hospitals by establishing weighting factors for each qualifying hospital   
based on the hospital’s Medicare IPPS payments in FY 2009 relative to the total Medicare IPPS 
payments for all qualifying hospitals in FY 2009, using FY 2009 Medicare claims data, so 
hospitals located in areas with the lowest Medicare spending per beneficiary that received more 
Medicare payments received a higher share of the $400 million. The states that received the most 
money were New York, Virginia and Wisconsin. There were two lump sum payments to the 
qualifying hospitals, the first in July 2011 and the second in April 2012 to distribute the $400 
million. The first payment distributed $250 million and the second payment distributed $150 











Table 1: Distribution of Section 1109 payments by State  
State Number of Eligible Hospitals Payment (in millions) Percentage of Total Funding 
Alabama 4 2.64 0.66% 
Arizona 5 4.39 1.10% 
Arkansas 6 8.07 2.02% 
California 6 5.80 1.45% 
Colorado 3 0.77 0.19% 
Georgia 11 17.81 4.45% 
Hawaii 14 15.11 3.78% 
Idaho 11 10.45 2.61% 
Illinois 6 4.63 1.16% 
Indiana 12 7.99 2.00% 
Iowa 20 33.33 8.33% 
Kansas 4 1.81 0.45% 
Kentucky 2 0.49 0.12% 
Maine 4 3.44 0.86% 
Michigan 8 4.52 1.13% 
Minnesota 13 10.66 2.67% 
Mississippi 4 3.39 0.85% 
Missouri 11 19.41 4.85% 
Montana 9 10.08 2.52% 
Nebraska 4 4.07 1.02% 
New Mexico 20 15.93 3.98% 
New York 50 46.24 11.56% 
North Carolina 7 2.89 0.72% 
North Dakota 5 9.41 2.35% 
Ohio 2 0.55 0.14% 
Oklahoma 1 1.06 0.27% 
Oregon 21 23.85 5.96% 
Pennsylvania 13 16.61 4.15% 
South Carolina 1 2.43 0.61% 
South Dakota 19 15.18 3.80% 
Texas 3 1.27 0.32% 
Utah 11 1.96 0.49% 
Vermont 2 0.96 0.24% 
Virginia 31 41.51 10.38% 
Washington 12 15.07 3.77% 
West Virginia 2 0.22 0.05% 
Wisconsin 40 33.35 8.34% 
Wyoming 3 2.64 0.66% 
Total 400 400.00 100.00% 
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When CMS announced the implementation of Section 1109 and the distribution of 
payments, the New York Times reported that “the result was not exactly what Congress or 
hospital lobbyists had expected.” According to the New York Times, “Members of Congress 
from Iowa, Minnesota, Washington and Wisconsin secured extra money in the new health care 
law to reward low-cost hospitals in their states, which they said had long been underpaid by 
Medicare. But it now turns out that New York will get more of the money than any other state, 
and some of the chief proponents of the bonus payments will not receive any.” The article noted 
that geographic disparities in Medicare spending were a critical component of the healthcare 
reform debate during which members of Congress particularly in the Midwest and Northwest 
complained that their hospitals were underpaid for their services. Additionally, the article pointed 
out that the hospitals that received the bonus money were largely in rural areas, small towns and 
medium-size cities and that New York had the most hospitals, receiving the largest share of the 
$400 million (Pear, 2010). 
It is also worth noting that since the implementation of Section 1109, the Medicare 
program has sought to move towards payment for value of healthcare as opposed to paying for 
volume of services. On April 2015, the Medicare Access & CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 
(MACRA) was enacted, that repealed the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) formula for 
determining Medicare payments for clinicians’ services, and established a new framework for 
rewarding clinicians for value over volume, and streamlined other existing Medicare quality 
reporting programs for providers by combining the existing CMS quality reporting programs into 
one new system. After repealing the SGR formula, MACRA creates the Merit-Based Incentive 
Payment System (MIPS) which combines various quality reporting programs for physicians into 
a  single consolidated program with four weighted performance categories upon which eligible 
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professionals (EPs) will be assessed: Quality; Resource Use; Clinical Practice Improvement 
Activities; and Meaningful Use of Certified EHR Technology. MACRA requires that CMS 
develop and provide clinicians with a Composite Performance Score that incorporates MIPS 
performance on each of these categories and based on this Composite Performance Score, 
physicians may receive additional reimbursement or penalties on their Medicare payments. 
MACRA also provides incentives for participation in certain Alternative Payment Models in 
which physician participants are not subject to MIPS adjustments, but instead receive a lump 
sum incentive payment. As a result, MACRA encourages expansion of these alternative payment 
models available to physicians. These new policies that are seeking to revise Medicare physician 
payment reimbursement demonstrate that Medicare is moving away from paying for volume to 
paying for better quality of care. This study could help to inform policy makers and other 
stakeholders if providing more funding could improve quality of care to Medicare beneficiaries. 
Study Goals and Objectives  
The purpose of this study is the following: 
 To evaluate whether these Section 1109 hospitals, located in areas with low Medicare 
spending per beneficiary, provide equivalent quality of care in terms of Medicare 
readmission rates and Medicare mortality rates as compared to the hospitals that are not 
located in counties with the lowest Medicare spending per beneficiary.   
 To examine whether the quality of care provided by Section 1109 hospitals improved 
more after receiving the additional funding, as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals 
and;. 
  To evaluate whether the amount of the additional funding that Section 1109 hospital 
received impacts the extent to which quality of care improved. 
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Ultimately, this study seeks to assess if Medicare gives hospitals more money, do patients 
receive better quality care.  
These findings are relevant to policymakers given the scrutiny of variation in Medicare 
spending across the country and the various pieces of legislation enacted to examine this issue of 
geographic variation in Medicare spending. Furthermore, these findings can inform Medicare as 
it moves towards paying for value over volume as indicated by the intent of the MACRA 
legislation.  
The second chapter of this study provides a literature review on sources of geographic 
variation in healthcare spending, how to measure quality of care and how healthcare spending 
impacts quality of care. The literature review will demonstrate that there is no clear pattern on 
how healthcare spending impacts quality of care or what contributes to geographic variation in 
healthcare spending. The third chapter describes the methodological approach of this study, 
including the research questions, hypotheses tested, data sources and statistical methods. The 
fourth chapter presents the findings of the study and the last chapter will present the policy 
implications of the results.   
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 A literature review was conducted to find existing research on several aspects of this 
study: 1) determinants of geographic variation on Medicare reimbursement, 2) studies that assess 
the relationship of quality of care and Medicare reimbursement, 3) studies that utilize CMS 
mortality rates and readmission rates as indicators of hospital quality of care, 4) studies that 
examine health policies using the difference-in-difference method and 5) studies that examine 
health policies using a propensity score matching method.  Several PubMed searches were 
conducted to inform this literature review. A search on PubMed was conducted using search 
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terms “geographic variation” and “Medicare spending” and yielded 42 results on January 11, 
2016. A search on PubMed on ‘“Medicare spending” and “quality of care”’ produced 239 
results. A search on PubMed was also conducted on the use of mortality rates and readmissions 
rates as indicators of quality of care. A literature review search was conducted on the methods 
for this study to identify if they are appropriate to use in health policy studies pertaining to 
Medicare.  A literature search was conducted on studies including “difference in difference” and 
“Medicare” and “propensity score” and “Medicare”. Lastly, a literature review search was 
conducted on Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act which yielded no results. The subsequent 
sections summarize the research by search topic with a discussion of the relevance of each 
section to the study aims. 
Literature Review of Determinants of Geographic Variation on Medicare Reimbursement 
There are several studies on the determinants of geographic variation in Medicare 
spending and the relationship of geographic variation in spending with outcomes and utilization. 
The research on the determinants of geographic variation in Medicare spending can be 
categorized into the following groups: 1) regional differences in costs of physician practice, 
(Mitchell & Davidson, 1989; Pope, Welch, Zuckerman, & Henderson, 1989), 2) payment 
variations due to policy decisions and market forces (MedPAC, 2009; Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, 2009), 3) provider training and supply as well as supply of other health care 
resources (Baicker & Chandra, 2004; Cooper, Cooper, McGinley, Fan, & Rosenthal, 2012; 
Ricketts & Belsky, 2012; Welch, Miller, Welch, Fisher, & Wennberg, 1993; Wennberg & 
Cooper 1999; Zuckerman, Waidmann, Berenson, & Hadley, 2010), 4) population demographics 
and socioeconomic status (Cooper et al., 2012; Ricketts & Belsky, 2012; Rosenthal, 2012; Zhang 
Steinman, & Kaplan, 2012; Zuckerman et al., 2010), 5) health status and prevalence of particular 
diseases (Reschovsky, Hadley, Saiontz-Martinez, & Boukus, 2011; Rosenthal, 2012; Sargen, 
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Hoffstad, & Margolis, 2012; Zuckerman et al., 2010), and 5) service use arising from patient 
preferences (Rosenthal 2012; Wennberg & Cooper, 1999; Zhang et al.,2012), and 7) 
discretionary decisions by health care providers (Cooper et al., 2012). 
Geographic variation research began in the 1970s where initial studies showed regional 
differences in utilization when adjusted by various population demographics. The first studies by 
Wennberg and Gittlesohn, examined variation in rates of surgical procedures in Maine and 
Vermont (Wennberg, Gittlesohn, 1973). Studies continued in the 1980s with research showing 
great variation in hospital use and mortality by Medicare beneficiaries in Boston versus New 
Haven, when adjusted for age, sex and race (Wennberg, 1989).  National studies found variation 
among “hospital referral regions”, which were defined as regional health care markets for tertiary 
medical care that generally requires the services of a major referral center.  These regions were 
found to vary with respect to Medicare spending, supply of physicians and hospitals, rates of 
surgical procedures and hospitalizations (Dartmouth Atlas Project, 2007). These geographic 
variation studies spurred a debate during health care reform, as studies found that overutilization 
reduced quality of care, harmed patients and increased Medicare spending (Wennberg, Fisher, 
2008). In the media, Atul Gawande’s New Yorker article raised awareness that variation in 
physicians’ chosen practice patterns drives variation in Medicare costs observed, even in cities 
geographically nearby one another (Gawande 2009).  
This literature review is focused on spending for Medicare beneficiaries and impact on 
utilization and health outcomes and found a body of research on the factors driving geographic 
variation in spending and whether policy can influence this.  The Dartmouth Atlas studies 
examine spending at the state level, hospital referral region (HRR) and hospital service area 
(HSA) levels. In general, the Dartmouth Atlas group focused on the Medicare Fee-for-Service 
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beneficiaries and adjusted variation for age, sex and race. The factors that they examine at the 
regional levels included variation in spending, utilization and resources. Spending analyses 
examined Medicare per beneficiary spending; utilization analyses examined rates of procedures 
or events at the regional level; and resource studies examined the quantity of staff or equipment 
used at the regional level. 
The 2013 report conducted by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), commissioned by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services after the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, 
examined the degree of geographic variation. In the IOM study, researchers were tasked with 
evaluating geographic variation in health care spending levels and growth among Medicare, 
Medicaid and other insured and uninsured populations, and making recommendations for 
changes to Medicare payments based on this evaluation. Researchers observed that age, sex and 
health status accounted for some geographic variation. Other demographic factors such as race, 
income, insurance, employer characteristics and market characteristics had trivial effects in 
reducing geographic variation, once health status was accounted for in the model. The study 
found that even when accounting for age, sex and health status, a substantial amount of 
geographic variation, ranging from 40 percent to 70 percent, remained unexplained.  
Furthermore, the study found that geographic variation in both Medicare and private spending 
was a real phenomenon and that high-cost areas in 1 year had consistently high costs in other 
years. Other observations included that areas with high costs in the treatment of 1 condition were 
somewhat more likely to have high costs in treating other conditions, but higher spending was 
not associated with better outcomes or higher quality care, either overall or when viewed from 
the perspectives of individual health conditions. Lastly, the study found that much of the 
variation in Medicare spending per beneficiary was in post–acute care (such as care provided by 
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home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation facilities, long-term care hospitals, 
and hospices). Variation due to post–acute care services contributed to 73% of the geographic 
variation in Medicare spending, even though these services only accounted for 13% of Medicare 
spending. After post-acute care services, the largest remaining overall expenditure variation, an 
estimated 27%, was due to variation in inpatient services. The study found that variation in 
outpatient procedures, visits, and diagnostic testing accounted for little of the overall geographic 
variation. (IOM, 2013) 
As described earlier, studies on factors that influence geographic variation in Medicare 
spending can be categorized by different factors such as utilization, access, patient characteristics 
and preferences. A general observation from the literature review is that there are no consistent 
results regarding what factors explain geographic variation in Medicare spending. Furthermore, 
the literature review shows that there are many factors that contribute to geographic variation in 
Medicare spending, many ways to measure those factors, various units of geography and many 
ways to measure Medicare spending. Despite the large amount of literature on determinants that 
can explain geographic variation in Medicare spending, much of the geographic variation in 
Medicare spending remains unexplained.    
Several studies have examined how provider training and supply, as well as supply of 
other health care resources, influence Medicare spending. The literature review found that there 
were no consistent results on how provider supply affects the geographic variation of Medicare 
spending. Furthermore, the literature review found that there are a variety of ways to measure 
physician supply, the geographic unit and Medicare spending.  One study found that states where 
more physicians are general practitioners showed lower cost per beneficiary. Furthermore, 
increasing the number of general practitioners in a state by 1 per 10,000 population (while 
20 
 
decreasing the number of specialists to hold constant the total number of physicians) was found 
to be associated with a reduction in overall annual spending of $684 per beneficiary. Conversely, 
the study found that States where more physicians are specialists have higher cost per Medicare 
beneficiary. The estimated effect of increasing the fraction of specialists by 1 per 10,000 resulted 
in an increase in annual spending of $526 per beneficiary. Lastly, the study found that the supply 
of nurses does not seem to affect either the use of high-quality care or total spending (Baicker & 
Chandra, 2004). Similarly, another study examined variations in Medicare per beneficiary costs 
at the hospital service area level and determined whether physician supply and the specialty of 
physicians have significant relationships with cost variation. Using correlational analysis as well 
as bivariate plots and fixed effects linear regression models, the study examined relationships 
between the physician supply per 1,000 beneficiaries categorized by specialty with covariates of 
poverty rate, per capita income and college education and per capita Medicare spending. The 
study found that the relative numbers of specialists or primary care physicians in a hospital 
service area were likely not the major correlate of Medicare costs. However, costs were strongly 
related to the sociodemographic characteristics of the hospital service areas and the overall 
supply of physicians. There were mixed correlations with the specialist supply depending on the 
interaction of the proportion of the physician supply who were international medical graduates 
(Ricketts & Belsky, 2012). On the other hand, a different study found that access to primary care 
services reduces Medicare spending. Specifically, the study found that hospital referral regions 
with high primary health center penetration had 10% lower Medicare spending by fee-for-service 
elderly beneficiaries (Sharma, 2014).  Even early studies of geographic variation found that 
physician supply and utilization greatly influenced Medicare spending.  A study by Welch, 
Miller, Welch, Fisher and Wennberg in 1993 examined spending at the metropolitan statistical 
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area (MSA) level and found that spending for physicians' services varied greatly among MSAs, 
with those for the areas with the lowest and the highest rates differing at least twofold on each 
measure of physician spending. The study found that areas with high rates of admission tended to 
have high levels of payment to physicians for inpatient care per admission, and areas with high 
payments for inpatient services tended to have high payments for outpatient services. Spending 
was not related to the number of physicians per capita but was lower in MSAs with a high 
proportion of primary care practitioners (Welch, Miller, Welch, Fisher and Wennberg, 1993). 
Lastly, another study found that physician supply did not influence Medicare spending and this 
study used linear multivariate-regression models that had as the dependent variable price-
adjusted Medicare spending per beneficiary. The independent variables included area-level 
measures of the supply of health care resources (numbers of hospital beds and physicians per 
1000 elderly population, percentage of physicians in primary care, number of resident physicians 
per bed, and whether or not the nearest hospital with ≥100 beds was a teaching hospita l). The 
study found that differences in the supply of medical resources were neither significant nor 
quantitatively important for understanding Medicare spending (Zuckerman, Waidmann, 
Berenson, & Hadley, 2010). 
The literature review included several studies that examined how population 
demographics and socioeconomic status impact geographic variation in Medicare spending. One 
study examined spending at the zip code level and found that understanding geographic variation 
among large regions, such as counties and HRRs, requires disaggregation into their constituent 
ZIP codes and census tracts. Second, residents of low-income ZIP codes have greatly increased 
rates of disability and hospital utilization and that poverty varies geographically and its variation 
explains a great deal about geographic variation in health care utilization and spending (Cooper, 
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McGinley, Fan, & Rosenthal, 2012).  As described earlier, one study found that costs were 
strongly related to the sociodemographic characteristics of the hospital service areas. This study 
measured sociodemographic characteristics with respect to the proportion of families in poverty, 
per capita income, the proportion of the population with a college degree, and the proportion of 
the population that was African American and found that at the HSA level, these characteristics 
were strongly related to Medicare Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary (Ricketts & 
Belsky, 2012).  Other factors found to contribute to variation in spending include racial or ethnic 
differences, socioeconomic status, insurance status and education. Some studies have found that 
non-whites have higher spending and more utilization than whites (Cooper, 2010). However, 
another study concluded that health status and supply of medical resources do not fully account 
for variation in Medicare spending and that more data are needed to identify the other causes of 
the variation.  Specifically, the study found that health status accounted for 29 percent of 
geographic differences in per beneficiary spending; adjustment for differences in supply of 
medical resources did not further reduce the differences in per beneficiary spending between the 
top and bottom spending quintiles of HRRs (Zuckerman, 2010). Another study found that State-
specific factors, such as income, health care capacity, and the share of elderly residents, are 
important factors in explaining the level of per capita Medicare spending variation among states 
(Cuckler, 2013). 
There have been several studies that examined health status and prevalence of specific 
diseases and their relationships to geographic variation in Medicare spending. These studies have 
found that for specific conditions, certain factors can contribute to geographic variation in 
Medicare spending. One study examined Medicare beneficiaries with diabetic complications and 
geographic variation in spending.  The study used linear regression analysis to determine the 
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effect that diabetic disease severity (rates of macrovascular and microvascular complications) 
and the utilization of inpatient and outpatient services (hospital admission rates and outpatient 
visits) have on per capita expenditures and mortality rates within a geographic region. The study 
found that increased Medicare spending was not associated with improved one-year survival for 
patients with foot ulcers or lower extremity amputations. However, hospital admissions, 
macrovascular complications and microvascular complications occurred more often in patients 
with foot ulcers living in higher spending regions. The study found that per capita Medicare 
spending varied considerably among hospital referral regions. Moreover, there was no 
statistically significant reduction in all-cause mortality associated with higher Medicare spending 
(Sargen, Hoffstad, & Margolis, 2012). Finally, one study examined patterns of prevalence, 
utilization, and expenditure for Medicare beneficiaries with multiple (6 or more) chronic 
conditions at the State level and found there is variation by State in the prevalence of 
beneficiaries with 6 or more chronic conditions. They also found that beneficiaries with 6 or 
more chronic conditions had higher readmission rates, Medicare spending and ED visits than 
average, although there was much variation in these outcome variables by State when looking at 
only Medicare beneficiaries with 6 or more chronic conditions (Lochner et al, 2013). Another 
study examined the extent to which the ESRD population contributes to geographic variation in 
Medicare spending. Using an ordinary least squares regression model with average annual 
Medicare payments per patient with ESRD as the dependent variable, the study found that the 
predictor variables of demographic descriptors (average age, race, and sex distributions by 
region) and one case-mix indicator (percentage of diabetic versus non-diabetic cases of ESRD) 
explained 80 percent of variance in spending. Overall, three factors accounted for most of the 
explained variation:  type of renal replacement therapy, standardized hospitalization ratio (SHR) 
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for dialysis patients, and Medicare area wage index explained approximately 70 percent of the 
geographic variation in spending. Spending varied little with the racial, age and gender 
distribution of the ESRD population. Area socioeconomic characteristics, like level of education 
and income, had stronger relationships to spending (Hirth, 2011). Another study examined 
variation in utilization among different categories of services and its effect on geographic 
variation in spending. The study found that high-use geographic areas were not necessarily high-
use sites across all service categories and similarly, low-use sites were not necessarily low-use 
sites across all service categories. Notably, the study found that durable medical equipment, such 
as wheelchairs and diabetic supplies, and Part B drugs showed the greatest variation. Overall, the 
study found that inpatient care, home health, and durable medical equipment contributed the 
most to geographic variations, followed by skilled nursing facility, hospital outpatient, and other 
physician visit services (Reschovsky et al, 2012). 
Another study examined if there are trends in geographic variation over time and whether 
regions with high Medicare expenditures in a given setting remain high cost over time. The study 
found that drivers of Medicare spending have changed over time such that high inpatient hospital 
and home health spending have always been associated with high total Medicare spending, but 
high spending on hospice care and skilled nursing facility care has become increasingly 
associated with high total Medicare spending from 1992 to 2010. The study also found that 
relative spending levels are persistent over time where an HRR deemed high cost in 1992 is 
likely to be high cost in 2010. This finding is true both for total Medicare spending as well as for 
certain categories of spending in home health, inpatient hospital, and outpatient hospital 
spending. Lastly,  the study found that there is some evidence of regression to the mean for total 
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Medicare spending, particularly for spending on certain types of post-acute care (hospice and 
skilled nursing facility) (Chiklis, 2010). 
Patient preference and its relationship to utilization also influences geographic variation 
in Medicare spending. One study assessed the extent to which differences in patients’ 
preferences across geographic areas explained differences in traditional fee-for-service Medicare 
spending across Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care Hospital Referral Regions. Using ordinary least 
squares models in which the dependent variables were Medicare spending per beneficiary and 
the independent variables included the share of respondents answering the preference questions 
affirmatively, the study found that the patient preference measures had a modest but statistically 
significant association with area average total Medicare spending per beneficiary.  The study also 
found that the number of physicians per 100,000 population was significantly negatively related 
to the spending. The number of hospital beds per 1,000 people was significantly positively 
related to the spending and the mortality rate of Medicare beneficiaries, adjusted for age, sex, 
and race, was positively related to spending variation (Baker, 2014). Another study found 
significant variation in prescription drug use at the HRR, State and regional level after adjusting 
for population characteristics such as age, gender, race and insurance status. The study found that 
prevalence of underlying disease alone did not explain the geographic variation in prescription 
drug use. The authors theorized whether disease severity and other discrete health status 
measures, or a patient’s preferences and explicit requests and expectations for antibiotic 
treatment influenced variation in prescription drug use and in turn geographic variation in 
spending for drugs by the Medicare population (Zhang, 2012). 
Overall, this literature review has demonstrated that there are several ways to measure 
spending at the regional level, be it at the county level, State level, hospital spending area or 
26 
 
hospital referral region. The level at which spending is measured can influence the results. 
Furthermore, the literature review has demonstrated that there are multiple factors that can 
contribute to geographic variation in spending including market characteristics, patient 
preferences, the supply of resources, and characteristics of the patient populations. However, the 
literature review has shown that there are conflicting results on how and the extent to which 
these factors influence geographic variation in Medicare spending and that there is no clear 
consistent cause of geographic variation in Medicare spending. Due to the complexity of this 
issue, policymakers are aware that geographic variation in spending is a concern, but have yet to 
identify ways in which Medicare payment policy can alleviate geographic variation in spending. 
Literature Review of the Relationship of Medicare Spending and Quality of Care 
One of the aims of this dissertation is to examine whether changes in Medicare spending 
result in changes in quality of care. Studies have shown mixed results in whether or not the level 
of Medicare spending improves or diminishes quality of care. Some studies have found that 
higher spending does not result in better patient care, better outcomes or better patient 
satisfaction while other studies have shown the opposite results. This literature review divides 
studies based on these two opposite sets of results, into the following categories: 1) Studies on 
higher healthcare spending and worse quality outcomes and 2) Studies on higher healthcare 
spending and better quality outcomes. Before describing those studies, it is worth noting that the 
major research on geographic variation in spending and quality of care are the studies from the 
Dartmouth Atlas Project. These studies found that regional variations in Medicare per capita 
spending by HRR did not result in higher-quality care, in terms of specific evidence-based health 
services or in terms of greater access to basic health care.  
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Specifically, one of these studies found that higher levels of spending at the HRR level 
did not improve certain process of care measures: AMI patients in the highest quintile of 
Medicare spending HRR were no more likely to receive acute reperfusion, were less likely to 
receive aspirin at admission or discharge and angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors in the 
setting of a low ejection fraction, and were more likely to receive beta-blockers, compared to the 
lowest quintile. The variation in spending in HRRs was attributed to more frequent hospital 
visits, more frequent physician visits, greater use of physician specialists, and more frequent 
diagnostic tests and minor procedures, and the quality of care was no better in higher-spending 
regions in terms of process of care measures (Fisher, 2009).  
The second analysis based on the Dartmouth Atlas research regarding regional variations 
in Medicare per capita spending found that the higher spending attributed to more hospital visits, 
physician visits and more procedures did not improve certain health outcomes. The study found 
that the pattern of practice observed in higher-spending regions did not lead to improved 
mortality rates, slower decline in functional status, or improved satisfaction with care (Fisher, 
2003). Another Dartmouth Atlas study found that a large proportion of Medicare spending,--
nearly 20 percent--appears to provide no benefit in terms of survival or improvement in quality 
of life (Skinner et al, 2005).  Finally, a study by Landrum examined whether greater service use 
among colorectal cancer patients in high-spending areas improves health outcomes and found 
mixed associations with end of life inpatient Medicare spending at the HRR level and 
recommended care for each of the 6 quality of care indicators for colorectal cancer, but higher 
spending was associated with higher use of costly chemotherapy treatment. In addition, the study 
found that increasing end of life inpatient spending at the HRR level was associated with 
28 
 
increased non-cancer mortality, but no association was found with end of life spending and all-
cause or cancer mortality (Landrum, 2008).  
Studies on Higher Healthcare Spending and Worse Quality Outcomes 
Another set of studies examined the relationship of spending and impact on outcomes and 
generally found that outcomes were worse with higher spending. This next section reviews those 
studies that found that relationship. One study by Baicker looked at the relationship of quality of 
care measured as a composite of twenty-four quality measures developed by the Medicare 
Quality Improvement Organizations with Medicare spending per beneficiary at the state level.  
Efficiency was measured in terms of Medicare spending per beneficiary at the State level, based 
on Medicare fee-for-service claims data, adjusted for age, sex and race. The study found an 
inverse correlation: States with lower spending per beneficiary had higher quality of care and 
conversely, States with higher spending per beneficiary had lower quality of care. The study 
suggested that the mix of the physician workforce plays a critical role in the use of highly 
effective care wherein states with more general practitioners had lower spending per beneficiary 
and better quality of care. Specifically, the study examined the sources of higher Medicare 
spending for States and found that States with hospitals with higher percentages of ICU patient 
days for the beneficiaries’ last 6 months of life had higher Medicare spending. Furthermore, 
States where more physicians are general practitioners showed greater use of high-quality care 
and lower cost per beneficiary (Baicker, 2004). 
Another study looked at the relationship of quality of care measured in terms of 
amputation rates and Medicare spending on vascular care. The study found that there is 
geographic variation in spending on vascular care, with vascular costs varying more than two-
fold across hospital referral regions in the United States. The study found that some regions spent 
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less than $13 000, on average, in the year prior to amputation, whereas other regions spent 
$30 000 or more in the year prior to amputation The variation was due to differences in the use 
of revascularization treatments, rather than differences in patient characteristics or costs related 
to the amputation itself. Overall, the study found there is little evidence to suggest that higher 
spending on invasive vascular care, especially endovascular care, in the year prior to amputation 
is associated with lower regional rates of amputation (Goodney, 2014). 
Studies on Higher Healthcare Spending and Better Quality Outcomes 
In contrast, some studies have found specific instances in which more spending resulted 
in improved health outcomes or lower spending resulted in lower quality of care.  One study by 
Jha found that hospitals with lower costs had marginally lower quality of care. In this study, 
costs were measured as a ratio of a hospital’s average cost per case for Medicare patients, based 
on Medicare hospital cost report data, to the predicted average cost per case for Medicare 
patients. The outcome variable of the study, quality of care, was measured based on a summary 
performance score on performance related to treatment of AMI, heart failure and pneumonia. In 
addition, the study examined costs and the 30-day mortality rates for AMI. The study measured 
costs as a ratio of observed costs versus predicted costs. The study found that hospitals with 
lower costs had slightly lower quality of care in terms of these performance measures (Jha, 
2009).  
Another study by Romley found that increased hospital spending was associated with 
lower risk-adjusted inpatient mortality among Medicare beneficiaries. Specifically, the study 
found that patients admitted into hospitals in the highest spending quintile had lower risk-
adjusted inpatient mortality for certain conditions compared with those admitted to hospitals in 
the lowest spending quintile.  (Romley, 2013).  This author did another study on the association 
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between hospital spending—the sum of spending on inpatient physician visits, hospital room 
charges, laboratory testing, diagnostic imaging, medication administration, and procedures—and 
inpatient mortality for the periods 1999 to 2003 and 2004 to 2008 for six major medical 
conditions treated in 208 California hospitals. Controlling for hospital size, volume, teaching 
status and managed care penetration, the study found that greater hospital spending was 
associated with lower inpatient mortality for all six diagnoses (Romley, 2011).  Similarly, 
another study, which had results contrary to the Dartmouth Health Atlas study, found that 
increased medical care and increased spending is associated with a statistically significant 
reduction in mortality rates and avoidable hospitalization for Medicare beneficiaries that 
received hospital care between 2004 and 2006 (Hadley et al, 2012).  An investigation building on 
the Baicker study found a correlation between higher Medicare per enrollee spending by State 
and worse quality of care based on a composite measure.  These findings were similar to the 
results of the Baicker study. However, the study found a strong correlation between higher total 
per capita unadjusted spending and better quality under the composite quality score and a strong 
correlation with increasing non-Medicare spending per capita and better quality under the quality 
composite measure (Cooper, 2008). 
A meta-analysis was conducted in 2013 that reviewed studies on the association between 
health care quality and cost published between 1990 and 2012 (Hussey, 2013). Sixty-one studies 
were reviewed and categorized based on the level of analysis (at the provider level or area level), 
type of quality measure, type of cost measure, and method of addressing confounders including 
health status. Of the 61 studies, the findings of the association between health care cost and 
quality were inconsistent, such that 34 percent reported a positive or mixed-positive association 
(meaning higher cost associated with higher quality); 30 percent reported a negative or mixed-
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negative association; and 36 percent reported no difference, an imprecise association, or a mixed 
association. The study findings on the association between cost and quality were also 
inconsistent at the various levels of analysis studied, where hospital-level analyses were slightly 
more likely to report a positive association (45 percent of studies had a positive association and 
34 percent had a negative association), whereas area-level studies were more likely to report a 
negative association (17 percent of studies had positive associations and 42 percent had negative 
associations). All of the studies evaluated were observation studies, not experimental design 
studies.  These observational studies used three approaches for accounting for health status as a 
confounding variable:  1) natural randomization, which involved assignment of patients to 
treatment groups using a natural feature (such as co-morbidities or smoking status, as opposed to 
the controlled assignment used in randomized, controlled trials; or 2) instrumental variables 
analysis, which uses instrumental variables (observable factors that influence treatment but do 
not directly affect the outcome measure) to mimic randomization; or 3) multivariable regression 
analysis, which adjusts for the effects of observable health status using statistical methods but 
does not account for unmeasured health status. Most of the studies, 77 percent, used 
multivariable regression analysis (Hussey, 2013). 
 While studies described so far have shown mixed results in the relationship between 
spending and health outcomes, survival or quality of life, another study looked at the relationship 
between the regional variation in Medicare spending and Medicare patients’ perceptions of the 
quality of care they receive. The study found that survey respondents in HRR areas with low per 
capita Medicare Part A and B spending did not have more perceived unmet needs for cardiac 
tests or treatments compared to survey respondents in high per capita Medicare Part A and B 
spending HRRs. In addition, survey respondents with higher health care utilization  (in terms of 
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more doctors’ visits, more types of doctors visited, more cardiac tests) were in HRRs with higher 
Medicare per capita spending, and they had a greater perceived unmet need for seeing specialists, 
despite the greater likelihood of seeing specialists in those HRRs. (Fowler et al, 2008).  
 In summary, the studies presented in this literature review demonstrate a variety of 
findings on how spending for healthcare services impacts health outcomes where in some cases 
greater spending is associated with better quality of care or outcomes and in other cases, lower 
spending is associated with better quality of care or outcomes . The literature review also 
presents a variety of ways to measure healthcare spending and quality of care.   
CMS Alternative Payment Models and Quality of Care 
 More recent literature has shown how changes in Medicare reimbursement under the 
Affordable Care Act, like movement towards alternative payment models, influence quality of 
care. This is relevant to this dissertation because it shows how hospitals’ incentives change with 
changes in Medicare reimbursement and how that also influences quality of care. Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs) were developed under the Affordable Care Act as a tool to control 
Medicare spending and improve quality of care. Under the Medicare ACO program, participating 
provider groups are rewarded financially for limiting the use of health care and improving the 
quality of care. Specifically, ACOs that achieve spending below the targets set by Medicare are 
eligible to receive a share of the savings However, if spending exceeds the target, some ACOs 
must return a share of the excess spending to Medicare. One study examined the effect of ACOs 
on patient satisfaction scores, using HCAHPS patient survey data.  Patient satisfaction scores 
were based on overall ratings of care and ratings for physicians, timely access to care, 
interactions with the primary physician, and care coordination and management. The covariate 
was an HCC risk score developed based on age, sex, race or ethnic group, whether disability was 
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the original reason for Medicare eligibility, and whether the respondent had end-stage renal 
disease or any of 27 conditions. Using linear regression and a difference-in-differences approach 
to estimate changes in patients' experiences in the ACO group from the pre-intervention period 
to the post-intervention period, the study found that ACO contracts were associated with 
meaningful improvements in some measures of patients' experience and with unchanged 
performance in others (McWilliams, 2014).    
 Another study estimated the impact of three provider-focused policies on geographic 
variation in Medicare spending: 1) bundled payment, 2) pay-for-performance (P4P), and 3) 
ACOs.  The study sought to determine whether the three programs, which can significantly 
change provider payments, contribute to geographic variation in payments. The study evaluated 
whether the three policies would decrease geographic variation in Medicare spending by 
comparing Medicare spending in 2008 for each health referral region under the baseline case to 
the scenarios in which each policy (bundled payments, P4P, ACOs) were implemented. The 
study found that P4P had small effects on spending and did not show a strong geographic pattern 
by spending quintile. The ACO scenario reduced spending in all HRRs, but with a relatively 
weak geographic pattern. ACOs largely reduced spending in areas with high spending. Under the 
bundled payment scenario, there was a clearer pattern of spending increases in the lower 
quintiles and spending reductions in the higher quintiles (Auerbach, 2015).  
 Overall, the literature review has shown that there are a variety of ways to measure 
Medicare spending and quality of hospital care, at the regional level and hospital level. 
Furthermore, the literature review has shown that there are no consistent results on the 
association of Medicare spending and quality of care. An aim of this study is to contribute to the 
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existing literature to determine whether providing additional Medicare spending has any impact 
on quality of care provided in a hospital.  
Literature Review of Readmissions and Mortality as Indicators for Quality of Care 
 As described earlier, the outcomes of interest in this dissertation are hospital-level, 
condition-specific 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates for the Medicare FFS 
population. These measures are used in this dissertation as a way to evaluate a hospital’s quality 
of care. There have been many studies using these indicators as measures of quality of care for 
hospitals, which supports the use of these measures in this study. This next section reviews some 
of these studies.  
 Readmissions cause a high burden to healthcare systems and patients. In 2008, nearly 
20% of Medicare patients were readmitted within 30 days after hospital discharge, associated 
with an estimated annual cost of $17 billion (Jencks, 2009). Readmissions were thought to be an 
indicator of quality of care, as they were seen as related to postoperative complications (Fischer, 
2014). Furthermore, there was much regional variation in readmissions rates, so readmissions 
were also viewed as potentially avoidable. Reducing readmission rates became a high policy 
priority for Medicare when the program first began publicly reporting Medicare FFS readmission 
rates for hospitals on the CMS Hospital Compare website, which is a consumer website that 
shows quality of care indicators for hospitals. Subsequently, through a provision in the 
Affordable Care Act, beginning in October 2012, CMS was required to reduce Medicare 
payments to hospitals with higher-than-expected readmission rates for certain high volume, high 
cost conditions. Lastly, under the Affordable Care Act CMS launched the Community-based 
Care Transitions Program, a $500 million provision that provides funding to hospitals and 
community-based organizations to implement programs collaboratively to reduce readmissions. 
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These initiatives demonstrate that appropriately measuring readmissions and holding hospitals 
financially accountable for performance on these measures are a policy priority for Medicare.  
 In light of these initiatives, one study examined the extent to which Medicare’s risk- 
standardized readmission rates change over a two-year period and whether those changes occur 
in a pattern that suggests that the changes are a reflection of quality of care or of random 
variation. The study also examined whether readmission rates were correlated with other 
common quality indicators, such as Medicare’s risk- standardized mortality rates, volume, 
teaching status, and process of care measures. The study found that hospitals with higher 
readmission rates in 2009 tended to improve over time, while hospitals with lower readmission 
rates tended to worsen. The analysis explained that these changes were due in part to regression 
to the mean. In addition, the study found weak or inverse correlations between readmission rates 
and other hospital quality indicators, including risk-standardized thirty-day mortality rates, 
volume, teaching status, and performance under process measures. Potential explanations for 
these patterns include that mortality rates and readmission rates are inversely related in that low 
readmission rates may be due to the fact that the patients have higher mortality rates. The 
finding, however, does indicate that some element of hospital performance, as measured by the 
change in readmission rates, is due to statistical noise rather than true changes in quality of care  
(Parina, 2014). 
 Another meta-analysis was conducted to assess the validity and reliability of the 
readmission measures as a quality of care indicator. The criteria to assess validity and reliability 
of a readmission measure were as follows: 1) whether the measure was relevant based on the 
measure’s impact on health, on policymaking and the measure’s capacity to be changed by the 
health care system, 2) whether the measure was feasible such that the data needed to calculate 
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the indicator was available and reliable, and 3) whether the measure has scientific soundness. 
The study found that the validity of readmission rates as a quality indicator is influenced by a 
number of factors including: 1) the rationale for the readmissions measure, 2) the clinical process 
that is assessed, 3) the indicator definition and the extent of case-mix adjustments, 4) the effect 
of competing outcomes such as mortality rates, and 5) data reliability.  The study found that the 
definition of readmission is important to the validity and reliability of the measure, including 
whether a readmission is defined to be disease specific and defined to account for planned 
readmissions. The study found that there is high variation in overall readmission rates, but that is 
not the case for the rate of preventable readmissions.  The study found that the time window after 
the index admission in which admissions are regarded as readmissions has not been consistently 
defined in the literature and the time window can affect the validity of the measure. Furthermore, 
readmission rates are influenced also by other factors beyond quality of hospital care, including 
length of stay, in-hospital death and patient characteristics. The meta-analysis found conflicting 
results on the relationship with length of stay and risk of readmissions where some studies found 
that there is an inverse relationship with length of stay and risk of readmission and other studies 
could not find any relationship. Furthermore, there have been several studies conducted on the 
relationship between high readmission rates and mortality rates.  The review described that 
studies found a “modest” inverse relationship between readmission rates and mortality rates for 
heart failure patients, and no relationship could be observed between readmission rates and 
mortality rates for pneumonia and AMI, suggesting that the readmission rates and mortality rates 
measure different aspects of quality of care, and may not be strongly related (Krumholz, 2013). 
The review found several studies that measured patient characteristics and its influence on risk of 
readmission. There have been a number of studies that examined socioeconomic status and 
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increased risk of readmission, although the meta-analysis noted that these characteristics have 
not been incorporated in readmission measures due to data limitations. The meta-analysis found 
that poorly accounting for these factors can severely bias the readmission rate results and 
comparisons among hospitals. The meta-analysis concluded that using readmission rates as a 
quality measure requires a clear definition of the context, including the rationale of measuring 
readmissions, the related care processes and the patient groups. (Fischer, 2014).  
 Another meta-analysis reviewed studies that examined avoidable readmissions, under the 
premise that readmissions are only an indicator of quality of care if it can be assumed that 
readmissions are avoidable. This meta-analysis reviewed studies between 1966 to July 2010 and 
found that the proportion of avoidable readmissions varied greatly. The study concluded that the 
variability makes it difficult to ascertain how many readmissions are preventable.  The study 
found that the variation seen in these studies could reflect actual differences in quality of care, 
but it could also reflect the subjectivity of the outcome itself as well as differences in study 
characteristics, including patient and hospital types included or factors in determining avoiding 
readmissions (Joynt, 2014).   
 Another study examined whether public reporting of readmission rates affects patient 
outcomes. The study specifically assessed the impact of the 2009 CMS policy change on public 
reporting of readmissions and evaluated public reporting as a quality improvement tool. The 
study concluded that reporting hospital readmission rates publicly on the Hospital Compare 
website was not associated with improvements in outcomes (Devore, 2016). 
 Another study examined if hospital performance on well-established measures of surgical 
quality, such as adherence to surgical process measures, procedure volume, and mortality, was 
correlated with its surgical-readmission rates. The study found that the overall relationships with 
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hospital quality were consistent with those observed for the composite readmission rates. All 
three quality measures — HQA surgical score, procedure volume, and surgical mortality — were 
generally associated with the procedure-specific readmission rates, although the differences were 
not always significant. The study found that adherence to best-practice guidelines, as reflected by 
the HQA surgical score, was weakly associated with marginally lower readmission rates. The 
absence of an independent relationship between the HQA surgical score and readmission rates 
may be a result of the low variation in performance on this measure (Tsai, 2013). 
 Overall, a review of the literature has found that there are many ways to measure 
readmissions, and readmission rates vary widely depending on how readmissions are defined. 
Other key factors that influence readmission rates are the inverse relationship of readmission 
rates to mortality rates and the exclusion of planned readmissions in the measure. In addition, 
hospital characteristics, such as the case mix of the patients, volume and teaching status, can 
influence readmission rates. The literature demonstrates that readmissions are a measure of 
healthcare utilization, and reducing avoidable readmissions reflects an improvement in hospital 
quality of care.  
 There are a number of studies that use hospital mortality rates as an indicator of quality of 
hospital care. For the purpose of this dissertation, mortality rates are defined as hospital patients 
who died within 30 days of discharge. These measures-- 30-day risk adjusted mortality rates for 
the Medicare population for certain conditions-- are publicly reported by CMS on the Hospital 
Compare website. In addition, the Affordable Care Act established the Hospital Value Based 
Purchasing Program, which adjusts a portion of Medicare hospital payment based on 
performance on a set of quality of care measures. Starting in 2014, 30-day mortality rates for 
certain conditions are included as part of the composite score in Medicare’s Hospital Value 
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Based Purchasing Program to evaluate a hospital’s performance, which demonstrates the 
importance of this measure to the Medicare program as an indicator of quality of care. This also 
demonstrates that mortality rates are a policy priority for Medicare. 
There have been several studies that use mortality rates as an indicator of quality of care 
for hospitals. One study examined hospital patient satisfaction scores and how that compared to 
several health outcome indicators, including 30-day mortality rates for the Medicare FFS 
population. The study justified using the 30-day mortality rate because it represents the quality 
outcome domain in the Donabedian framework and it represents components of key national 
policy initiatives, including Medicare’s Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program.  The study 
found that hospital patient satisfaction scores were positively related to a lower perioperative 
mortality rate, when adjusted for hospital characteristics and volume (Tsai, 2015). 
Another study examined the impact of the CMS Hospital Value Based Purchasing 
Program on 30-day mortality rates. More specifically, the study examined whether the payment 
penalties and bonuses applied to Medicare payments for hospitals based on their performance on 
a number of quality measures impacted 30-day mortality rates.  The study found that three years 
after the introduction of the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, there was no evidence 
that it has led to better patient outcomes. Specifically, the trends in mortality for the target 
conditions among hospitals participating in Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program slowed 
after the program’s introduction, although that slowing was also seen among hospitals not 
participating in the program. Furthermore, the study found that among hospitals with worse 
patient mortality at baseline, there was no evidence that the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 
Program drove improvement as compared to a matched group of hospitals that were not subject 
to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (Burke, 2017). This study demonstrates both 
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the use of mortality measures as a quality of care indicator and the value of assessing how 
changes in Medicare reimbursement impacts such quality of care.  
Overall, a review of the literature has found that mortality rates are indicators of hospital 
quality of care and that reducing mortality rates is a policy priority for Medicare, which supports 
the use of these measures in this study.  
Using Difference-in-Differences Methods in Health Policy Studies 
 As described in more detail in Chapter Three (Methods), this study intends to use several 
statistical analyses to evaluate hypotheses. In addition to multiple linear regression, a common 
technique, this study will use difference-in-differences statistical modelling to evaluate the 
hypotheses. The difference-in-differences method has been used in economic analysis and is 
becoming more frequently used in health policy evaluations.  Difference-in-differences models 
partially address the limitations in linear regression modeling by using repeated cross-sectional 
data. Additionally, observational studies are commonly used to evaluate the changes in outcomes 
associated with health care policy implementation. However, a limitation in using observational 
studies in this context is the need to control for other factors related to those outcomes that could 
occur during that time. The difference-in-differences approach is increasingly applied for health 
policy evaluations to address this problem. The approach compares changes in the outcome in 
those places that have implemented a policy with changes in the outcome in those places with no 
policy. This approach removes trends over time in both intervention and comparison hospitals. It 
is then possible to conclude that significant changes in the outcome are associated with the new 
policy.  
 In difference-in-differences modeling, outcomes after and before the policy are compared 
between the comparison group without the exposure (group 1) and the study group with the 
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exposure (group 2), and the difference is removed from the outcome in order to determine the 
specific impact of the policy on that outcome.  Additionally, there are two differences in 
outcomes that are important: the difference after versus before the policy change in the group 
exposed to the policy (Group 2current time –Group 2 baseline) and the difference after versus before 
the date of the policy change in the unexposed group (Group 1current time –Group 1 baseline) The 
change in outcomes that are related to implementation of the policy beyond background trends 
can then be estimated from the difference-in-differences analysis as follows: (Group 2current time –
Group 2 baseline) −( Group 1current time –Group 1 baseline). If there is no relationship between policy 
implementation and subsequent outcomes, then the difference-in-differences estimate would be 
equal to 0. Alternatively, if the policy is positively associated with a change in the outcome, then 
the outcomes following policy implementation will improve to a greater extent in the exposed 
group, as demonstrated by the difference-in-differences estimate. Regression modeling can be 
utilized in difference-in-differences methods in order to adjust by covariates, or identify 
interaction terms or to assess statistical significance (Dimmick, 2014). Studies have identified 
two common limitations of the difference-in-difference methods, which will also be described in 
Chapter 3 (Methods) for this study. First, utilizing difference-in-difference methods assumes that 
the trends in outcomes between the test group and comparison groups are the same prior to the 
policy intervention, sometimes referred to as the parallel trend assumption. If this assumption is 
true, then it is reasonable to assume that these parallel trends would continue for both groups in 
the absence of this policy. This assumption can be tested by examining the trends for both groups 
before the policy was implemented. If the trends are significantly different prior to the 
implementation of the policy, a difference-in-differences analysis could be biased and a different 
comparison group should be used. This study will utilize a similar test to determine if such a 
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limitation exists. Second, the common shocks assumption assumes that an unexpected or 
unpredictable event unrelated to the policy that impacts the outcomes will do so the same extent 
for the test group and comparison group.  A limitation to implementing the difference-in-
differences design is finding a comparison or control group for which these assumptions are met 
(Dimmick, 2014). 
 There have been several recent studies that utilize the difference-in-differences method to 
evaluate the effects of Medicare payment policy over time. These studies described below share 
many similarities with the evaluation of Section 1109 in that they look at the impact of a change 
in Medicare payment policy over time on certain outcomes for healthcare providers or patients. 
While at the time of this literature review, there were 69 studies that met the search criteria of 
“difference-in-differences” and “Medicare”, this section highlights a few studies that support the 
use of this method. One study examined the impact of an ACA provision that provided additional 
Medicare hospital payments to low volume hospitals for a specified period of time. The study 
examined the effect of the ACA payment adjustment on qualifying hospitals’ profitability 
margins, and the hospital and market characteristics of the hospitals that would be most 
adversely affected by the loss of the ACA payment adjustment. The study utilized the difference-
in-differences regression model with hospital-level random effects to determine whether the 
ACA low volume payment adjustment improved qualifying rural hospitals’ profitability margins 
relative to rural hospitals not receiving the low volume payment adjustment. The study stated 
that difference-in-differences models were useful because they reduce bias stemming from 
selection into treatment and control groups by comparing each group relative to its respective 
time trend (Whitaker, 2016).  
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Another study examined the association between the 2014 Medicaid expansion 
established by the Affordable Care Act and hospitals’ uncompensated care costs, Medicaid 
revenue, and financial margins utilizing difference-in-differences modeling. Difference-in 
differences statistical modeling was used to estimate changes in outcomes associated with the 
ACA. Separate models were estimated for each outcome measure and those models included 
hospital fixed effects, a set of fiscal year–specific dummy variables, and a random error term. 
Robust standard errors were clustered at the hospital level to correct for possible 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Blavin, 2016).   
Finally, one study used difference-in-difference methods to evaluate the effects of 
Medicare's hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project on hospital revenues, costs, and 
margins and on Medicare costs. The study looked at hospitalizations for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) over time for hospitals that participated in a pay-for-performance 
demonstration compared to hospitals that did not participate in the demonstration. The study also 
utilized propensity score matching between the test hospitals and comparison hospitals based on 
certain hospital characteristics such as teaching status, average daily census and bed size. The 
outcome variables in this study were hospital revenues, costs, and margins and Medicare 
payments for AMI hospitalizations. Then the study used a difference-in-differences model to 
examine the effects of the Medicare pay-for-performance program on hospital revenues, costs, 
and margins and Medicare payments for these AMI hospitalizations.  The results showed that 
changes in hospital financials associated with the pay-for-performance program were small and 
not statistically significant. Hospital revenues increased at pay-for-performance hospitals 
compared with comparison hospitals after the implementation of the pay-for-performance 
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demonstration, but these increases were small in absolute and relative terms and were not 
statistically significant (Kruse, 2012). 
The review of the literature suggests that the difference-in-differences method can be a 
useful technique to evaluate health policy studies when comparing changes in an outcome in 
places that have implemented a policy with changes in an outcome in those places with no 
policy. The study design presented in this dissertation is set-up in such a way that the difference-
in-differences method could be used as part of the analysis and it is supported by the literature.  
Using Propensity Score Matching to Evaluate Health Policy Interventions 
 As described in more detail in Chapter Three (Methods), this dissertation aims to use 
several statistical analyses to evaluate the hypotheses in this study. The study will utilize 
propensity score matching, which is a method used to reduce bias in observational studies by 
creating two populations that are similar across a number of covariates using a match on a 
propensity score. The matched samples can be considered as a quasi-experimental population.  
 The literature shows that propensity score matching is a technique used in health policy 
evaluations. One review study examined various statistical approaches to address common 
challenges of conducting policy evaluations including constructing a comparison population 
when a policy affects a population for whom a well-matched comparator is not immediately 
available (using propensity score or synthetic control approaches). This review study examined 
the literature and found that propensity score matching is an approach to form a comparator 
population for the policy-affected population and can be utilized when one is able to identify 
some who were exposed to a policy of interest and others who were not. However, propensity 
score matching is used when those unexposed differ from exposed subjects in obvious ways, 
such as in income status or location. The review study noted that a propensity score measures the 
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estimated probability that individuals in a data set will experience policy exposure, given their 
observed features such as age, sex, income, and location. A propensity score is provided for each 
observation using logistic regression, in which the policy exposure is regressed against observed 
covariates of interest. The review study noted that a weakness of propensity score matching is 
that inferences from the approach can be made only when both policy-unaffected and -affected 
observations have nonzero probabilities of being in either group (Basu, 2017). One study used 
propensity score matching to examine the impact of paid and unpaid supplementary caregiving 
on preventable readmissions among Medicare home health beneficiaries with diabetes. Using 
Medicare claims data and other national datasets, the study used propensity score matching based 
on beneficiaries’ “predisposing, enabling, and health need factors” to create matched cohorts for 
episodes solely assisted by paid supplementary caregivers versus those solely assisted by unpaid 
supplementary caregivers (or the intervention under evaluation). Using the propensity score, the 
study applied Cox regression on the matched cohorts to estimate the 30-day preventable 
readmissions for certain conditions (Chen, 2017). Another recent study used propensity score 
matching to evaluate a change in healthcare payment policy where it examined the association of 
health outcomes and medical spending with a bundled-payment pay-for-performance program 
for breast cancer in Taiwan compared with a fee-for-service (FFS) program. It was a patient level 
analysis that matched patients in the bundled-payment program with control individuals in the 
FFS program (Wang, 2017). While several studies have used propensity score matching to match 
at the patient level, the literature shows that there are studies that use propensity score matching 
at the hospital level, similar to this dissertation. One recent study examined the association of 
hospital enrollment and participation in the American College of Surgeons quality reporting 
program with outcomes and Medicare payments compared with control hospitals that did not 
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participate in the program, using propensity score matching. The control hospitals were 
identified using propensity score matching, as compared to the hospitals enrolled in the quality 
reporting program. The propensity score match was done on certain outcome variables and 
surgical volume with a 1:2 level of matching for the study hospitals versus the control hospitals 
(Osborne, 2015).  
 These are a few examples in the literature that demonstrate the use of propensity score 
matching as a technique to evaluate policy interventions which can be done at the hospital-level. 
The benefits of this technique are that it can reduce bias in observational studies by creating two 
populations that are similar across a number of covariates using a match on a propensity score. 
The literature also supports using the propensity score technique in evaluating the hypotheses of 
this study.  
Chapter 3: Study Methods  
Conceptual Framework 
  The conceptual framework that has influenced the framework for this study was 
developed by Bazzoli et al. to examine hospital financial conditions and quality of care (Bazzoli, 
2008). This model examined the relationship among financial resources on hospital decisions 
and patient health outcomes and also accounted for the contribution of market characteristics and 
hospital characteristics on the patient health outcomes.  That study examined how hospitals’ 
decisions about the quality of their product can also be influenced by other institutional and 
market factors. Hospital characteristics, including ownership status, system affiliation, hospital 
bed size and patient characteristics, can influence the costs of producing a high-quality product. 
All of these characteristics, in turn, also influence future financial performance.   Their study 
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used the following conceptual framework which also serves as the basis of the framework for 
this study:   
Figure 1: Bazzoli Framework and Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework for the Bazzoli study is modified to apply to this investigation 
such that the framework examines how the infusion of additional funding under Section 1109 
impacts a hospital’s performance on readmission rates and mortality rates while taking into 




Other conceptual frameworks were also examined in order to inform the conceptual framework 
used for this study. There are a variety of conceptual frameworks that have been utilized to 
examine the relationship of a hospital’s reimbursement and quality of care. This body of work 
suggests that it may be important to consider the relationship between a hospital’s financ ial 
condition and quality of care, as a hospital’s financial condition can be a competing variable that 
affects how a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement relates to quality of care.  For example, an 
early study by Newhouse found behavior in which non-profit hospitals used the excess of 
payments over costs for those patient groups that were profitable in order to expand the quality 
and/or quantity of services they offered (Newhouse, 1973). 
 There have been some studies that examined the relationship between a hospital’s 
financial condition and quality of care using a variety of conceptual frameworks. To briefly 
summarize the prevailing conceptual frameworks, there is first the Andersen Behavioral 
Framework that was originally designed to predict and explain use of health care services by 
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individuals; this has recently been applied to model clinician response to quality-based payment 
incentives.  The Andersen Behavioral Framework includes hospital characteristics and resources 
that motivate coordination of health services.  
Another dominant conceptual framework is the Donabedian Quality Framework that is 
used to assess quality of care (Donabedian, 1966). The Donabedian Quality Framework 
examines the relationships among three related concepts--structure, process and outcomes. First, 
structures of health care are defined as the physical and organizational aspects of care settings 
(e.g., facilities, equipment, personnel, operational and financial processes supporting medical 
care, etc). Second, the processes of patient care are located in the middle of the diagram because 
they rely on the structures to provide resources and mechanisms for participants to carry out 
patient care activities. In addition, processes are performed in order to improve patient health 
care outcomes in terms of promoting recovery, functional restoration, survival and even patient 
satisfaction.  
Study Questions and Hypotheses 
 This study begins with the general research questions: Do the acute care hospitals that 
have received bonus payments under Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act, which are 
hospitals located in the quartile of counties with the lowest Medicare per beneficiary spending, 
provide equivalent quality of care, in terms of 30-day mortality rates and 30-day readmission 
rates, in comparison to other acute care hospitals? Did the hospitals that received Section 1109 
funding show greater change in quality of care after receiving the funding compared to hospitals 
that did not receive funding? Did hospitals that received more money under Section 1109 show 
more change in their quality of care than Section 1109 hospitals that received less money? 
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 The study seeks to evaluate the implementation of Section 1109 and whether funding was 
distributed to hospitals that provide high quality of care or whether the funding led to change in 
quality of care. The study tests the following null hypotheses: 
H01) Prior to the intervention, the hospitals that are located in areas with the lowest quartile of 
Medicare per beneficiary spending and received bonus payments under Section 1109 are not 
different compared to all other acute care hospitals, in terms of certain quality of care indicators, 
specifically, in terms of 30-day mortality rates and 30-day readmission rates.  
H02) The hospitals that received payments under Section 1109 had an equivalent change in 
quality of care in terms of changes in 30-day mortality rates and 30-day readmission rates, 
compared to hospitals that did not receive bonus payments under Section 1109, when comparing 
quality of care indicators before and after the Section 1109 hospitals received their bonus 
payments.  
Ho3) The hospitals that received a greater amount of Section 1109 funding are not different in 
terms of the level of change in quality of care than hospitals that received less funding under 
Section 1109.  
The study does not provide for alternative hypotheses. Given the inconsistent findings in the 
literature review on how payment relates to quality of care, if we reject the null hypothesis, we 
cannot determine whether the alternative hypothesis would be that the Section 1109 hospitals 
had better or worse quality of care, as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals. Because we 




 This study is a natural experiment and a pre/post observational cohort study design where 
Section 1109 hospitals were given bonus money and the other hospitals were not given money 
over time.  The intervention in this study is the bonus payments received by Section 1109 
hospitals that occurred in July 2011 and April 2012. The pre-period in this study is July 2008 
through June 2011 and the post-period is July 2012 through June 2015.  The Campbell Stanley 
notation of this design is:  Test: X 0 X; Comparison: X X.  Figure 2 shows a timeline for this 
study:  
Figure 2: Timeline of Study 
 
 The design of this study examines the group of hospitals that received the money under 
Section 1109, which were hospitals located in the bottom quartile of counties ranked for 
Medicare Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary. The analysis compares this group of 
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hospitals to a comparison group of all other acute care hospitals that did not receive funding 
under Section 1109. For the purpose of this study, hospitals are defined as acute care hospitals 
paid under the IPPS. Only IPPS hospitals were eligible to receive bonus payments under Section 
1109. Under this definition, hospitals that are not paid under the IPPS, including Critical Access 
hospitals, Long Term Care hospitals, Veteran’s hospitals, Cancer hospitals, children’s hospitals, 
and acute care hospitals in Maryland paid under a State waiver were not considered hospitals 
eligible for inclusion in this study.   
The study compares specific quality indicators among the hospitals that received money 
under Section 1109 to the comparison group of hospitals, before and after the Section 1109 
hospitals received their bonus payments. The baseline, or pre-intervention, quality indicators data 
are based on the readmission and mortality rates data posted on the CMS Hospital Compare 
Website, which is based on three years of claims data, spanning July 2008 to June 2011. This 
includes the time period before the Section 1109 hospitals received their funding. The 
comparison, or post-intervention, quality indicator data are based on 30-day readmissions and 
mortality rates data posted on the CMS Hospital Compare website based on a performance 
period of July 2012 to June 2015, which includes the time period after which the Section 1109 
hospitals received their funding.  
This is a retrospective cohort study in which we analyze existing Medicare claims and 
health outcomes data.  
Description of Data Sources 
 The study uses several data sources.  The list of hospitals that received money under 
Section 1109 is publicly available on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
website. This file identifies the hospitals located in the quartile of counties with the lowest 
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Medicare Part A and B spending per beneficiary, which is the test population for this study. This 
file also provides the Medicare provider number (or Hospital Identifier), and the name and 
county of the hospitals that received money under Section 1109. There are 400 hospitals that are 
in this test population that received money under Section 1109.  
The data source used to determine the hospital characteristics is the FY 2011 Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) Impact File posted on the CMS website. The IPPS Impact 
File is a hospital-level file that contains hospital payment information and hospital characteristics 
used for Medicare hospital inpatient rate setting. The FY 2011 IPPS Impact File was produced in 
August 2010. This file contains Medicare information by hospital, including bed size, county 
location, rural or urban identification, teaching hospital status and Medicare case mix. This file 
merged with the list of qualifying hospitals is used to characterize the hospitals that received 
funding under this provision. The comparison group is non-Section 1109 hospitals. Those are all 
acute care hospitals paid under the IPPS that are not located in the quartile of counties with the 
lowest Medicare per beneficiary spending. There are 3100 hospitals in the comparison group. 
These hospitals and their characteristics are also identified from the FY 2011 IPPS Impact File.  
The Medicare Hospital Cost Report was used to calculate the total hospital margins, a 
covariate in the study. Using the 2012 Medicare Hospital Cost Reports, total hospital margin was 
calculated as follows:   
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒+𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
= 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 
 The Section 1109 hospitals are also categorized based on the relative amounts of bonus 
payments they received under the provision. The weighting factors or the proportion of the 
funding that each hospital received under Section 1109 is posted on the CMS website, so the 
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share of the $400 million that each Section 1109 hospital received as bonus payments can be 
calculated. 
 Hospital quality of care indicators are measured in terms of 30-day mortality rates and 
30-day readmission rates that are posted on the Hospital Compare Website. The Hospital 
Compare Website, managed by CMS, publicly reports the 30-day mortality rates and 30-day 
readmission rates by hospital for heart failure, AMI and pneumonia.  Readmission rates and 
mortality rates for the Section 1109 hospitals are compared to all other acute care hospitals, both 
before and after the Section 1109 hospitals received their bonus payments.  
 In summary, the following data sources are used: 
1. Section 1109 hospitals listed on the CMS website: Identifies test population 
2. FY 2011 IPPS Impact File: Identifies comparison population and hospital characteristics 
for comparison and test populations. 
3. Section 1109 Payment Factors on the CMS website: Identifies the bonus payments that 
the Section 1109 hospitals received. 
4. 30-day readmission rates and mortality rates posted on the Hospital Compare Website. 
5. 2012 Medicare Hospital Cost Report on the CMS website: Data reported on these forms 
were used to calculate each hospital’s total hospital margin. 
Creation and Cleaning the Data Set and Variables 
Considerable effort was taken to pull data from the multiple data sources, scrub the data 
by comparing records across multiple data bases, ensuring no duplicate records to assure 
accuracy for this research. All of the data used in this study is stored as SAS files and all of the 
displayed data are summarized, aggregated data at the hospital level and no patient-level data 
was shared for the purposes of the study. 
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Study Population and Setting: 
Variables 
 The independent variable, or the intervention in this study, is the implementation of 
Section 1109. The hospitals in the study are either categorized as benefitting from Section 1109 
and receiving money from the provision or the hospitals are categorized as not receiving money 
from Section 1109. The hospitals that receive bonus payments under Section 1109, which are 
hospitals that are located in the lowest quartile of counties of Medicare Part A and Part B 
spending per beneficiary are the test group and the hospitals that do not receive money under 
Section 1109 are the comparison group. There are 400 hospitals in the test group and there are 
3100 hospitals in the comparison group.  For those hospitals in the test group, the amount of 
money received is also introduced as an independent variable in some analyses.  In addition, 
during the analysis process, a consideration is made as to whether the size of the comparison 
group, which is currently at 3,100 hospitals, is too large. Thus, certain analyses were conducted 
with the comparison group to exclude hospitals based on certain hospital characteristics in order 
to be more comparable to the test population. As described in greater detail in Chapter 4 
(Results), the comparison group was reduced to include hospitals of a similar bed size to the test 
group, and to include only the hospitals located in the same thirty-eight states as the test group. 
In addition, as discussed further in the analytical approach section, sub-analyses were conducted 
in which the study and comparison groups are matched as another method to control for certain 
hospital characteristics that may influence the outcome variables in this study.  
The dependent variables of the study are the hospital’s 30-day Medicare FFS 
readmissions rates and 30-day Medicare FFS mortality rates. The hospital’s 30-day readmissions 
and mortality rates are based on the data posted on the CMS Hospital Compare website.  The 
readmissions measures are hospital-specific, risk-standardized, 30-day all-cause readmission 
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rates for Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) patients discharged from the hospital with a principal 
diagnosis of pneumonia or AMI or heart failure. To account for the clustering of observations 
within hospitals and differences in the number of admissions across hospitals, CMS uses 
hierarchical logistic regression to estimate risk-adjusted rates. The formula to calculate the 
readmission rate for each condition is as follows: 
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 ′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 ′𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 𝑥 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
The “predicted” number of readmissions (the numerator) is calculated by regressing the risk 
factors identified for each condition, and the hospital-specific intercept on the risk of 
readmission. The estimated regression coefficients are then multiplied by the patient 
characteristics in the hospital. The results are then transformed and summed over all Medicare 
patients attributed to the hospital to get a value. The “expected” number of readmissions (the 
denominator) is obtained by regressing the risk factors identified for each condition and a 
common intercept on the readmission outcome using all hospitals in our sample. The estimated 
regression coefficients are then multiplied by the patient characteristics in the hospital. The 
results are then transformed and summed over all patients in the hospital to get a value. This ratio 
is multiplied by the national rate to calculate the risk standardized readmission rate (Grady et al, 
2013). 
 The model uses administrative claims data from each index hospitalization, and from 
inpatient and outpatient Medicare claims from the 12 months prior to the hospitalization. The 
hospital specific mortality measures are risk adjusted based on patient characteristics such as age, 
gender and comorbidities. CMS first chose to focus their readmission measurement and 
reduction efforts on three conditions: heart failure, pneumonia and AMI, as these represent high 
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volume and high cost cases.  CMS defines certain exclusions for readmissions in their measures 
including if a patient is transferred to another hospital, if the patient dies during the initial 
admission or if the patient left the hospital against medical advice. In addition, certain planned 
readmissions, developed through an algorithm by CMS, are not considered readmissions in these 
measures. For the baseline readmission rates in this study, the measure is based on three years of 
claims data from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2011. For the comparison readmission rates in this 
study, the measure is based on a three year performance period from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 
2015. The measures are based on three years of data in order to ensure that there are a sufficient 
number of cases to have a reliable measure. The minimum number of cases to calculate the 
measures is 25 cases, which can be met using three years of data.  
Similar to the 30-day readmission rate, the 30-day Medicare FFS mortality rate is a risk-
adjusted measure examining hospital rates for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries’ deaths 
within 30 days of discharge.  To account for the clustering of observations within hospitals and 
differences in the number of admissions across hospitals, CMS uses hierarchical logistic 
regression to estimate risk-adjusted rates.  The formula to calculate the mortality measure for 
each condition is as follows: 
Number  of deaths  within 30 days predicted on the basis of the hospital’s performance with its observed case mix  
𝑁umber  of deaths  expected  on the basis of the nation’s performance with that  hospital’s case mix 
 𝑥 national  observed mortality rate    
The “predicted” number of deaths (the numerator) is calculated by regressing the risk 
factors identified specific for each condition and the hospital-specific intercept on the risk of 
mortality. The estimated regression coefficients are then multiplied by the patient characteristics 
in the hospital. The results are then transformed and summed over all patients attributed to the 
hospital to get a value. The “expected” number of deaths (the denominator) is obtained by 
regressing the identified risk factors and a common intercept on the mortality outcome using all 
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hospitals in our sample. The estimated regression coefficients are then multiplied by the patient 
characteristics in the hospital. The results are then transformed and summed over all patients in 
the hospital to get a value. This ratio is multiplied by the national rate to calculate the risk 
standardized mortality rate for each condition (Grady et al, 2013). 
The model uses administrative claims data from each index hospitalization, and from 
inpatient and outpatient Medicare claims from the 12 months prior to the hospitalization. The 
hospital-specific mortality measures are risk adjusted based on patient characteristics such as 
age, gender and comorbidities. CMS first chose to measure mortality rates for three conditions: 
heart failure, pneumonia and AMI. Similar to the readmission measures, the minimum number of 
cases required to calculate a measure is 25 cases. For this study, the baseline mortality measures 
are based on three years of claims data from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2011 and the comparison 
mortality measures are based on three years of claims data from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 
2015.  
In summary, in order to demonstrate whether hospitals showed any change in quality of 
care, in terms of 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates, the analysis evaluates these 
measures prior to receiving the Section 1109 funding and after receiving the funding.  CMS 
reports 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates over three years, so the analysis 
evaluates the 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates from 2008 to 2011 as the 
baseline and the 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates from 2012 to 2015 for the 
post-intervention period.   
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Methods of Data Collection 
 The data sets described in the Study Design section are secondary data sources that are 
maintained by CMS. All of the data sources are publicly available on the CMS website or CMS 
Hospital Compare website.  
 As discussed earlier, the study uses patient data to the extent that it is included in the 
readmissions and mortality measures. Because this is a national data set administered by the 
federal government, measures have been taken to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of the 
health data. We cannot identify who is a participant from the data.  
 Below is a table summarizing the variables to be used in this study, whether or not they 
represent an independent, dependent or control variable, whether the value of the variable is 
continuous or dichotomous, the data source, the unit of measurement, and the time period of the 
data collection. The last column cites previous studies in which similar variables have been used, 
which provides support for the use of these variables in this study. The 30-day risk adjusted 
readmission rates and 30-day risk adjusted mortality rates have been used in previous studies as 
indicators of quality of care for a hospital.  The hospital characteristics that are covariates in this 















Data Source Unit of Variable Time Period Study 
Hospital Type: 
Section 1109 
Hospital vs. Other 
Acute Care Hospital  
Independent Dichotomous CMS provider 
list from FY 
2009; Section 
1109 provider 
list from FY 
2009 
 
Dummy variable indicating 





Section 1109 Money 
Received by Hospital 
Independent Continuous Section 1109 
provider list 
from FY 2009 
Expressed as dollar amount, 
logarithm of dollar amount, 
dollar amount per number 
of inpatient beds, logarithm 
of dollar amount per 
number of inpatient beds 
Payments 
published in FY 
2010, payments 
made on July 
2011 and April 
2012 
 
30 Day Hospital 
Readmission Rates 
for AMI, Heart 
Failure, Pneumonia  
 




Ratio of Predicted 
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multiplied by the national 
rate 






30 Day Hospital 
Mortality Rates for 
AMI, Heart Failure, 
Pneumonia  




Ratio of Predicted 
Mortality versus Expected 












Change in the 30-day 
readmission rates for 
AMI, Heart Failure, 
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The percentage point 
difference in the 
Readmission Rate in the 




Change in the 30-day 
mortality rates for 
AMI, Heart Failure, 
Pneumonia 




The percentage point 
difference in the Mortality 
Rate in the post period and 
the baseline period 
  
Bed size Control Continuous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Number of Hospital 
Inpatient Beds, also 
expressed as the logarithm 
of the number of inpatient 
beds 
FY 2011 Borah, 
2012 






Average of the Medicare 
MS-DRG relative weights 




Control Continuous Medicare 
Hospital Cost 
Reports 
Percentage of Net Income 
out of Net Patient Revenue 




Control Dichotomous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Dummy variable indicating 
yes or no for Sole 
Community Hospital status 
FY 2011  
Medicare Dependent 
Hospital  
Control Dichotomous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Dummy variable indicating 
yes or no for Medicare 
Dependent Hospital Status 







Control Dichotomous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Dummy variable indicating 
for-profit, government or 
non-profit status 
FY 2011  
Rural vs. Urban Control Dichotomous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Dummy variable indicating 
rural or urban 
FY 2011  
State Control Dichotomous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Dummy variable for state 
that hospital is located in 
FY 2011  
Number of Medicare 
FFS Discharges 
Control Continuous IPPS Impact 
Table 
Number of annual 
Medicare FFS discharges, 
also expressed as the 
logarithm of Medicare FFS 
discharges 
FY 2011 Romley, 
2013 
Number of Medicare 





Control Continuous CMS Hospital 
Compare 
website 
Number of condition 
specific  Medicare FFS 
discharges used to calculate 
the baseline readmission 






The data used in this analyses are quantitative data for two time periods (pre-intervention and 
post-intervention) and the variables in this study are continuous and dichotomous. As such, a 
variety of statistical models are used to determine whether any differences exist in the dependent 
variables for hospitals that received funding under Section 1109 and hospitals that did not.  In 
other words, the statistical model is used to determine whether hospitals that are located in 
counties with the lowest Medicare spending are different or not with respect to health outcomes 
in comparison to hospitals located in counties with higher Medicare spending. This study uses 
individual multiple linear regression analyses to determine the relationship between the 
independent variable and the six outcome variables (three mortality measures, three readmissions 
measures. The model controls for the number of Medicare discharges, bed size, Medicare case 
mix, rural versus urban status, total hospital margin, ownership status, Medicare Dependent 
Hospital status and sole community hospital status. These variables are identified as control 
variables in this analysis because, based on the information presented in Table 4 below, these 
characteristics differ between the test hospitals and the comparison hospitals.  This study seeks to 
ensure that these characteristics do not influence the outcomes, rather these effects are removed 
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in assessing the relationship of the independent variables and the outcome dependent variables. 
The dependent variables, the 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates, are highly 
adjusted. The risk adjustments for these variables are age, gender and several comorbidities.  As 
a result, this approach eliminates the need to use these patient specific covariates in the study and 
limits the covariates to hospital level characteristics. If the hospital does not have the minimum 
number of cases to calculate the quality of care indicator, according to the CMS measure 
specifications, then the hospital’s observation is excluded from the analysis.  Because this study 
is comprised of the entire IPPS hospital population and not a sample of hospitals, power 
calculations are not necessary. The data are analyzed using SAS.   
Analysis for Hypothesis 1 
 The first hypothesis of this study is that hospitals that are located in areas with low 
Medicare per beneficiary spending provide quality of care that is equivalent to all other hospitals, 
in terms of mortality rates for AMI, heart failure and pneumonia and readmission rates for AMI, 
heart failure and pneumonia. To test this hypothesis, a t-test analysis is first performed to 
determine if there are statistically significant differences in the quality of care indicators for 
Section 1109 hospitals as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals. Second, a multivariate linear 
regression is performed with covariates including bed size, Medicare case mix, number of 
Medicare FFS discharges, number of Medicare FFS discharges for the quality of care indicator, 
rural versus urban status, sole community hospital status, ownership status treated as a dummy 
variable (for profit versus government owned versus non-profit), total hospital margin. States are 
also treated as dummy variables in the analysis. The quality of care indicators under 
consideration are the dependent variables.  The multivariate linear regression analysis is 
performed to examine if there are any statistically significant differences in each of the quality of 
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care measures for the Section 1109 hospitals compared to the non –Section 1109 hospitals before 
the Section 1109 hospitals received additional funding.  
 An example equation for this model is as follows:  
30-day readmission rate for AMI= b0 + b1(log bed size) + b2(case mix) + b3 (log Medicare 
discharges) +b4 (rural/urban dummy) +b5 (SCH dummy) + b6 (MDH dummy) + by (ownership 
status dummy) +  b8 (State dummy) + b9 (total hospital margin) + b10 (Section 1109 dummy) + 
error 
Analysis for Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis of this study is that hospitals that received payments under Section 
1109 had an equivalent change in quality of care in terms of a change in 30-day mortality rates 
and 30-day readmission rates under Section 1109.  There are four statistical approaches that are 
used to test this hypothesis.  First, a t-test analysis is performed to determine if there are 
statistically significant differences in the change in the quality of care indicators for Section 1109 
hospitals as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals. Second, a multivariate linear regression is 
performed with covariates of bed size, Medicare case mix, number of Medicare FFS discharges, 
number of Medicare FFS discharges for the quality of care indicator, rural versus urban status, 
sole community hospital status, ownership status treated as a dummy variable (for profit versus 
government owned versus non-profit) and total hospital margin. States are also treated as a 
dummy variable. As later described in Chapter 4 on results, because we reject the first null 
hypothesis of the study for some of the dependent variables, the baseline performance on 30-day 
readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates are also included as a control variable. In other 
words, because the Section 1109 hospitals and the non-Section 1109 hospitals do show 
statistically significant differences in performances on 30-day mortality rates and 30-day 
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readmission rates, that may bias the extent to which these quality of care indicators change over 
time for the Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison group of hospitals. The 
dependent variables are the percentage point change in the quality of care measures, comparing 
the quality of care measures before the Section 1109 hospitals received their funding and after 
the Section 1109 hospitals received their funding (or Outcome Variable Time 2- Outcome Variable 
Time 1). Specifically, the dependent variables are the percentage point changes in the 30-day 
readmission rates for AMI, Heart Failure and Pneumonia and the percentage point changes in the 
30-day mortality rates for AMI, Heart Failure and Pneumonia from the baseline period of July 
2008-June 2011 to the comparison period of July 2012-June 2015.  
An example equation for this model is as follows:  
Percentage point change in readmission rate for AMI= = b0 + b1(log bed size) + b2(case mix) + 
b3 (log Medicare discharges) +b4 (rural/urban dummy) +b5 (SCH dummy) + b6 (MDH dummy) + 
by (ownership status dummy) +  b8 (State dummy) + b9 (total hospital Margin) + b10 (baseline 
readmission rate for AMI)+b11 (Section 1109 status dummy) + error 
A weakness with the multivariate linear regression model is that it assumes that changes in 
the outcome are solely attributable to the Section 1109 policy and the covariates in the study 
when there could be other factors occurring during this time period that are influencing the 
outcome. Ideally the comparison hospitals would be the same as the Section 1109 hospitals in 
everything other than the Section 1109 payments. However, in reality, differences, absent the 
Section 1109 policy, do exist between the study population and the comparison group. To 
overcome this potential weakness, the difference-in-differences model is also used to test this 
hypothesis. Using the difference-in-differences analysis, it assumes that absent the 
implementation of Section 1109, the difference in the quality of care between the study 
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population and the comparison group would be the same over time. This technique is commonly 
used in evaluation of the impacts of policy or natural experiments, and similar policy evaluations 
described in the literature review use this technique. The differences between the Section 1109 
hospitals and the comparison hospitals are not important in this model, but rather, the differences 
in the changes over time, as examined in the analysis. Instead of comparing outcomes between 
the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison groups after the intervention, the difference-in-
differences method compares trends between the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison groups. 
The trend for an individual is the difference in the outcome for that individual before and after 
the intervention. In this case, the independent variable is whether or not the hospital received 
Section 1109 funding. The dependent variables are the differences in 30-day readmission rates 
and 30-day mortality rates.  
An example equation for this model is as follows:  
yjt=b0 + b1*(t) + b2*(j) + b3*(t*j)+ b4(log bed size) + b5(case mix) + b6 (log Medicare discharges) 
+b7 (rural/urban dummy) +b8 (SCH dummy) + b9 (MDH dummy) + b20 (ownership status 
dummy) +  b22 (State dummy) + b23 (total hospital Margin) + error 
where Yjt is the outcome variable; j is the Section 1109 hospital status dummy (Section 1109 
hospitals have a dummy variable of 1 in both the baseline and comparison period); t is the 
dummy variable for the year (0 is for the baseline period and 1 is for comparison period).  
A limitation of the difference-in-differences model is that any factor that disproportionately 
affects one of the two groups over the time period of the study and is not taken into account in 
the regression can invalidate or bias the estimate of the impact of the Section 1109 payment on 
changes in quality of care. 
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The fourth method we use to evaluate this hypothesis is propensity score matching, in which 
study hospitals and comparison hospitals are assigned probabilities that the hospital is a Section 
1109 hospital (or propensity score) based on the observed values of its characteristics (the 
covariates). This score is a number between 0 and 1 that summarizes the influence of all of the 
observed characteristics on the likelihood of a hospital being a Section 1109 hospital. The 
equation for the propensity score is: 
ei = Pr(Zi = 1|Xi) or probability that observation is in treatment group given baseline 
covariates 
ei = propensity score 
Zi= observation 
Xi  = covariate 
We use the following three propensity score methods in our analysis: 1) Inverse Probability 
of Treatment Weighting Method, 2) Stratification Method, 3) Matching, which were identified 
through a paper by Austin (Austin, 2011).     
For the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighing Method, we compute weights for each 
observation based on its propensity score and use it in further analysis. The weights create a 
synthetic sample in which the distribution of the baseline covariates is independent of treatment 
assignment. The weight for the Section 1109 hospitals are defined as follows: 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1109 ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1109 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
 
The weights for the comparison hospitals are as follows: 
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1 − 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1109 ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
1 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1109 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
A subject's weight is equal to the inverse of the probability of receiving the treatment that the 
subject actually received.  Once the weights have been assigned to each observation, we use that 
to conduct simple linear regressions. 
Under the Stratification Method, we rank hospitals by their propensity score and then 
group Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals into quintiles based on propensity scores. 
Stratifying based on quintiles is used because it has previously shown that it eliminates 90% of 
bias due to continuous confounding variable (Cochran, 1968). Within each propensity score 
stratum, Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals are expected to have comparable 
propensity scores. We then estimate the mean difference between the dependent variables for the 
Section 1109 hospitals and the comparison hospitals within each strata. We can also average the 
mean differences across the strata to produce an overall mean difference. In order to produce the 
overall mean difference to assess the overall difference between Section 1109 hospitals and non-
Section 1109 hospitals, the stratum-specific estimates of effect are weighted by the proportion of 
hospital observations within that stratum or quintile. 
Lastly under the matching procedure method, for each Section 1109 hospital, we find one 
or more matching comparison hospitals based on their propensity scores. The propensity score 
matching method tries to mimic the randomized assignment to treatment and comparison groups 
by choosing for the comparison group those hospitals that have similar propensities to the 
Section 1109 hospitals.  We use the matched sample to do a t-test analysis to determine the 




1. Specified set of confounding variables that might be related to both the treatment assignment 
and the outcome which are the Medicare case mix, total hospital margin from 2012, bed count, 
number of Medicare discharges, rural status, Medicare dependent hospital status, sole 
community hospital status, for-profit ownership and government hospital ownership. 
2. Use this set variables to fit a regression model and compute propensity scores. The propensity 
score represents the probability of assignment to being a Section 1109 hospital (treatment group). 
We first perform logistic regression analysis using Section 1109 hospitals assigned a value of 1 
and 0 otherwise as dependent variable, and the confounding variables identified in step 1 as 
independent variable. The probability being a hospital selected for the Section 1109 payment is 
calculated from the logistic regression analysis and is the propensity score for that hospital.  
3. Specify the matching statistic or caliper (the distance metric for comparing the similarity of 
subjects) at 0.1 and the method for creating matched sets of observations.  
4. Assess the balance of variables by comparing the distributions between the Section 1109 
hospitals and comparison hospitals. 
5. To improve the balance, repeated the process with a different set of variables for the logistic 
regression model, a different set of matching criteria, or a different matching method. 
6. Use the output of the propensity match to run the t-test regression analyses with the Section 
1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals identified through the propensity match.  
The advantages of a matching approach are that it can reduce confounding and potentially 
increase efficiency. A weakness of the approach is that it assumes that those factors by which the 
study and comparison hospitals are matched upon are the only factors that affect the outcome 
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variable.  Furthermore, the effects of those matching variables on the outcome variables cannot 
be included in the model.  
Analysis for Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis is that hospitals that received a higher proportion of Section 1109 
funding are not different in terms of improvement in quality of care than hospitals that received 
less funding under Section 1109. To test this hypothesis, Pearson and Spearman correlations are 
conducted. In addition, a multivariate linear regression is performed to examine the relationship 
of the independent variable of the amount of money received and the change in the dependent 
variables, including the mortality measured and readmissions measures prior to and after the 
Section 1109 payment with covariates of bed size, number of Medicare FFS discharges, number 
of Medicare FFS discharges for the quality of care indicator, total hospital margin, Medicare case 
mix, rural versus urban status, Medicare Dependent Hospital status, sole community hospital 
status and ownership status (proprietary status, government status). The independent variable is 
the amount of money received by the hospital expressed as the logarithm of the total amount of 
funding the hospital received or as the logarithm of the amount of money received per bed count. 
The dependent variables are the percentage point changes in the quality of care measures, 
comparing time period before the Section 1109 hospitals received their funding to after the 
Section 1109 hospitals received their funding. Specifically, the dependent variables are the 
percentage point changes in the 30-day readmission rates for AMI, Heart Failure and Pneumonia 
and the percentage point changes in the 30-day mortality rates for AMI, Heart Failure and 
Pneumonia from the baseline period of July 2008-June 2011 and the comparison period of July 
2012-June 2015.  An example equation is as follows: 
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Percentage point change in readmission rate for AMI= = b0 + b1(log bed size) + b2(case mix) 
+ b3 (log Medicare discharges) +b4 (rural/urban dummy) +b5 (SCH dummy) + b6 (MDH dummy) 
+ by (ownership status dummy) +  b8 (State dummy) + b9 (total hospital margin) + b10 (baseline 
readmission rate for AMI)+b11 (Section 1109 money) + error 
As part of the analysis using multivariate linear regressions to test the three hypotheses in 
this study, a residual analysis is conducted to determine if a linear regression is the appropriate 
model or if nonlinear regression analyses should be considered.  
Lastly, to overcome the weaknesses in the multiple linear regression model described earlier, 
a difference in differences model is used to assess this hypothesis. The equation for this model is 
as follows: 
The equation for this model is as follows:  
yjt=b0 + b1*(t) + b2*(j) + b3*(t*Section 1109 payment)+ b4(log bed size) + b5(case mix) + b6 (log 
Medicare discharges) +b7 (rural/urban dummy) +b8 (SCH dummy) + b9 (MDH dummy) + b20 
(ownership status dummy) +  b22 (State dummy) + b23 (total hospital margin) + error 
where Yjt is the outcome variable; j is the dummy variable for Section 1109 status; t is the year 
dummy variable where it is 0 in the baseline period and 1 in the comparison period. 
 The distributions of the outcome variables are also examined and are described in 
Chapter 4 (Results), and the distributions of the outcome variables were not significantly 
skewed. If the distributions of the outcome variables were skewed, it would suggest that the data 
were not normally distributed and that may invalidate results from the models used to evaluate 
the data.  Skewed data would suggest that the mean and standard deviation statistics are not 
informative of the spread of the data and would suggest that the multivariate linear regression 
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model may not be a valid model to evaluate the relationships between the independent and 
outcome variables.  If the data have skewed distributions, the logarithms of the outcome 
variables could be examined to determine if they have more normal distributions. If the 
logarithms of the outcome variables have more normal distributions, the models described above 
could be regressed on the logarithms of the outcome variables. However, based on the results of 
the distributions of the outcome variables that showed that the data were not skewed, we used the 
















Table 3: Summary of Analysis Plan 
Hypothesis Model Weaknesses Other Considerations 
Hypothesis 1: Hospitals that 
are located in areas with low 
Medicare per beneficiary 
spending provide care 
equivalent to all other 
hospitals, in terms of mortality 
rates for AMI, heart failure 
and pneumonia and 
readmission rates for AMI, 
heart failure and pneumonia 
A multivariate linear regression, with 
covariates including bed size, number of 
Medicare FFS discharges, number of 
Medicare FFS discharges for the quality 
of care indicator, total hospital margin, 
Medicare case mix, rural versus urban 
status, Medicare Dependent Hospital 
status, sole community hospital status and 
ownership status (proprietary status, 
government status, non-profit status). 
May not be a valid 
model if the outcome 
variables are highly 
skewed. 
Use logarithm of outcome 
variables as the dependent 
variables in evaluation, if data are 
highly skewed. 
Hypothesis 2: Hospitals that 
received payments under 
Section 1109 had an 
equivalent change in quality of 
care in terms of a change in 
30-day mortality rates and 
readmission rates, compared to 
hospitals that did not receive 
bonus payments under Section 
1109.   
A multivariate linear regression, with 
covariates of bed size, number of 
Medicare FFS discharges, number of 
Medicare FFS discharges for the quality 
of care indicator of interest, total hospital 
margin, Medicare case mix, rural versus 
urban status, baseline performance on the 
readmission rate or mortality rate of 
interest, Medicare Dependent Hospital 
status, sole community hospital status and 
ownership status (proprietary status, 
government status, non-profit status). 
Dependent variables are the percent 
change in the quality of care measures, 
comparing the quality of care measures 
before the Section 1109 hospitals 
received their funding and after the 
Section 1109 hospitals received their 
funding 
Assumes that changes in 
the outcome are solely 
attributable to the 
Section 1109 policy 
when there could be 
other factors occurring 
during this time period 
that are influencing the 
outcome. 
Would not be a valid 
model if the outcome 
variables are highly 
skewed. 
Difference-in-di fference model 
where the independent variable is 
the Section 1109 status and the 
dependent variables are the 
changes in 30-day readmission 
rates and 30-day mortality rates 
before and after the qualifying 
hospitals received the Section 
1109 funding. Having the 
outcome variables reflect the 
change in the readmission rates or 
mortality rates, removes biases 
between the treatment and 
comparison group due to 
permanent differences in the two 
hospital categories or due to time.    
 
Propensity score analysis with 
Section 1109 hospitals and 
comparison hospitals are matched 
on the covariates. This assumes 
that those factors by which the 
cases and controls are matched 
upon are the only factors that 
affect the outcome variable 
Hypothesis 3: Hospitals that 
received a higher proportion of 
Section 1109 funding are not 
different in terms of 
improvement in quality of care 
than hospitals that received 
less funding under Section 
1109 
Multivariate linear regression is 
performed to examine the relationship of 
the independent variable of the amount of 
money received per bed size and the 
change in the dependent variables, 
including the mortality measures and 
readmissions measures prior to the 
Section 1109 payment with covariates of 
bed size, number of Medicare FFS 
discharges, number of Medicare FFS 
discharges for the quality of care 
indicator of interest, baseline 
performance on the readmission rate or 
mortality rate of interest, total hospital 
margin, Medicare case mix, rural versus 
urban status, Medicare Dependent 
Hospital status, sole community hospital 
status and ownership status (proprietary 
status, government status, non-profit 
status). 
Would not be a valid 
model if the outcome 
variables are highly 
skewed. 
Use logarithms of outcome 
variables as the dependent 
variable in evaluation, if data are 
highly skewed. 
 
Difference-in-di fference model 
where the independent variable is 
the amount of Section 1109 
funding that hospitals received 
and the dependent variables are 
the differences in 30-day 
readmission rates and 30-day 
mortality rates before and after 
the qualifying hospitals received 
the Section 1109 funding. Having 
the outcome variables reflect the 
change in the readmission rates or 
mortality rates, removes biases 
between the treatment and 
comparison group due to 
permanent differences in the two 





Human Subject Issues 
In August 2015 the Institutional Review Board Office at Johns Hopkins University determined 
upon review of the submitted IRB Office Determination Request Form for the dissertation titled 
Evaluation of Section 1109, that the research is not human subjects research. 
Chapter 4: Results 
Results of Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
An exploratory data analysis was conducted comparing the test and comparison 
populations. Below are summary statistics on the Section 1109 hospitals and the other acute care 
hospitals in the comparison group. 
 Table 4 shows that the hospitals that benefitted from Section 1109 tended to be more 
rural than all other IPPS hospitals. The average bed size for Section 1109 hospitals was smaller 
compared to IPPS hospitals. Section 1109 hospitals were comparable to IPPS hospitals in terms 
of their teaching status and whether they received a Medicare Disproportionate Share hospital 
add-on payment. Section 1109 hospitals were more likely to be Sole Community Hospitals, 
which is a Medicare hospital categorization for hospitals that are located in rural areas that are a 









Table 4: Hospital Characteristics from FY 2011 IPPS Impact File  
Hospital Characteristic Section 1109 Hospitals  Comparison IPPS 
Hospitals  
Number of Observations 400 3100 
Rural 49% 24% 
Urban 51% 76% 
Average Bed Size 137 beds  ( min 4, max 
716, std dev 124) 
193 beds  (min 1, max 
1928, std dev 184.81 ) 
Teaching Hospital 28% 30% 
Receives Medicare DSH Payments 83% 79% 
Sole Community Hospital 30% 9% 
Medicare Dependent Hospital 7% 5% 
Rural Referral Center 6% 8% 
Indian Health Service Hospital 1% 1% 






Average Medicare FFS Cases for One Year 2202 (min 1, max 12609, 
std dev 2203) 
3107 ( min 1, max 37713, 
std dev 3178) 
Average Medicare FFS Cases for AMI over Three 
Year Period (2008-2011) 
131 (min 1, max 1384, std 
dev 176.4) 
161 (min 1,max std dev 
1652,211) 
Average Medicare FFS Cases for Heart Failure Over 
Three Year Period (2008-2011) 
253 (min 1,max 1853, std 
dev 241.3) 
379 (min 1, max 3667, std 
dev 359.1) 
Average Medicare FFS Cases for Pneumonia Over 
Three Year Period (2008-2011) 
245 (min 1, max 1256, std 
dev 179.1) 
297 (min 1, max 2233, std 
dev 233.2) 
Average Medicare Case Mix  1.4424 (min 0.563, max 
2.3488, std dev 0.303) 
1.46 (min 0.634, max 3.71, 
std dev 0.330) 
Average Wage Index  0.94869 (min 0.7071, max 
1.4448, std dev 0.125) 
0.98056 (min 0.3963, max 
1.9343, std dev 0.2032) 
Average DSH Patient Percentage  25% (min 1.1%, max 
82.6%, std dev 12.12%) 
29% (min 0, max 119%, std 
dev 18.31%) 
Hospital Total Margin 2012 5.46% (min -58%, max 
47%, std dev 10.8%) 
3.13% (min -1184%, max 





Table 4 shows that in terms of Medicare payment characteristics, Section 1109 hospitals 
are, on average, comparable to other IPPS hospitals. Section 1109 hospitals have similar 
Medicare case mix as other IPPS hospitals, which shows that both groups of hospitals treat 
similar types of Medicare patients with comparable acuities of illness. The average wage index, 
which is the geographic adjustment applied to an IPPS and OPPS hospital payment that reflects 
the wages of the area of the hospital, differs for the two categories of hospitals.  The DSH patient 
percentage is a measure of the hospital’s low income patient population defined as the proportion 
of the hospital’s Medicare patients who have Supplementary Security Income and the hospital’s 
proportion of patients eligible for Medicaid.  Section 1109 hospitals and other IPPS hospitals 
have comparable low income patient populations. Total hospital margins are higher for Section 
1109 hospitals than the comparison group. Lastly, Section 1109 hospitals tend to have non-profit 
ownership status while the comparison hospitals were a mix of non-profit and for-profit 
ownership. 
As shown in Table 4, the non- Section 1109 hospitals are different from the Section 1109 
hospitals in that they are larger with respect to bed size and volume, and they are more urban. 
There is a potential that these factors can contribute to how hospitals perform on the quality of 
care indicators and it may not be appropriate for the comparison group to include these large 
hospitals. As a result, we modified our data set to remove hospitals with beds greater than 717 
because the largest Section 1109 hospital has 717 beds. That exclusion results in 400 Section 
1109 hospitals continuing to remain and 3029 non-Section 1109 comparison hospitals remaining 
in the data set. We then applied an exclusion to both remove hospitals with beds greater than 717 
and hospitals located in the states that do not have Section 1109 hospitals.  That exclusion results 
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in 400 Section 1109 hospitals continuing to remain and 2362 non-Section 1109 comparison 
hospitals remaining. The following tables show the summary statistics for the trimmed data sets.  
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Hospitals with < 717 Beds, and Hospitals <717 in States 
with Section 1109 Hospitals  
Hospital Characteristic For Hospitals with < 717 Beds For Hospitals with <717 Beds Located in States 
with Section 1109 Hospitals 
Section 1109 Hospitals- 
avg (min, max, std dev) 
Comparison IPPS 
Hospitals- avg (min, 
max, std dev) 
Section 1109 Hospitals- 
avg (min, max, std dev) 
Comparison IPPS 
Hospitals- avg (min, 
max, std dev) 
Number of Observations 400 3029 400 2362 
Rural 49% 25% 49% 27% 
Urban 51% 75% 51% 73% 
Average Bed Size 137 beds  ( min 4, max 
716, std dev 124) 
175 beds  (min 1, max 
709, std dev 143 ) 
137 beds  ( min 4, max 
716, std dev 124) 
170 beds (min 1, max 
709, std dev142) 
Average Number of 
Annual Medicare FFS 
Discharges 
2202 (1, 12609, 2203) 2863 (1, 16520,,2623) 2202 (1, 12609, 2203) 2732 (1, 16520, 2568)  
Teaching Hospital 28% 29% 28% 29% 
Receives Medicare DSH 
Payments 
83% 79% 83% 80% 
Sole Community Hospital 30% 11% 30% 12% 
Medicare Dependent 
Hospital 
7% 6% 7% 6% 
Rural Referral Center 6% 5% 6% 6% 
Indian Health Service 
Hospital 
1% 1% 1% 1% 
Ownership Status 70% % Non-Profit 
15% For-Profit 
15% Public 
55% % Non-Profit 
28% For-Profit 
16% Public 






Average Medicare Case 
Mix  
1.4424 (0.563, 2.3488, 
0.303) 
1.45 (0.634, 3.71, 0.327) 1.4424 (0.563, 2.3488, 
0.303) 
1.456 (0.634, 3.71, 
0.334) 
Average Wage Index  0.94869 (0.7071, 1.4448, 
0.125) 
0.98024 (0.3963, 1.9343, 
0.2045) 
0.94869 (0.7071, 1.4448, 
0.125) 
0.9873 (0.707, 1.75, 
0.1928) 




29% (0, 119%, 18.38) 25% (1.1%, 
82.6%,12.12) 
29% (0%,119%,19) 
Hospital Total Margin 
2012 
5.46% (-58%, 47%, 
10.8%) 
3.1% (-1184%, 70.8%, 
26.3) 
5.46% (-58%, 47%, 
10.8%) 







Table 5 shows that the exclusions of hospitals with bed size greater than 717 beds makes 
the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals more comparable in terms of the hospital 
characteristics. The additional exclusion of hospitals located in States without Section 1109 
hospitals also makes the study population and comparison population more comparable in terms 
of hospital characteristics.  Based on this analysis, the hypotheses in this study will be evaluated 
using a data set that excludes hospitals with a bed size greater than 717 beds and excludes 
hospitals in States without section 1109 hospitals. 
Table 6 shows the average performance (as well as the standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum) for 30-day readmissions and mortality rates for heart failure, AMI and pneumonia for 
Section 1109 hospitals and the comparison hospitals, based on a performance period from July 1, 
2008 to June 30, 2011, before Section 1109 hospitals received funding under Section 1109. It 
also shows the average performance (as well as the standard deviation, minimum and maximum) 
for 30-day readmission rates and 30- day mortality rates for heart failure, AMI and pneumonia 
for Section 1109 hospitals and the all other IPPS hospitals, based on a performance period from 
July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2015, which covers the period after the Section 1109 hospitals received 
money under that provision. On average, Section 1109 hospitals have lower readmission rates on 
the three conditions compared to the comparison hospitals.  The readmission rates declined both 
for the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals over time. The Section 1109 hospitals 
have higher mortality rates than comparison hospitals, both for the baseline period and post-
intervention period, and the mortality rates decline both for the Section 1109 hospitals and 





Table 6: Descriptive Statistics on the Dependent Variables  in the Study 
  Overall Section 1109 Hospitals Comparison Hospitals 






















































































































































































































































































































The third hypothesis of this study focuses only on the Section 1109 hospitals, so Table 7 below 
shows summary statistics related to payment for only those hospitals. The table shows that the 
Section 1109 payment varied widely, so we also examine this variable as the logarithm of 
Section 1109 payments. We also consider standardizing the payments by calculating the Section 
1109 payment per bed and calculation the logarithm of Section 1109 payment per bed.   
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Section 1109 hospitals  




Median Minimum Maximum 
Section 1109 Payment 
Amount 
400 997,290 1,143,328 530,405 1358 6,667,429 
Section 1109 Payment 
Per Bed  
400 3,990 1,860 3,954 15.91 13,219 
Log of Section 1109 
Payment  
400 13.15 1.31 13.18 7.21 15.71 
Log of Section 1109 
Payment Per Bed  
400 0.198 0.25 0.13 0.02 2.37 
 
The next table provides correlations of Section 1109 payments and covariates in the model. It 
shows that the payments are generally positively correlated with Medicare case mix, bed size, 
and discharges. Section 1109 payments are negatively correlated with rural status, for-profit 








Table 8: Pearson Correlations for Section 1109 payments and hospital covariates  










Payment per Bed 
Medicare Case Mix 0.5254* 0.5498* 0.5571* -0.1359* 
Total Margin 
-0.0397 -0.0607 -0.0977 0.0909 
Logarithm of  Beds 
0.7771* 0.3701* 0.8522* -0.7797* 
Logarithm of 
Medicare Discharges 0.7327* 0.6530* 0.9675* -0.6499* 
Rural -0.4102* -0.2409* -0.3513* 0.1987* 
Medicare Dependent 
Hospital -0.1466* -0.0610 -0.0871 0.0189 
Sole Community 
Hospital -0.1363* -0.0213 -0.0516 -0.0389 
For Profit Ownership -0.1968* -0.1316* -0.2914* 0.3025* 
Government 
Ownership -0.0169 -0.1582* -0.1334* 0.0011 
*indicates statistically significant with p-value <0.05 
 
The figures below show the distribution of the Section 1109 payments by hospital, the logarithm 
of Section 1109 payments by hospital and the logarithm of Section 1109 payments per bed by 
hospital. The distribution of the Section 1109 payments by hospital show that payments are 
skewed to higher values, which can bias the regression analyses. As a result, based on the 
distributions, we chose to use the logarithm of Section 1109 payments and logarithm of Section 






Figure 3: Distribution of Section 1109 Payments  
 
























Log of Section 1109 Payment by Hospital
83 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of the logarithm of Section 1109 Payments  per bed 
 
 
We also show the distributions of the dependent variables through histograms in the 
charts below. The purpose of the distributions is to identify if the variables are skewed which 
would inform whether the multivariate linear regression model is the appropriate model to use. 
The charts below show that the distributions are slightly skewed to the left or evenly distributed, 
which suggests that the multivariate linear regression model is the appropriate model to use, as 











Log Section 1109 Payments per Bed by Hospital
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Figure 6: Distributions of the Quality of Care Indicators or Dependent Variables in Study 
Distribution of Medicare FFS 30-Day AMI Readmission Rates Prior to Section 1109 
Payments (2008-2011) 
 
Distribution of Medicare FFS 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rates Prior to Section 





Distribution of Medicare FFS 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rates from Prior to Section 
1109 Payments (2008-2011) 
 
 






Distribution of Medicare FFS 30 Day Pneumonia Mortality Rates Prior to Section 1109 
Payments (2008-2011) 
 





We also assess whether the dependent variables are correlated with each other for Section 1109 
hospitals and the comparison hospitals as displayed below.  
Table 9: Correlations of Quality of Care Indicators for Section 1109 hospitals versus Non-Section 1109 
hospitals (beds <717, in states with Section 1109 hospitals) 





















































































-0.043 -0.050* 0.045* 0.308* 0.388* 1 



















































1 0.412* 0.345* 0.059* -0.129* 0.010 



















0.345* 0.461* 1 0.002 -0.145* 0.048* 








0.059* 0.044 0.002 1 0.282* 0.333* 



















0.010 0.009 0.048* 0.333* 0.387* 1 
*indicates statistically significant with p-value <0.05.  
The readmission rates are generally correlated with each other for both Section 1109 hospitals 
and comparison hospitals, both during the baseline and post-performance period. The mortality 
rates are generally correlated with each other as well for both Section 1109 hospitals and 
comparison hospitals, both during the baseline and post-performance period.  
 The Appendix B, C and D provide additional descriptive analyses, including Pearson 
Correlations for the independent variables, covariates and dependent variables and scatterplots of 
the baseline performance for the quality indicators versus the post-intervention performance for 




Results for Hypothesis 1 
As stated earlier, the first null hypothesis of this study is that hospitals that are located in 
areas with low Medicare per beneficiary spending provide quality of care equivalent to all other 
hospitals, in terms of mortality rates for AMI, heart failure and pneumonia and readmission rates 
for AMI, heart failure and pneumonia. To test this hypothesis, we use two methods. First, we 
conduct an independent t-test. Second, we conduct a multivariate linear regression with 
covariates including bed size, Medicare case mix, number of Medicare FFS discharges for the 
hospital, the number of Medicare FFS discharges for the specific condition related to the 
dependent variable (ie. AMI, heart failure or pneumonia), total hospital margin, dummy variable 
for ownership status (government hospital versus for-profit versus not-for-profit), dummy 
variable for state that hospital is located in, rural versus urban status, Medicare dependent 
hospital status and sole community hospital status. If the hospital does not have the minimum 
number of cases to calculate the quality of care indicator, according to the CMS measure 
specifications, then the hospital’s observation is excluded from the analysis.  
T-Test Analysis 
In this section, we present the results of various statistical tests. We focus our analysis for 
three groups of hospitals. Our first group consists of all acute care hospitals in the U.S. Our 
second group consists of hospitals with less than 717 beds as the maximum number of beds for 
both acute care hospitals that did and did not receive a bonus payment under Section 1109.  Our 
third group includes only hospitals with less than 717 beds from states that had Section 1109 
hospitals.  As noted earlier, the reason for excluding beds greater than 717 was that no Section 
1109 hospitals had beds greater than 717 and we wanted to ensure that the hospitals with 
extremely large bed sizes did not influence the results.  
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We begin with analyses to determine whether there are differences in quality of care 
indicators among hospitals that did not receive and that received bonus payments under Section 
1109. For this purpose, we did 2-independent sample t-tests. This test is based on the 
assumptions that the samples are independent and the population distributions follow the normal 
distribution. However, as two independent samples t-tests are robust for large samples, the 
normality requirement is not as important for our analysis. According to one study, t-tests should 
be used for large sample studies even with heavily skewed data (Fagerland, 2012). We choose 
the results of t-tests based on outcomes of the Leveine’s test regarding whether variances are 
equal.  We use the Cochran approximation when variances are not equal. The quality of care 
indicators include 30-day mortality rates and 30-day readmission rates for heart failure, 
pneumonia, and AMI.    
 In Table 10A, we present two-independent samples t-tests for all hospitals.  For all 
quality of care indicators, the p-values are less than 0.05, which means that the differences in the 
means for the quality indicators between hospitals that received Section 1109 payments and the 
hospitals that did not receive payments are statistically significant at this level. The Section 1109 
hospitals have statistically significant higher (or worse) mortality rates for heart-failure (mean 
difference=0.8791), pneumonia (mean difference= 0.464) and AMI (mean difference=0.237) 
than non-Section 1109 hospitals. The Section 1109 hospitals have statistically significant lower 
(or better) readmission rates for heart failure (mean difference=-1.30), pneumonia (mean 
difference =-0.794) and AMI (mean difference=-0.951) than non-Section 1109 hospitals.  
In Table 10B, we repeated the independent t-test analysis for hospitals with beds less than 
717. The results are similar to those for all hospitals in Table 10A.  For all quality of care 
indicators, the p-value is less than 0.05. The 30-day mortality indicators for pneumonia (mean 
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difference=0.447), heart failure (mean difference= 0.855) and AMI (mean difference= 0.206) are 
higher (or worse) for hospitals that did not receive Section 1109 payments as compared to 
hospitals that received payments. The 30 day readmission rates are lower (or better) for hospitals 
that did receive Section 1109 payment compared to hospitals that did not receive the Section 
1109 payment. Again, the quality of care indicators are mixed between hospitals that received 
and did not receive Section 1109 payments. 
In Table 10C, we examined the quality of care indicators of hospitals with beds less than 
717 limited to states where there were hospitals that received the Section 1109 payments. The 
results are somewhat consistent with the two previous analyses. Our analysis indicates that 
hospitals that received Section 1109 payments have statistically significant higher 30-day heart 
failure (mean difference=0.824, p-value= 0) and pneumonia mortality rates (mean 
difference=0.443, p-value=0) than hospitals that did not receive payments. However, while the 
30 day mortality rate for AMI is higher for Section 1109 hospitals than non-Section 1109 
hospitals, the difference is not statistically significant (mean difference=0.1821, p-value=0.055). 
The 30-day readmission rates for heart failure, pneumonia, and AMI were lower (or better in 
terms of quality of care) among hospitals that received payments in comparison to those that did 
not receive payments.  
In summary, the independent t-test analyses show that the Section 1109 hospitals have 
statistically significant higher mean 30-day mortality rates for pneumonia and heart failure than 
non-Section 1109 hospitals, before they received the bonus payment, and that the Section 1109 
hospitals have lower means for 30 day readmission rates for heart failure, pneumonia and AMI 
than non-Section 1109 hospitals. Furthermore, the mean differences do not vary significantly 
when we trim the data set to exclude hospitals with more than 717 beds and eliminate hospitals 
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in States where there are no Section 1109 hospitals, which supports making those exclusions to 
the data set in order to make the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals more 
comparable.  
Table 10A Independent t-tests for differences in quality (all hospitals) 
Quality of Care Measure  Section 1109 
Hospital 









Heart Failure Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 359 12.338 1.482 0.879 0.000 Equal 
N 2722 11.459 1.566     
 
Pneumonia Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 364 12.414 1.674 0.464 0.000 Not equal 
N 2748 11.950 1.855     
 
AMI Mortality Rate Baseline* Y 288 15.642 1.403 0.237 0.0113 Equal 
N 2253 15.405 1.505     
 
Heart Failure Readmission Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 364 23.474 1.761 -1.309 0.000 Not Equal 
N 2702 24.783 1.924 
   
Pneumonia Readmission Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 369       17.846       1.317 -0.795 0.000 Not equal 
N 2710 18.641 1.512 
   
AMI Readmission Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 247 18.366 1.767 -0.951 0.000 Equal 
N 1978 19.317 1.641 
   
*Indicates that the results are statistically significant  
Table 10B Independent t-tests for differences in quality (hospitals with beds <717) 
Quality of Care Measure Section 1109 
Hospital 










Heart Failure Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 359 12.338 1.483 0.855 0.000 
Equal 
N 251 11.483 1.566 
     
Pneumonia Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 364 12.414 1.674 0.447 0.000 
Not Equal 
N 2677 11.967 1.857      
AMI Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 288 15.642 1.403 0.206 0.027 
Equal 
N 2182 15.436 1.495 
     
Heart Failure Readmission 
Rate Baseline* 
Y 364 23.474 1.761 -1.296 0.000 
Not Equal 
N 2633 24.770 1.915 
   
Pneumonia Readmission 
Rate Baseline* 
Y 369 17.846 1.318 -0.780 0.000 
Not Equal 
N 2761 18.626 1.496 
   
AMI Readmission Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 247 18.3662 1.7673 -0.931 0.000 
Equal 
N 1909 19.2971 1.6292 
   





Table 10C Independent t-tests for differences in quality (hospitals with beds <717 from states that 
received payments) 











Heart Failure Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 359 12.338 1.483 0.8241 .000 Equal 
N 2058 11.514 1.582      
Pneumonia Mortality Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 364 12.414 1.674 0.443 .000 Not Equal 
N 2080 11.971 1.852      
AMI Mortality Rate Baseline Y 288 15.642 1.403 0.182 .055 Equal 
N 1663 15.460 1.498      
Heart Failure Readmission 
Rate Baseline* 
Y 364 23.474 1.761 -1.21 .000 Not Equal 
N 2107 24.684 1.917 
  
 
Pneumonia Readmission Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 369 17.846 1.318 -0.724 .000  Not Equal 
N 2114 18.57 1.469 
  
 
AMI Readmission Rate 
Baseline* 
Y 247 18.366 1.767 -0.857 .000 Equal 
N 1492 19.222 1.625 
  
 
*Indicates that the results are statistically significant  
 
Multivariate Linear Regression Analysis 
The bivariate analyses described above and displayed in Tables 10A-10C consider the 
impact of one variable at a time. However, there are other hospital characteristics that can impact 
the quality of care indicators in this study. So we performed different multivariate regression 
analyses using the generalized linear model to account for the possible impact of those hospital 
characteristics on the quality of care indicators. The generalized linear model covers a wide 
range of linear models where a dependent variable may be linearly related to independent 
variables through a variety of link functions. We examined the distributions of the dependent 
variables, as shown earlier in Figure 3.  The dependent variables can have several non-normal 
distributions. We modeled quality indicators as a gamma distribution.  The Gamma distribution 
is appropriate when a variable consists of positive values and is skewed towards larger values. 
For the analysis, we used the following covariates in the analysis: Medicare hospital case mix, 
total hospital margin, Medicare Dependent Hospital status, Sole Community Hospital Status, 
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ownership status, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for rural hospitals, logarithm of hospital 
beds, logarithm of Medicare discharges and dummy variables for each state. We used a dummy 
variable representing 1 for hospitals that received payments and 0 otherwise as the independent 
variable.  
The output parameters for both multivariate linear regression analyses are shown in 
Tables 11A-11G. The dummy variable for states was not found to be statistically significant for 
any of the quality of care indicators, so it is not reflected in the tables. 
The analyses show that there is a statistically significant difference (p <0.05) in mortality 
rates for AMI and heart failure between Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals. 
Generally, the mortality rates are higher (or worse) for Section 1109 hospitals compared to 
comparison hospitals. According to Table 11A, the AMI mortality rates are 0.263 percentage 
points higher (or worse) for the Section 1109 hospitals than for the comparison hospitals. The 
heart failure mortality rate for Section 1109 hospitals is 0.725 percentage points higher (or 
worse) than for comparison hospitals (see Table 11B). These results are consistent with the 
results from the t-test analysis.  
 Tables 11D-F show the multivariate linear regression results for the 30-day readmission 
rates. The analyses show that there are statistically significant differences (p <0.05) for all the 
readmission rate indicators for the Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the comparison 
hospitals. According to Table 10D, the 30-day readmission rate for AMI is 0.547 percentage 
points lower (or better) for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals.  
The 30-day readmission rate for pneumonia is 0.599 percentage points lower (or better) for 
Section 1109 hospitals as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals and the 30-day readmission 
rate for heart failure is 0.923 percentage points lower for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to 
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the comparison hospitals. These results are also consistent with the results from the t-test 
analysis.  
Not all of the covariates in the model are statistically significant. For all of the 
readmission measures, the case mix index and for-profit status contribute to the readmission 
rates. A higher case mix index contributes to lower baseline readmissions rates for heart failure 
(coefficient=-2.65), pneumonia (coefficient=1.49) and AMI (coefficient=-1.39). For profit 
ownership status contributes to higher baseline readmission rates for heart failure (coefficient=-
0.688), pneumonia (coefficient=0.458) and AMI (coefficient=0.235). The number of discharges 
for the heart failure and AMI mortality rate indicators were also statistically significant for those 
models where the higher the number of discharges, there was slightly lower mortality rates. Total 
hospital margin and rural status were not found to be statistically significant in their contribution 
to any of the dependent variables in the model.  
 Based on these analyses, we can reject the null hypothesis that the hospitals that are 
located in areas with the lowest quartile of Medicare per beneficiary spending and received 
bonus payments under Section 1109 have quality of care equivalent to comparison hospitals, 
specifically, in terms of 30-day mortality rates and, 30-day readmission rates (with the exception 
of the pneumonia mortality rate). More specifically, the hospitals that are located in areas with 
the lowest quartile of Medicare per beneficiary spending and received bonus payments under 
Section 1109 had worse performance on mortality rates and better performance on readmission 
rates. The F-statistic assesses the overall fit of the regression model, including all the covariates. 
The F-statistic for all the regression analyses are statistically significant (p < 0.05), which 




Table 11A Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as a dependent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 15.849 12.730 <.0001 
Baseline AMI Discharges -0.002 -5.670 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.845 -3.870 0.000 
Total Margin -0.002 -1.790 0.073 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.395 3.330 0.001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.116 -0.900 0.367 
Rural 0.262 2.120 0.035 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.002 -0.010 0.991 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.088 -0.630 0.527 
For Profit Ownership 0.238 2.320 0.021 
Government Ownership 0.249 2.220 0.026 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.263 2.130 0.033 











Table 11B Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as a dependent variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 13.291 9.590 <.0001 
Baseline Heart Failure Discharges -0.001 -2.460 0.014 
Medicare Case Mix -0.304 -1.290 0.198 
Total Margin 0.002 1.410 0.159 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.226 -1.760 0.079 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.165 1.080 0.281 
Rural 0.119 0.880 0.376 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.056 -0.260 0.794 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.009 -0.060 0.954 
For Profit Ownership -0.175 -1.570 0.117 
Government Ownership -0.048 -0.390 0.694 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.725 5.420 <.0001 














Table 11C Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as a dependent variable  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 14.821 9.750 <.0001 
Baseline pneumonia discharges 0.000 1.120 0.261 
Medicare Case Mix -0.581 -2.010 0.045 
Total Margin -0.002 -1.180 0.239 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.493 3.320 0.001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.643 -3.730 0.000 
Rural 0.216 1.390 0.164 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.147 -0.590 0.556 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.027 0.150 0.879 
For Profit Ownership 0.286 2.220 0.027 
Government Ownership 0.296 2.100 0.036 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.289 1.870 0.062 











Table 11D Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent variable  
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 18.140 13.680 <.0001 
Baseline  AMI discharges  -0.001 -3.780 0.000 
Medicare Case Mix -1.386 -5.720 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.002 -1.410 0.158 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.364 2.850 0.004 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.100 0.760 0.446 
Rural -0.189 -1.430 0.154 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.164 0.770 0.443 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.166 -1.110 0.266 
For Profit Ownership 0.235 2.130 0.034 
Government Ownership 0.170 1.410 0.158 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.547 -4.130 <.0001 














Table 11E Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rate as the dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 15.835 13.420 <.0001 
Baseline pneumonia discharges -0.001 -2.490 0.013 
Medicare Case Mix -1.485 -6.680 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.002 -1.350 0.178 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.122 1.060 0.291 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.512 3.830 0.000 
Rural -0.071 -0.590 0.554 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.115 -0.600 0.551 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.152 -1.120 0.262 
For Profit Ownership 0.458 4.560 <.0001 
Government Ownership 0.259 2.370 0.018 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.599 -4.990 <.0001 











Table 11F Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as the dependent 
variable  
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 24.473 15.050 <.0001 
Baseline heart failure discharges 0.000 -1.410 0.160 
Medicare Case Mix -2.643 -9.630 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.001 -0.800 0.425 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.340 2.270 0.023 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.211 1.190 0.235 
Rural 0.176 1.120 0.261 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.350 -1.390 0.165 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.496 -2.810 0.005 
For Profit Ownership 0.688 5.280 <.0001 
Government Ownership 0.299 2.100 0.036 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.923 -5.900 <.0001 













Results for Hypothesis 2 
The second null hypothesis of this study is that hospitals that received payments under 
Section 1109 had an equivalent change in quality of care in terms of a change in 30-day 
mortality rates and 30-day readmission rates, compared to hospitals that did not receive bonus 
payments under Section 1109.   We compare changes in quality of care indicators before and 
after the Section 1109 payments. We calculate the differences by subtracting the rates of the 
quality of care indicators in the baseline period of July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2011 from the 
comparison period of July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2015. If the hospital does not have the 
minimum number of cases to calculate the quality of care indicator, according to the CMS 
measure specifications, then the hospital’s observation is excluded from the analysis. 
T-Test Analysis 
We conducted the independent t-test analyses for hospitals with fewer than 717 beds and 
in states with hospitals that received Section 1109 money, and the results are presented in Table 
12.  A negative value for the mean value indicates that the readmission rate or mortality rate 
decreased, which means that quality of care improved. A positive value for the mean value 
indicates that the readmission rate or mortality rate increased or worsened over time.  
The t-tests indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in the changes in 
the quality of care indicators for Section 1109 hospitals compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals 
other than changes in the 30-day readmission rates for heart failure and AMI. For the 30-day 
readmission rates for heart failure and AMI, the rates declined more for non-Section 1109 
hospitals than for Section 1109 hospitals, which means that the readmission rates improved more 
for non-Section 1109 hospitals than for Section 1109 hospitals. The mean difference for the 
change in the AMI readmission rate is 0.315 (p-value=0.0108), which indicates that the non-
Section 1109 hospitals on average had a greater reduction or greater improvement in their AMI 
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readmission rate by 0.315 percentage points, as compared to the non-Section 1109 hospitals. 
Similarly, the mean difference for the change in the heart failure readmission rate is 0.446 (p-
value=0),  which indicates that the non-Section 1109 hospitals on average had a greater reduction 
or greater improvement in their heart failure readmission rate of 0.446 percentage points, as 
compared to the non-Section 1109 hospitals. For these two quality indicators, we would reject 
the null hypothesis that hospitals that received payments under Section 1109 had an equivalent 
change in quality of care as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals. For the other quality of 
care indicators, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
Table 12: Two-independent samples t-tests for changes in quality of care indicators before 
and after payment to Section 1109 hospitals (comparison hospitals with beds <717 and 
hospitals in states with Section 1109 hospitals) 
















about the equality 
of variances 
Change in the 30 day 
AMI Readmission 
Rate* 
Y 218 -2.289 1.724 0.315 0.0108 Equal 
N 1323 -2.604 1.678      
Change in 30 day 
Heart Failure 
Readmission Rate* 
Y 344 -2.283 1.815 0.446 0.000 Not equal 
N 1909 -2.729 1.988      
Change in 30 day 
Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
Y 350 -1.230 1.534 0.098 0.298 Equal 
N 1963 -1.329 1.642      
Change in 30 Day 
Heart Failure 
Mortality Rate 
Y 343 0.445 1.739 -0.0539 0.585 Equal 
N 1894 0.499 0.924      
Change in 30 day 
Pneumonia Mortality 
Rate 
Y 349 4.443 2.202 0.0504 0.693 Equal 
N 1951 4.393 2.197      
Change in 30 Day 
AMI Mortality Rate Y 254 -1.351 1.570 0.0202 0.8525 Equal 
N 1474 -1.371 1.602      




Multivariate Linear Regression Analysis 
The bivariate analysis above considers the impact of one variable at a time. As we did in 
the first hypothesis, we performed a multivariate linear regression analyses using the generalized 
linear model. The generalized linear model covers a wide range of linear models where a 
dependent variable may be linearly related to independent variables through a variety of link 
functions. The dependent variable can have several non-normal distributions. We model quality 
indicators as a gamma distribution.  The Gamma distribution is appropriate when a variable 
consists of positive values and is skewed towards larger values. According to the omnibus test, 
the model outperforms the intercept only model. For the multivariate regression analysis, we 
used the following covariates in the analysis: baseline performance on quality of care indicator of 
interest, baseline number of Medicare FFS discharges for the quality of care indicator of interest, 
Medicare case mix, total margin, Medicare dependent hospital status, sole community hospital 
status, ownership status, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for rural hospitals and 0 
otherwise, logarithm of hospital beds, logarithm of Medicare discharges and dummy variables 
for each state. We used a dummy variable representing 1 for hospitals that received payments 
and 0 otherwise as the independent variable. The results of these regression analyses are shown 
in Tables 13A-F below. The dummy variables for each state are not statistically significant, so 
they are not displayed in the tables.   
The multivariate linear regression models show that the Section 1109 hospitals had 
statistically significant differences in the change in the performance of the quality of care 
indicators for certain conditions compared to the comparison hospitals. The coefficient in the 
regression represents the amount of the change in the quality of care indicator that the covariate 
contributes relative to the comparison group. In other words, a negative coefficient indicates that 
the quality of care indicator either improved more or worsened less, and a positive coefficient 
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indicates that the quality of care indicator worsened more or improved less than the comparison 
group. The F-statistic assesses the overall fit of the regression model, including all the covariates. 
The F-statistics for all the regression analyses are statistically significant (p < 0.05), which 
indicates that the model has a reasonable fit and supports the finding to reject the null hypothesis. 
The change in the AMI readmission rate for Section 1109 hospitals is 0.256 percentage points 
lower (p-value = 0.005) as compared to the comparison hospitals. The change in the heart failure 
readmission rate for Section 1109 hospitals is 0.461 percentage points lower (p-value=0.001) as 
compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals.  Similarly, the change in the pneumonia readmission 
rate for Section 1109 hospitals was 0.404 percentage points lower (p-value =0.002) as compared 
to non-Section 1109 hospitals. These results would indicate that the readmission rates improved 
more or worsened less for the Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison group.  
However, the change in the heart failure mortality rates was 0.401 percentage points higher (p-
value=0.002) as compared to the comparison group, which indicates that these rates worsened or 
improved less for Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison group. For all the other 
quality of care indicators (change in mortality rates for pneumonia and AMI), the coefficient for 
the Section 1109 hospital status was not statistically significant. This indicates that we failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that hospitals that received payments under Section 1109 had an 
equivalent change in quality of care in terms of a change in 30-day mortality rates for AMI and 
pneumonia, compared to hospitals that did not receive bonus payments. We reject the null 
hypothesis that hospitals that received payments under Section 1109 had an equivalent change in 
quality of care in terms of a change in readmission rates for AMI, heart failure and pneumonia 
and mortality rates for heart failure.  
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Some of the covariates in the models are statistically significant. The baseline 
readmission rate and mortality rate covariates are statistically significant for all of the dependent 
variables. The coefficients for the baseline rates for readmissions and mortality are all negative, 
which indicates that the higher the rate results in improvement in the rate over time. The overall 
hospital Medicare case mix and for-profit ownership status are also statistically significant in the 
models where the change in the readmission rates are dependent variables. The hospital’s 
Medicare case mix contributes to an improvement in the readmission rates over time (AMI 
coefficient=-0.392, heart failure coefficient=-1.01, pneumonia coefficient=-0.997).  For-profit 
ownership status contributes to worsening readmission rates or less improvement over time 
(AMI coefficient= 0.195, heart failure coefficient=0.365, pneumonia coefficient=0.363).  
Medicare Dependent Hospital status and sole community hospital status did not influence the 
change in any of the quality of care indicators.  
The F-statistic assesses the overall fit of the regression model, including all the 
covariates. The F-statistic for all the regression analyses are statistically significant (p < 0.05), 
which indicates that the model has a reasonable fit.  
The statistically significant results of this analysis are consistent with the t-test results in 
both the regression analyses and t-test analysis was statistically significant for AMI and heart 
failure readmission rates. However, the results are directionally inconsistent in that the t-test 
results showed that the AMI and heart failure readmission rates for comparison hospitals 
improved more than for Section 1109 hospitals, but when the model is adjusted for hospital 
covariates, the results show that readmission rates improved more or worsened less for the 




Table 13A Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 11.441 11.940 <.0001 
Baseline Readmission Rate for AMI -0.849 -51.660 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for AMI -0.001 -4.710 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.392 -2.290 0.022 
Total Margin -0.001 -0.830 0.404 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.198 2.210 0.027 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.183 1.910 0.056 
Rural -0.010 -0.100 0.919 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.129 0.770 0.443 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.086 0.820 0.415 
For Profit Ownership 0.195 2.550 0.011 
Government Ownership 0.103 1.250 0.213 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.256 -2.790 0.005 










Table 13B Multiple Linear Regression Model with 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 15.804 10.160 <.0001 
Baseline Heart Failure Readmission 
Rate 
-0.711 -32.490 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for Heart Failure 0.000 -0.960 0.336 
Medicare Case Mix -1.010 -3.900 0.000 
Total Margin 0.000 -0.020 0.982 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.266 1.950 0.052 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.098 -0.580 0.564 
Rural -0.289 -2.030 0.043 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.360 1.400 0.163 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.279 1.730 0.084 
For Profit Ownership 0.365 3.090 0.002 
Government Ownership 0.271 2.130 0.034 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.461 -3.270 0.001 












Table 13C Multiple Linear Regression Model with the change in the 30-Day Pneumonia Readmissions Rate as a 
dependent variable  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 9.613 7.450 <.0001 
Baseline Pneumonia Readmission 
Rate 
-0.681 -26.800 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for Pneumonia -0.001 -3.460 0.001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.997 -4.080 <.0001 
Total Margin 0.000 -0.170 0.866 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.254 2.060 0.039 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.243 1.640 0.100 
Rural -0.012 -0.090 0.926 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.216 0.930 0.352 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.050 0.340 0.733 
For Profit Ownership 0.363 3.400 0.001 
Government Ownership 0.009 0.080 0.936 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.404 -3.180 0.002 










Table 13D Multiple Linear Regression Model with the Change in the 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as a 
dependent variable  
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 9.778 7.320 <.0001 
Baseline Heart Failure Mortality 
Rate 
-0.658 -28.770 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for Heart Failure 0.000 -0.550 0.581 
Medicare Case Mix 0.290 1.270 0.205 
Total Margin 0.000 0.330 0.743 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.052 -0.430 0.671 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.044 -0.280 0.776 
Rural 0.129 1.010 0.314 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.192 0.830 0.407 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.166 1.150 0.251 
For Profit Ownership -0.067 -0.640 0.525 
Government Ownership 0.037 0.320 0.746 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.401 3.170 0.002 












Table 13E Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as the dependent 
variable  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 14.013 7.740 <.0001 
Baseline Pneumonia Mortality Rate -0.514 -17.960 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia 0.000 0.490 0.626 
Medicare Case Mix -0.183 -0.530 0.600 
Total Margin 0.001 0.590 0.552 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.298 -1.680 0.094 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.004 -0.020 0.986 
Rural 0.309 1.670 0.095 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.558 -1.670 0.094 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.144 -0.690 0.492 
For Profit Ownership -0.087 -0.570 0.571 
Government Ownership 0.076 0.460 0.646 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.134 0.740 0.459 










Table 13F Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as the dependent 
variable  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 9.876 8.540 <.0001 
Baseline AMI Mortality Rate -0.758 -35.390 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for AMI -0.001 -2.660 0.008 
Medicare Case Mix -0.187 -0.940 0.346 
Total Margin 0.001 0.960 0.336 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.264 2.460 0.014 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.116 -0.960 0.336 
Rural -0.114 -1.020 0.309 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.557 2.770 0.006 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.075 0.590 0.554 
For Profit Ownership 0.084 0.910 0.362 
Government Ownership 0.025 0.260 0.799 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.168 1.530 0.126 













The difference-in-differences model was also used to test this hypothesis. In this case, the 
independent variable is whether or not the hospital received Section 1109 funding. The 
dependent variables are the change in 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates before 
and after the qualifying hospitals received the Section 1109 funding. However, this model also 
takes into account the effect of time and assumes that there are no significant changes between 
the Section 1109 hospitals and the comparison hospitals relative to each other prior to the 
Section 1109 payments. A dummy variable is created to identify Section 1109 hospitals and non-
Section 1109 hospitals. A dummy variable for the time period (year) is also created to take into 
account the time period of before versus after the Section 1109 payments were made. The 
interaction term of the year and Section 1109 status is the difference-in-differences estimator, 
and its coefficient reflects the magnitude of the association between the Section 1109 hospitals 
and the quality of care indicators.   
The difference-in-differences model is run for each quality of care indicator in this study. 
The model uses the following covariates: Medicare Case Mix, total hospital margin, Logarithm 
of Bed Count, Logarithm of Medicare Discharges, Rural, Medicare Dependent Hospital Status, 
Sole Community Hospital Status, ownership status (For Profit Status and Government Status in 
comparison to not-for-profit status) and rural (expressed as a dummy variable). The difference-
in-differences variable is the variable of interest in the analysis and if statistically significant, 
demonstrates that the change in the quality of care indicator for the Section 1109 hospitals is 
different from the change in the quality of care indicators for the comparison hospitals. The 
results of this analysis are shown in Tables 14A-F below. 
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The results show that there is a statistically significant difference in the change in quality 
of care indicators among Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison group for the 
readmission rates for AMI and heart failure. For the AMI readmission rate, the difference-in-
difference coefficient shows that the change in the readmission rate for Section 1109 hospitals 
was 0.304 percentage points higher as compared to the comparison hospitals (p-value= 0.019). 
For the change in the heart failure readmission rate, the difference-in-difference coefficient 
shows that the change in the readmission rate for the Section 1109 hospitals was higher by 0.470 
percentage points as compared to the comparison hospitals (p-value=0.0). For the other quality 
of care indicators of interest, the difference-in-difference coefficients were not statistically 
significant with p-values greater than 0.05.  
Some of the covariates in the models are statistically significant. The hospital Medicare 
case mix index, the log of the bed count, the log of Medicare discharges and ownership status 
(for-profit and government) contributed to the change in the AMI and heart failure readmission 
rates.  Higher hospital Medicare case mix contributes to improvements in the heart failure and 
AMI readmission rates over time, where the coefficient for the AMI readmission is -0.93 and the 
coefficient for the heart failure readmission rate is 1.996. The log of Medicare discharges, for-
profit ownership status and government ownership status reduce the change in the readmission 
rates for AMI and heart failure. The coefficient for the log of Medicare discharges for AMI 
readmission is 0.155 and for heart failure readmission rate is 0.150. The coefficient for for-profit 
ownership for AMI readmission rate is 0.224 and for heart failure readmission rate is 0.481 and 
the coefficient for government ownership for AMI readmission rate is 0.145 and for heart failure 
readmission rate is 0.248.  
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These findings indicate that we failed to reject the null hypothesis that hospitals that 
received payments under Section 1109 had an equivalent change in quality of care in terms of a 
change in mortality rates for AMI, pneumonia and heart failure and the change in readmission 


















Table 14A Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as the dependent variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 15.542 25.740 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.002 -9.160 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.522 -4.080 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.001 -1.210 0.228 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.379 5.420 <.0001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.111 -1.520 0.129 
Rural 0.167 2.250 0.025 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.133 1.140 0.256 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.019 -0.230 0.815 
For Profit Ownership 0.153 2.430 0.015 
Government Ownership 0.151 2.220 0.026 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.276 2.940 0.003 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.007 0.050 0.956 
Year -1.382 -29.680 <.0001 










Table 14B Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as the dependent 
variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 12.027 26.380 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.001 -5.180 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.023 -0.190 0.849 
Total Margin 0.001 1.510 0.132 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.137 -2.060 0.039 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.172 2.530 0.012 
Rural 0.151 2.140 0.033 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.116 1.130 0.258 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.127 1.630 0.103 
For Profit Ownership -0.190 -3.060 0.002 
Government Ownership -0.045 -0.700 0.483 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.569 6.070 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference -0.045 -0.370 0.709 
Year 0.498 10.600 <.0001 












Table 14C Difference in Difference Model with the Change in the 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as the 
dependent variable  
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 12.851 22.420 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia 0.000 0.400 0.689 
Medicare Case Mix -0.428 -2.500 0.013 
Total Margin -0.001 -1.130 0.259 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.229 2.600 0.009 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.190 -2.180 0.030 
Rural 0.377 4.030 <.0001 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.135 -1.000 0.319 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.024 -0.230 0.821 
For Profit Ownership 0.147 1.770 0.077 
Government Ownership 0.220 2.570 0.010 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.400 3.200 0.001 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.042 0.270 0.790 
Year 4.402 66.580 <.0001 



























Table 14D Difference-in-Difference Model with the Change in the 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable  
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 17.478 23.710 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.001 -6.690 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.930 -6.910 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.001 -1.840 0.065 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.286 3.890 0.000 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.155 2.010 0.044 
Rural -0.123 -1.520 0.130 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.155 1.120 0.262 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.055 -0.590 0.552 
For Profit Ownership 0.224 3.340 0.001 
Government Ownership 0.145 1.980 0.048 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.587 -5.730 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.304 2.360 0.019 
Year -2.614 -53.150 <.0001 



























Table 14E Difference-in-Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 16.660 41.730 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for pneumonia 0.000 -3.450 0.001 
Medicare Case Mix -1.284 -10.600 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.001 -1.140 0.256 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.205 3.420 0.001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.257 4.280 <.0001 
Rural -0.087 -1.340 0.179 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.001 -0.010 0.991 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.043 -0.600 0.551 
For Profit Ownership 0.353 6.120 <.0001 
Government Ownership 0.160 2.700 0.007 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.546 -6.290 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.084 0.760 0.449 
Year -1.283 -27.850 <.0001 



























Table 14F Difference-in-Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 24.938 46.850 <.0001 
Baseline discharges for heart failure 0.000 -2.260 0.024 
Medicare Case Mix -1.996 -14.460 <.0001 
Total Margin 0.000 -0.240 0.813 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.242 3.340 0.001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.150 2.010 0.045 
Rural 0.075 0.960 0.338 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.002 -0.020 0.986 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.213 -2.460 0.014 
For Profit Ownership 0.481 6.970 <.0001 
Government Ownership 0.248 3.460 0.001 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.989 -9.480 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.470 3.520 0.000 
Year -2.762 -52.670 <.0001 











Propensity Score Matching Analyses 
 The study also utilizes propensity score matching to evaluate this hypothesis. The goal of 
propensity score matching is to reduce bias or the effects of confounding in observational studies 
by creating two populations that are similar across a number of covariates using a match on a 
propensity score. The propensity score represents the probability of assignment to treatment 
conditional on a set of observed baseline covariates. In other words, the covariates including log 
of beds, rural status, log number of discharges, sole community hospital status, Medicare 
dependent hospital status, case mix, total hospital margin and ownership (for-profit and 
government vs. not-for-profit) are the independent variables to determine the probability that a 
hospital is a recipient of Section 1109 payments. When the propensity match is performed, the 
balance between the two samples is evaluated. Balance checking serves multiple purposes- it 
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may be used to compare matches from multiple iterations of the propensity score model or from 
different matching algorithms, and it provides information for any trade-offs between the 
closeness of the match and final sample size. When using propensity scores, the imbalances in 
the final matched sample should be kept in mind and possibly adjusted for when analyzing study 
outcomes. The literature shows that typically one or more controls are matched to each case on 
the propensity score as closely as possible while maintaining an adequate sample size.  
There are several methods to use propensity scores in the analysis of observational data. We use 
the following three methods in our analysis: 
1) Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighing Method: In this method, we compute weights for 
each hospital based on its propensity score and use it in further analysis. 
2) Stratification Method: In this approach, we rank hospitals by their propensity scores and 
group hospitals into several groups based on propensity scores. We then estimate the 
treatment effect for each strata and combine the results of the individual strata to get the final 
treatment effect. 
3) Matching: In the matching procedure, for each Section 1109 hospital, we find one or more 
matching comparison hospitals based on their propensity scores. We use the matched sample 
to do subsequent analyses to determine the treatment effect. The matching analysis used is 
the greedy matching SAS macro developed by Hamill (Hamill, 2015). We use a caliper or 
the difference between propensity scores of the Section 1109 hospitals (treatment) and 
matched comparison observations to be less than 0.1. 
 
We use the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting Method to test for differences in the 
outcome variables based on the SAS macros given in Lanehart et al. (Lanehart, 2012). Under this 
methodology, observations are weighted by the inverse probability of receiving the treatment 
116 
 
that they actually received. Section 1109 hospitals (or the treatment group) receive a weight 
equal to 1/propensity score and comparison hospitals receive a weight equal to 1/ (1-propensity 
score) (Harder et al., 2010). The weights are then used in a weighted least squares regression 
model along with other predictor covariates.  The regression results are presented in Table 15 
below. 
 
The results of Table 15 show that the change in the AMI readmission rate for Section 1109 
hospitals is lower by 0.495 percentage points (p-value < 0.05), as compared to the comparison 
group, identified through the propensity score. Furthermore, it shows that the change in the heart 
failure readmission rate for Section 1109 hospitals is lower by 0.4175 percentage points (p-value 
< 0.05), as compared to the comparison group, identified through the propensity score. Lastly, 
the change in the pneumonia readmission rate is 0.2696 lower for the Section 1109 hospitals as 
compared to the comparison hospitals. The change in the heart failure mortality rate is 0.4272 
higher for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to comparison hospitals. Furthermore, the change 
in the pneumonia mortality rate is 0.2202 higher (or worse) for Section 1109 hospitals as 
compared to the comparison hospitals.  In this case, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in the change in the readmission rates for AMI, heart failure and pneumonia and in the 
mortality rates for heart failure and pneumonia. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference in the change in the AMI mortality rate for Section 1109 hospitals compared to the 
comparison hospitals. We note that a disadvantage with this approach is that extreme propensity 
scores can result in very large weights that can bias the treatment effect estimates (Austin, 2011; 
Shadish & Steiner, 2010). 
The second analysis utilizes the stratification method. The Section 1109 hospitals and 
non-Section 1109 hospitals are ranked by propensity score and grouped into quintiles. This 
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essentially creates matched groups among Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals for 
each quintile. Quintiles are chosen because they have been used in many propensity score studies 
and have been shown to remove 90% of the bias due to measured confounders (Thoemmes & 
Kim, 2010). After t-tests are conducted for each stratum, the weighted mean for the Section 1109 
hospitals and the matched comparison hospitals are calculated. And then the t-test was conducted 
on the combined weighted values. Results based on t-tests using stratification are given below in 
Table 16 and show that the mean difference in the change in the AMI readmission rate, heart 
failure readmission rate, pneumonia readmission rate and heart failure mortality rates are 
statistically significant (p-value <0.05) for the Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the 
matched comparison group. Specifically the mean difference in the change in the AMI 
readmission rate is 0.3338 percentage points lower for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the 
non-Section 1109 hospitals.  The mean difference in the change in the heart failure readmission 
rate is 0.2508 percentage points lower for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the non-Section 
1109 hospitals.  The mean difference in the change in the pneumonia readmission rate is 0.2137 
for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to comparison hospitals. The mean difference in the 
change in the mortality rate is 0.3742 for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the comparison 
hospitals. For the other quality of care indicators, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference in the change in the quality of care for Section 1109 hospitals and non-Section 
1109 hospitals after Section 1109 payments were made.  
The last propensity score analysis utilizes matching Section 1109 hospitals with 
comparison hospitals with beds fewer than 717 located in states with Section 1109 hospitals. 
Table 17 shows the means and standard deviations of the hospital covariates for the 400 Section 
1109 hospitals and 2362 non-Section 1109 hospitals prior to matching. There are statistically 
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significant differences (p-value < 0.05) between the Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the 
non-Section 1109 hospitals on the following characteristics: bed count, number of Medicare FFS 
discharges, rural status, sole community hospital status and for-profit ownership. Specifically, 
Section 1109 hospitals had an average of 137 beds as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals 
with an average of 170 beds and Section 1109 hospitals had an average of 2200 Medicare FFS 
discharges as compared to 2362 discharges for non-Section 1109 hospitals. Section 1109 
hospitals had a greater frequency of rural hospitals (49% versus 27%) and sole community 
hospitals (30% versus 12%) and had a lower frequency of having for-profit status (16% versus 
26%) as compared to non-Section 1109 hospitals. These differences before matching indicate 
that these covariates could bias the results of this study and that matching on these covariates 
could mitigate this concern. 
 
Table 18 shows the means and standard deviations for the covariates for Section 1109 
hospitals and the matched comparison hospitals. The table shows that the differences in the 
means between the Section 1109 hospitals and the matched comparison hospitals are not 
statistically significant (p-value > 0.05). This indicates that the Section 1109 hospitals and 
matched comparison hospitals are not significantly different on these characteristics, and this is 
an appropriate matched dataset to evaluate the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the 
change in quality of care indicators between the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals 
after the Section 1109 payments were made.  
 
We also considered matching Section 1109 hospitals with comparison hospitals located 
in the same state, if inter-state differences contributed to differences in the quality of care 
indicators. Table 19 shows the differences in the comparison hospitals and Section 1109 
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hospitals when matched on the covariates described above as well as matched on state. The table 
shows that after the match, there are still statistically significant differences between the 
comparison group and Section 1109 hospitals. These differences indicate that the match on state 
does not remove other differences that can impact the dependent variables in the study. 
Furthermore, it was challenging to find a match between Section 1109 hospitals and comparison 
hospitals based on propensity scores within 0.1 of each other. As the table shows, out of the 400 
Section 1109 hospitals, we are only able to match on 281 hospitals. As a result, we use the match 
shown in Table 18 that does not limit the match on state.  
Table 20 shows the results of the t-test for the matched data set where the independent 
variable is Section 1109 hospital status and the dependent variables are the changes in the quality 
of care indicator after the Section 1109 payment was made as compared to before the Section 
1109 payment.  However, only the mean difference (0.3242) in the change in the heart failure 
readmission rate is statistically significant. This indicates that we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
and that there is no difference in the change in the quality of care for the Section 1109 hospitals 
compared to matched non-Section 1109 hospitals.  
 
 The first two propensity score analyses (the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting 
method and the stratification method) provide some consistent results. The inverse probability 
weighting method and the stratification method had statistically significant results for the change 
in the AMI, pneumonia and heart failure readmission rate and for the heart failure mortality rate. 
In other words, both methods showed that there were statistically significant changes in those 
quality of care indicators for the Section 1109 hospitals as compared to the comparison hospitals. 
The third propensity score matching analysis only showed that the difference in the change in the 
heart failure readmission rate is statistically significant for Section 1109 hospitals as compared to 
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the matched comparison hospitals, and a similar result was found using the inverse probability 
weighting method and the stratification method.  
There are several limitations to the propensity score matching technique. First, the 
matching was conducted on a 1:1 basis with one Section 1109 hospital matched to one non-
Section 1109 hospital. While there are 400 Section 1109 hospitals, there are 2362 non-Section 
1109 hospitals that could have been matched with the Section 1109 hospital, which indicates that 
we could have had multiple comparison groups and variations on the match that could have 
resulted in a different outcome. Second, the caliper was set to 0.1 which means that a comparison 
hospital would need to have a propensity score within 0.1 of the propensity score of the Section 
1109 hospital to match. However, if the caliper had been set to a different level, it would have 
resulted in a different comparison group. These methodological changes could have resulted in a 
different matched data set and provided different results.  Third, matching methods can use only 
observed characteristics to construct the comparison group, since unobserved characteristics 
cannot be taken into account. Thus, we assume that there are no unobserved differences in the 
Section 1109 hospitals and comparison groups that are also associated with the outcomes of 
interest. Lastly, a limitation of this technique is that a proper matched group should be matched 
on baseline characteristics, to ensure that those characteristics are not impacted by the policy 
intervention, and matched on characteristics that we believe could impact the dependent 
variables.  While the study mitigates some of these limitations, it is possible that we could have 





Table 15: Results of linear regression using weighted propensity score 
Quality variable Intercept Treatment=1/Control=0 t-value F value R-squared 
Change in the AMI 
Readmission Rate 
-2.525 -0.495 -5.50* 30.24* 0.0195 
Change in the Heart Failure 
Readmission Rate  
-2.620 -0.418 -4.99* 24.91* 0.0111 
Change in the Pneumonia 
Readmission Rate 
-1.277        -0.269      -3.98*       15.82*     0.0069 
Change in Heart Failure 
Mortality Rate 
0.425       0.427       6.03*       36.32* 0.0162 
Change in Pneumonia 
Mortality Rate 
4.369      0.220 2.41* 6.82* 0.0026 
Change in AMI Mortality 
Rate 
-1.394         0.141 1.85 3.41 0.002 
*indicates results are statistically significant 
 
Table 16:  T-test analysis comparing Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals 
identified by stratification of propensity scores 
 
Quality of Care Indicator Mean Difference of the Treatment and 
Comparison 
t-value 
Change in the AMI Readmission Rate -0.334 -2.98* 
Change in the Heart Failure Readmission 
Rate  
-0.251 -2.30* 
Change in the Pneumonia Readmission Rate -0.214 -2.26* 
Change in Heart Failure Mortality Rate  0.374    3.61* 
Change in Pneumonia Mortality Rate 0.222 1.62 
Change in AMI Mortality Rate 0.167  1.47 
*indicates results are statistically significant 
 
Table 17:  Means and Standard Deviations for Section 1109 hospitals and Comparison 
Hospitals before Matching 





Number Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Medicare Case Mix Index 400 1.442 0.303 2362 1.455 0.334 
Total Margin 388 6.306 11.289 2187 3.988 28.294 
Beds* 400 137.16 124.121 2362 170.23 142.200 
Number of Medicare 
Discharges* 
400 2202.82 2203.33 2362 2732.60 2568.484 
Rural* 400 0.49 0.50 2362 0.27 0.440 
Medicare Dependent Hospital 400 0.07 0.255 2362 0.06 0.239 
Sole Community Hospital * 400 0.30 0.460 2362 0.12 0.330 
For Profit Ownership* 400 0.16 0.362 2348 0.26 0.441 
Government Ownership 400 0.15 0.355 2348 0.17 0.379 
Propensity Score 400 0.204 0.119 2187 0.140 0.086 







Table 18:  Means and Standard Deviations for Section 1109 hospitals and Comparison 
hospitals (hospitals <717 beds in states with Section 1109 hospitals) before and after 
Matching 
 









Difference in Means Prior to 
Matching (Section 1109 
hospital-comparison) 
 









400 1.442 0.303 1.454 0.348 -0.012 -0.014 
Total 
Margin 















2580.21 -352.18* -529.78* 


















400 0.148 0.355 0.163 0.369 -0.015 -0.020 



















Table 19:  Means and Standard Deviations for Section 1109 hospitals and Comparison 
hospitals (hospitals <717 beds in states with Section 1109 hospitals) before and after 
Matching, where hospitals are matched if located within the same state  





















Mix Index 281 1.4002 0.2768 1.4475 0.3012 
-0.0473* -0.0135 
Total Margin 
276 5.2794 10.2176 5.9632 10.0948 -0.9011 2.3186 
Beds 
281 135.3701 119.8873 157.6406 133.6192 -22.27* -33.07* 
Number of 
Medicare FFS 
Discharges 281 2306.5100 2313.86 2634.68 2338.87 
-328.2 -529.78* 
Rural 
281 0.4769 0.5004 0.3950 0.4897 0.0819* -0.22* 
Medicare 
Dependent 
Hospital 281 0.0890 0.2852 0.0819 0.2746 
0.0071 0.01 
Sole Community 
Hospital  281 0.2562 0.4373 0.2135 0.4105 
0.0427 0.18* 
For Profit Hospital 
281 0.1495 0.3572 0.1673 0.3739 -0.0178 -0.1* 
Government 
Owned Hospital 281 0.1744 0.3801 0.1068 0.3094 
0,0676* -0.02 
*Differences in means statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
Table 20: Means and Standard Deviation of (Treatment-Control) for the Matched Section 
1109 hospitals and non-Section 1109 Hospitals using propensity scores 
 
Quality Indicator Number of Observations Mean Treatment-Control t-value 
Change in the AMI Readmission Rate 129 0.141  0.65 
Change in the Heart Failure Readmission 
Rate  
293 0.324 2.02* 
Change in the Pneumonia Readmission 
Rate 
302 0.062 0.46 
Change in Heart Failure Mortality Rate 289 -1.965 -1.42 
Change in Pneumonia Mortality Rate 299 -0.1367 -0.81 
Change in AMI Mortality Rate 165 0.281 1.65 
*Differences in means statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
Additional Analyses 
We also tested this second hypothesis on a subset of hospitals. We were interested to see 
if Section 1109 hospitals with certain hospital characteristics had an equivalent change compared 
to other hospitals with the same characteristics. Specifically, we tested within the sole 
community hospitals whether Section 1109 sole community hospitals had equivalent change in 
quality of care compared to other sole community hospitals.  Sole community hospital status is a 
unique Medicare payment designation for hospitals that have less than 50 beds, are located 25-35 
124 
 
miles from other hospitals and are the primary service area for Medicare beneficiaries. However, 
the results for our t-test, multivariate regression analysis and difference-in-differences analyses 
limited to sole community hospitals led us to fail to reject the null hypothesis.   
Results for Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis focuses only on the hospitals that received the funding. The null 
hypothesis is that hospitals that received a higher proportion of Section 1109 funding are not 
different in terms of improvement of quality of care than hospitals that received less funding 
under Section 1109.  To test this hypothesis, first, two different correlation analyses were 
performed. First, a Pearson correlation analysis was performed comparing the payment amounts 
and payments per bed to the quality of care indicators and the results are in Table 21A. The 
correlations measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the independent 
variables and dependent variables. The correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1, with -1 
indicating a perfect negative correlation, +1 indicating a perfect positive correlation, and 0 
indicating no correlation at all.  The correlation coefficient suggests the extent to which you can 
predict the value of one variable given a value of the other variable. The Pearson correlation 
assumes normal distribution. The Pearson correlation may not be the appropriate assessment if 
the data deviates from normality and if there are outliers in the data. To address this limitation, a 
Spearman correlation was also performed, as it overcomes these distribution and outlier 
assumptions and is not affected by deviations in normality, and it examines the monotonic 
relationship between the independent variables and dependent variables. As shown in Table 21B, 
the Spearman correlation is a moderately better indicator for our data. 
As described earlier, the bivariate analysis, like the Pearson and Spearman correlations, is 
not reliable because it does not take into effect the impact of other variables on the dependent 
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variable. To overcome this issue, multivariate linear regression analyses are performed to 
examine the relationship of the independent variable of the amount of Section 1109 money 
received and the change in the dependent variables, including the mortality measures and 
readmissions measures with covariates of logarithm of bed size, logarithm of the number of 
Medicare FFS discharges, baseline performance of the quality of care indicator of interest, 
number of Medicare FFS discharges for the quality of care indicator, total hospital margin, 
Medicare case mix, rural versus urban status, Medicare Dependent Hospital status, sole 
community hospital status, for profit status and government status. The independent variable of 
the amount of money received by the hospital is expressed either as the logarithm of the total 
amount of funding the hospital received or as the amount of money received per bed. The 
dependent variables are the change in the quality of care measures, comparing the time period 
before the Section 1109 hospitals received their funding to after the Section 1109 hospitals 
received their funding.  
 Lastly, a difference-in-differences model is used with covariates of logarithm of bed 
size, logarithm of the number of Medicare FFS discharges, baseline performance of the quality 
of care indicator of interest, number of Medicare FFS discharges for the quality of care indicator, 
hospital margin, Medicare case mix, rural versus urban status, Medicare Dependent Hospital 
status, sole community hospital status, for profit status and government status. If the hospital 
does not have the minimum number of cases to calculate the quality of care indicator, according 
to the CMS measure specifications, then the hospital’s observation is excluded from the analysis.  
Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
The Pearson correlations show that the amount of the Section 1109 payment is positively 
correlated with the change in the AMI readmission rate. The correlation coefficient is 0.139 with 
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a p-value of 0.040, which signifies that it is statistically significant. However, a positive 
correlation indicates that the higher the payment, the greater the positive change in the 
readmission rate which indicates a worse quality of care.  For all other quality of care indicators, 
there is no association in the amount of payment the Section 1109 hospitals received and the 
change in the quality of care. 
The Spearman correlations show that the Section 1109 payment amount per bed is 
positively correlated with the change in the AMI readmission rate. The correlation coefficient is 
0.142 with p-value of 0.036, which signifies that this result is statistically significant. Again, a 
positive correlation indicates that the higher the Section 1109 payment per bed size, the greater 
the positive change in the AMI readmission rate, which indicates worsening quality of care. For 
all other quality of care indicators, there is no association in the amount of payment the Section 












Table 21A: Pearson Correlations of Amount of Section 1109 Payments with the Quality of Care Indicators 









Amount of Section 1109 
Payment 
Logarithm of the 
Amount of Section 
1109 Payment 
Section 1109 
Payment Per Bed 
Count 
Logarithm of Section 
1109 Payment Per Bed 
Count 
Coefficient P value  Coeffici
ent 









218 0.139* 0.040 0.115 0.089 0.104 0.123 -0.046 0.503 
Change in 
Heart  Failure 
Readmission 
Rate 




















254 0.110 0.079 0.105 0.094 0.097 0.121 -0.055 0.387 











Table 21B: Spearman Correlations of Amount of Section 1109 Payments with the Quality of Care Indicators  









Amount of Section 1109 
Payment 
Logarithm of the 
Amount of Section 
1109 Payment 
Section 1109 
Payment Per Bed 
Count 
Logarithm of Section 
1109 Payment Per 
Bed Count 
Coefficient P value  Coefficie
nt 


































254 0.111 0.076 
 
0.111 0.077 0.090 0.151 -0.091 0.150 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Multivariate Linear Regression Analysis 
As stated earlier, the bivariate analyses such as the Pearson and Spearman correlations do 
not account for other factors such as hospital characteristics that can influence the dependent 
variables. Therefore, multivariate linear regression analyses were performed. The independent 
variable in the analysis is presented in two ways: 1) the logarithm of the Section 1109 payment 
and 2) the logarithm of Section 1109 payment per bed. Because Section 1109 payments were 
large and varied, as shown in the distributions in the descriptive statistics section, the 
independent variable was adjusted as the logarithm of the Section 1109 payment and the 
payment per bed.  The dependent variables are the changes in the quality of care indicators, 
comparing the performance before and after the Section 1109 payments were made. The 
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covariates in this study include logarithm of bed size, logarithm of the number of Medicare FFS 
discharges, total hospital margin, Medicare case mix, rural versus urban status, Medicare 
Dependent Hospital status, sole community hospital status, for profit status and government 
status. Multiple linear regression models were also run with Section 1109 payments and the 
logarithm of Section 1109 payments as the independent variable, and included in the Appendix. 
However, for the reasons described earlier, we do not believe that is the independent variable 
should be reflected as the Section 1109 payment amount or logarithm of Section 1109 payment 
because of their distributions. The results are in Tables 23A-F. 
 The regression analyses show that the change in the AMI readmission rate is statistically 
significant (coefficient= 8.51, p-value=0.047) which indicates that the higher the Section 1109 
payment (expressed as a log of the Section 1109 payment per bed) contributes to an increase in 
the AMI readmission over time. The F-statistic assesses the overall fit of the regression model, 
including all the covariates. The F-statistic for all the regression analyses are statistically 
significant (p < 0.05), which indicates that the model has a reasonable fit. 
 Most of the covariates in each model are not statistically significant, except for the 
baseline quality of care indicators. The baseline quality of care indicator contributes to a more 
negative change, or improvement, in the quality of care indicator for Section 1109 hospitals. This 
suggests that the higher (or worse) the baseline readmission rate or mortality rate for Section 
1109 hospitals, the more improvement the hospitals experienced over time. 
 We also note that while the Pearson and Spearman correlations showed that the amount 
of the Section 1109 payments is positively correlated with the change in the AMI readmission 
rate with a correlation coefficient of 0.139 with a p-value of 0.040, consistent with the findings 
from the multiple linear regression analysis.  For all other quality of care indicators, we fail to 
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reject the null hypothesis that the hospitals that received a higher proportion of Section 1109 
funding are not different in terms of the level of change in quality of care than hospitals that 



















Table 22A:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the AMI Readmission Rate as the dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 8.434 2.67 0.008 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.001 -1.03 0.306 
Baseline Readmission Rate for AMI -0.809 -18.73 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -1.1480 -2 0.047 
Total Margin -0.002 -0.25 0.805 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.210 -0.8 0.422 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.259 -0.59 0.553 
Rural -0.015 -0.07 0.942 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.004 0.01 0.991 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.136 0.63 0.527 
For Profit Ownership 0.767 3.07 0.002 
Government Ownership 0.167 0.62 0.534 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment 0.646 1.36 0.175 
Number of Observations 216   
F-value 36.57  <.0001 
R-squared 0.685   
R-squared(adj) 0.666   
Durbin-Watson 2.038   
Table 22B:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Heart Failure Readmission Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 14.744 2.99 0.003 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.0001 -0.13 0.897 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Heart Failure -0.552 -9.03 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -1.328 -1.48 0.142 
Total Margin -0.003 -0.29 0.775 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.666 1.63 0.107 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.019 0.03 0.978 
Rural -0.182 -0.56 0.575 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 1.415 2.61 0.009 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.086 0.26 0.798 
For Profit Ownership 0.188 0.47 0.636 
Government Ownership 0.453 1.08 0.281 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment -0.411 -0.57 0.571 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 8.74  <.0001 
R-squared 0.342   
R-squared(adj) 0.303   




Table 22C:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Pneumonia Readmission Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 14.388 3.43 0.0007 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia 0.001 1.16 0.248 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Pneumonia -0.577 -8.13 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.981 -1.25 0.212 
Total Margin -0.006 -0.62 0.536 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.693 1.91 0.058 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.228 -0.36 0.721 
Rural -0.173 -0.6 0.549 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.814 1.7 0.091 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.028 0.09 0.926 
For Profit Ownership -0.026 -0.07 0.942 
Government Ownership 0.0322 0.09 0.932 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment -0.418 -0.65 0.518 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 8.74  <.0001 
R-squared 0.286   
R-squared(adj) 0.244   
Durbin-Watson 1.721   
Table 22D:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Heart Failure Mortality Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 7.212 1.76 0.079 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.001 -1.8 0.073 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Heart Failure -0.771 -12.9 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.506 -0.69 0.491 
Total Margin 0.002 0.17 0.868 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.166 -0.48 0.632 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.193 0.32 0.751 
Rural -0.069 -0.25 0.800 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.0015 0 0.997 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.211 -0.75 0.453 
For Profit Ownership -0.317 -0.96 0.337 
Government Ownership -1.159 -3.27 0.001 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment 0.255 0.42 0.678 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 16.27  <.0001 
R-squared 0.491   
R-squared(adj) 0.461   




Table 22E:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Pneumonia Mortality Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 7.7753 1.42 0.1562 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia -0.0001 -0.12 0.9082 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Pneumonia -0.6163 -7.93 <.0001 
Case Mix -0.1198 -0.12 0.9078 
Total Margin -0.0030 -0.23 0.8178 
Logarithm of Bed Count -1.1351 -2.34 0.0200 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.0428 0.05 0.9596 
Rural -0.0377 -0.1 0.9216 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.2890 -0.45 0.6498 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.0257 -0.07 0.9480 
For Profit Ownership 0.5131 1.11 0.2675 
Government Ownership -0.3380 -0.67 0.5049 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment 0.7122 0.83 0.4070 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 6.68  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2842   
R-squared(adj) 0.2416   
Durbin-Watson 2.034   
Table 22F:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the AMI Mortality Rate as the dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 3.5017 0.94 0.35 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.0018 -2.06 0.041 
Baseline Mortality Rate for AMI -0.789 -13.59 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -1.066 -1.72 0.086 
Total Margin -0.011 -1.33 0.184 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.072 -0.23 0.815 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.095 -0.19 0.853 
Rural -0.128 -0.53 0.599 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.718 1.78 0.077 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.139 0.55 0.580 
For Profit Ownership 0.115 0.39 0.697 
Government Ownership -0.162 -0.51 0.607 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment 0.754 1.37 0.172 




R-squared 0.512   
R-squared(adj) 0.483   




Table 23A:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the AMI Readmission Rate as the dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 7.08 2.33 0.021 
Baseline discharges for AMI -0.001 -1.44 0.150 
Baseline Readmission Rate for AMI -0.799 -18.86 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.632 -1.42 0.158 
Total Margin -0.003 -0.35 0.728 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.654 1.49 0.137 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.273 1.08 0.283 
Rural -0.064 -0.31 0.759 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.089 -0.26 0.798 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.201 0.94 0.346 
For Profit Ownership 0.728 2.95 0.004 
Government Ownership 0.131 0.49 0.623 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment per bed 8.507 1.99 0.048 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 37.12  <.0001 
R-squared 0.688   
R-squared(adj) 0.669   
Durbin-Watson 2.057   
Table 23B:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Heart Failure Readmission Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 12.061 2.63 0.009 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.0002 -0.19 0.848 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Heart Failure -0.555 -9.07 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -1.645 -2.27 0.024 
Total Margin -0.004 -0.31 0.755 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.640 0.96 0.339 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.287 -0.62 0.536 
Rural -0.173 -0.53 0.596 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 1.368 2.48 0.014 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.070 0.21 0.833 
For Profit Ownership 0.216 0.55 0.584 
Government Ownership 0.400 0.95 0.341 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment per bed 0.753 0.12 0.909 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 8.7  <.0001 
R-squared 0.342   
R-squared(adj) 0.303   




Table 23C:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Pneumonia Readmission Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 17.146 4.54 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia 0.001 1.46 0.145 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Pneumonia -0.579 -8.21 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -1.187 -1.87 0.063 
Total Margin -0.005 -0.54 0.589 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.214 -0.36 0.718 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.581 -1.54 0.125 
Rural -0.125 -0.43 0.665 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.966 1.99 0.048 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.027 -0.09 0.929 
For Profit Ownership -0.0003 0 0.999 
Government Ownership 0.102 0.27 0.785 
Logarithm Section 1109 Payment per bed -9.553 -1.67 0.096 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 7.02  <.0001 
R-squared 0.294   
R-squared(adj) 0.252   
Durbin-Watson 1.738   
Table 23D:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Heart Failure Mortality Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 14.2739 3.83 0.0002 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.001 -1.26 0.210 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Heart Failure -0.769 -12.99 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.200 -0.34 0.731 
Total Margin 0.003 0.32 0.746 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.975 -1.73 0.085 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.317 0.83 0.408 
Rural -0.032 -0.12 0.908 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.198 0.43 0.667 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.234 -0.84 0.401 
For Profit Ownership -0.336 -1.03 0.303 
Government Ownership -1.007 -2.86 0.005 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment per bed -10.179 -1.85 0.065 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 16.8  <.0001 
R-squared 0.499   
R-squared(adj) 0.461   




Table 23E:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the Pneumonia Mortality Rate as the 
dependent variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 10.430 2.15 0.033 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia -0.0002 -0.17 0.866 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Pneumonia -0.614 -7.89 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix 0.363 0.43 0.666 
Total Margin -0.0032 -0.24 0.812 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.779 -0.98 0.328 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.612 1.23 0.222 
Rural -0.068 -0.18 0.859 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.279 -0.43 0.668 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.012 0.03 0.975 
For Profit Ownership 0.471 1.02 0.307 
Government Ownership -0.293 -0.58 0.563 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment per bed 2.377 0.31 0.756 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 6.61  <.0001 
R-squared 0.282   
R-squared(adj) 0.239   
Durbin-Watson 2.042   
Table 23F:  Multivariate Regression Model with the Change in the AMI Mortality Rate as the dependent 
variable 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 8.1504 2.3 0.022 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.002 -1.71 0.089 
Baseline Mortality Rate for AMI -0.781 -13.42 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.528 -1.1 0.274 
Total Margin -0.011 -1.28 0.202 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.034 0.07 0.948 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.462 1.48 0.140 
Rural -0.151 -0.62 0.538 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.782 1.89 0.059 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.168 0.67 0.504 
For Profit Ownership 0.067 0.23 0.818 
Government Ownership -0.059 -0.19 0.852 
Logarithm of Section 1109 Payment per bed -0.613 -0.12 0.904 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 17.31  <.0001 
R-squared 0.507   
R-squared(adj) 0.478   





 Lastly, we evaluate this hypothesis using the difference-in-differences model. The 
dependent variables are the change in 30-day readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates. This 
model also takes into account the effect of time and assumes that there are no significant changes 
between the Section 1109 hospitals. A dummy variable for the time period (year) is created to 
take into account the difference in the time period of before versus after the Section 1109 
payments were made. The Section 1109 variable is a dummy variable for Section 1109 hospital 
or not a Section 1109 hospital. The interaction term of the year and Section 1109 payment 
(expressed as the logarithm of Section 1109 payment per bed) is the difference-in-difference 
estimator, and its coefficient reflects the magnitude of the association between the Section 1109 
payments and the quality of care indicators.  
The difference-in-differences model is run for each quality of care indicator in this study. 
The analysis examines the following covariates: Medicare Case Mix, total hospital margin, 
Logarithm of Bed Count, Logarithm of Medicare Discharges, Rural, Medicare Dependent 
Hospital Status, Sole Community Hospital Status, ownership status (For Profit Status and 
Government Status in comparison to not-for-profit status) and rural (expressed as a dummy 
variable). The difference-in-difference variable is the variable of interest in the analysis and if 
statistically significant, demonstrates that the change in the quality of care indicator based on the 
payment amount (expressed as the logarithm of Section 1109 payments per beds). The results of 
this analysis are shown in Tables 24A-F below. We also conducted the difference-in-differences 
model using the independent variable expressed as the Section 1109 payments, logarithm of 
Section 1109 payments and Section 1109 payments per bed. The results of that analysis are 
included in the appendix.  
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 The difference-in-differences model shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference change in quality of care in the heart failure mortality rate based on the Section 1109 
payment (reflected as the logarithm of the Section 1109 payment per beds). It shows that Section 
1109 payment (reflected as the log of Section 1109 payment per bed) contributes to a change in 
the heart failure mortality rate by -2.378 percentage points or that the heart failure mortality rate 
improved more for higher Section 1109 payments.   
 Some of the covariates in each of the models are statistically significant. Hospital 
Medicare case mix index influences the change in the quality of care indicators among Section 
1109 hospitals such that higher case mix results in greater improvement in the quality of care 
indicator. The log of the bed count also influences the change in all of the quality of care 
indicators among Section 1109 hospitals such that higher bed counts show worsening or less 
improvement in the quality of care indicators with the exception of the heart failure mortality 
measure, where it has the opposite impact. For-profit ownership status influences all the quality 
of care indicators for the Section 1109 hospitals except in the change in the heart failure 
mortality rate. Section 1109 hospitals with a for-profit ownership status show worsening or less 
improvement in those quality of care indicators as compared to Section 1109 hospitals that are 
non-profit or government owned. Section 1109 hospitals that are rural experienced worsening or 
less improvement on the three mortality rates (coefficient for AMI=0.338, coefficient for heart 
failure=0.2204, coefficient for pneumonia=0.2834), as compared to the urban Section 1109 
hospitals. Total hospital margin and Medicare Dependent Hospital status generally did not have a 
statistically significant association with the change in the quality of care indicators among the 




Table 24A Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as a dependent variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 15.031 27.230 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.002 -7.090 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.642 -3.940 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.002 -2.220 0.026 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.211 2.220 0.026 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.064 0.650 0.518 
Rural 0.334 3.460 0.0006 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.082 -0.540 0.591 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.088 -0.830 0.408 
For Profit Ownership 0.389 4.650 <.0001 
Government Ownership 0.300 3.360 0.0008 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.216 2.310 0.021 
Difference-in-Di fference -2.160 -1.590 0.113 
Year -1.114 -5.660 <.0001 










Table 24B Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 10.5456 24.72 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.001 -5.39 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.131 -0.82 0.414 
Total Margin 0.002 1.70 0.089 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.264 -2.98 0.003 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.359 4.01 <.0001 
Rural 0.221 2.43 0.015 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.096 0.72 0.474 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.024 0.24 0.809 
For Profit Ownership -0.138 -1.71 0.088 
Government Ownership 0.031 0.37 0.715 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.701 7.69 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference -2.378 -2.39 0.017 
Year 0.809 4.39 <.0001 












Table 24C Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 12.7598 28.51 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia 0.0001 0.44 0.658 
Medicare Case Mix -0.563 -2.71 0.007 
Total Margin -0.003 -1.91 0.057 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.229 2.19 0.029 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.174 -1.69 0.091 
Rural 0.283 2.62 0.009 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.009 -0.06 0.951 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.081 -0.69 0.491 
For Profit Ownership 0.305 3.15 0.002 
Government Ownership 0.418 4.20 <.0001 
Section 1109 Hospital Status 0.449 4.13 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.579 0.58 0.559 
Year 4.353 21.16 <.0001 










Table 24D Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 18.446 28.51 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.001 0.44 0.658 
Medicare Case Mix -1.857 -2.71 0.007 
Total Margin -0.003 -1.91 0.057 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.429 2.19 0.029 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.200 -1.69 0.091 
Rural -0.149 2.62 0.009 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.176 -0.06 0.951 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.218 -0.69 0.491 
For Profit Ownership 0.205 3.15 0.002 
Government Ownership 0.0837 4.20 <.0001 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.645 4.13 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 3.082 0.58 0.559 
Year -2.645 21.16 <.0001 













Table 24E Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 17.1525 50.85 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia -0.0008 -3.69 0.0002 
Medicare Case Mix -2.141 -13.94 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.003 -2.37 0.018 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.297 3.85 0.0001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.426 5.61 <.0001 
Rural -0.128 -1.57 0.116 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.137 1.13 0.258 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.131 -1.47 0.142 
For Profit Ownership 0.213 2.91 0.004 
Government Ownership 0.026 0.35 0.728 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.500 -6.10 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 0.682 0.89 0.374 
Year -1.279 -8.11 <.0001 




























Table 24F Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 25.1483 52.06 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.0003 -1.39 0.164 
Medicare Case Mix -3.0356 -16.47 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.002 -1.45 0.147 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.464 4.67 <.0001 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.211 2.12 0.034 
Rural 0.129 1.24 0.216 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.109 0.71 0.479 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.305 -2.67 0.008 
For Profit Ownership 0.393 4.21 <.0001 
Government Ownership 0.109 1.13 0.257 
Section 1109 Hospital Status -0.999 -9.47 <.0001 
Difference-in-Di fference 2.341 1.94 0.052 
Year -2.634 -12.10 <.0001 











 The chart below summarizes the findings by hypothesis and method to identify if there 


















Null Hypothesis 1: Section 
1109 hospitals quality of 
care that is equivalent to 
all other hospitals prior to 
receiving the Section 1109 
payment 
Null Hypothesis 2: hospitals that received payments under Section 1109 had 
an equivalent change in quality of care in terms of a change in 30-day 
mortality rates and readmission rates, compared to hospitals that did not 
receive bonus payments under Section 1109 
Null Hypothesis 3: hospitals that received a higher 
proportion of Section 1109 funding are not different in terms 
of improvement of quality of care than hospitals that 
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for Section 1109 
payment=0.139; 
Spearman correlation 
for Section 1109 
payment per bed 
size=0.141; The 
higher the Section 
1109 funding, the 
higher (or worse) the 
readmission rate. 
Log of Section 
1109 payment per 
bed coefficient= 
8.5073 which 
means that the 
higher the 
payment, the 
worse the change 
in the readmission 
rate 








































0.461; Change in 
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rate is 0.461 
lower or 
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Fail to reject null 
hypothesis 
Fail to reject null 
hypothesis 










Null Hypothesis 1: Section 
1109 hospitals quality of 
care that is equivalent to 
all other hospitals prior to 
receiving the Section 1109 
payment 
Null Hypothesis 2: hospitals that received payments under Section 1109 had 
an equivalent change in quality of care in terms of a change in 30-day 
mortality rates and readmission rates, compared to hospitals that did not 
receive bonus payments under Section 1109 
Null Hypothesis 3: hospitals that received a higher 
proportion of Section 1109 funding are not different in terms 
of improvement of quality of care than hospitals that 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Policy Implications 
Key findings 
 The primary objective of this study is to determine whether the hospitals that benefitted 
from Section 1109 of the Affordable Care Act show any differences in the quality of care 
compared to hospitals that did not benefit from this provision. The study seeks to add to the 
literature of whether additional reimbursement is associated with better quality of care. The 
literature review showed inconsistent findings on the relationship between spending to medical 
providers and quality of care, Major study findings can be grouped in the following categories: 
1) increased spending led to improved quality of care, 2) increased spending did not improve 
quality of care, 3) inconclusive of whether spending influenced quality of care. 
 Based on the Bazzoli framework and the literature review, this study examined whether 
increased reimbursement to hospitals, through the bonus payments provided under Section 1109 
of the Affordable Care Act, impacts patient outcomes or quality of care. Furthermore, the 
framework considers how other factors influence the quality of care indicators including hospital 
characteristics, such as inpatient volume, bed size, ownership status, and the hospital’s financial 
condition, measured by the hospital’s total margin.  
This study was evaluated through three hypotheses. The descriptive statistics showed the 
differences in the Section 1109 hospitals and comparison hospitals. The Section 1109 hospitals 
are located in the bottom quartile of counties for Medicare per capita spending and those 
hospitals tend to be more rural, have fewer discharges, have fewer beds and have a higher total 
hospital margin and tend to be more sole community hospitals as compared to non-Section 1109 
hospitals (or acute care hospitals located in higher Medicare per capita spending counties). 
Section 1109 hospitals are comparable to the comparison hospitals with respect to the wage 
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index, case mix and DSH patient percentage. This study contributes to the literature on what 
types of hospitals are low cost hospitals with respect to Medicare spending. 
The first hypothesis examined whether the Section 1109 hospitals are equivalent to the 
non-Section 1109 hospitals with respect to certain quality of care indicators. The analyses 
resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis which stated that prior to the intervention, the 
hospitals that are located in areas with the lowest quartile of Medicare per beneficiary spending 
and received bonus payments under Section 1109 had different performance than all other acute 
care hospitals, in terms of certain quality of care indicators, specifically, 30-day mortality rates 
and 30-day readmission rates. Section 1109 hospitals or hospitals that are located in low 
Medicare spending areas had lower Medicare FFS 30-day readmission rates and higher Medicare 
FFS 30-day mortality rates, which suggests that these hospitals had varied performance on 
quality of care indicators prior to receiving the funding under Section 1109. This finding is 
notable in that the condition-specific readmission rates are correlated with each other, and the 
condition-specific mortality rates are correlated with each other, but readmission rates and 
mortality rates are not consistently correlated with each other. Furthermore, not all of the 
covariates in the model, adapted from the Bazzoli framework, were statistically significant. The 
Medicare hospital case mix index and for-profit ownership status are associated with the 
readmission rates, where hospitals with a higher case mix had lower baseline readmission rates 
and for-profit hospitals had higher readmission rates. Total hospital margin and rural status were 




In summary, the analyses show that these Section 1109 hospitals located in the counties 
with the lowest Medicare per capita spending were different in that they had lower readmission 
rates and higher mortality rates than other acute care hospitals in the country. 
  The second hypothesis examined whether Section 1109 hospitals show any differences in 
changes in quality of care compared to other hospitals after they received the bonus money. To 
test this hypothesis, we conducted t-tests, multivariate linear regression models, difference-in-
differences models and propensity score matching. The results are generally inconclusive where 
under certain statistical models, there were statistically significant differences in the change in 
quality of care between the Section 1109 hospitals and the comparison hospitals, and other 
statistical models did not show a statistically significant change in quality of care. More 
specifically, under each analysis, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that there was a 
statistically significant difference in the change in pneumonia mortality rate and the change in 
the AMI mortality rate for Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison hospitals. For the 
other quality of care indicators, the analyses showed statistically significant differences in the 
changes for Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison hospitals but the results were not 
directionally consistent across the statistical methods used. 
 Similar to the first hypothesis, not all of the covariates were statistically significant when 
evaluating the second hypothesis.  The covariates were used in the multiple linear regression and 
difference-in-difference analyses. The baseline readmission rates and mortality rates were 
statistically significant in that the baseline measures did influence the extent of the change in the 
readmission rates and mortality rates over time. A hospital’s case mix index continued to 
influence the change in the readmission rates where hospitals with a higher case mix had greater 
improvement in the readmission rates for heart failure, pneumonia and AMI. For-profit hospital 
149 
 
ownership also influenced the change in the readmission and mortality rates where changes in 
those quality of care indicators worsened over time, as compared to government owned and non-
profit hospitals.     
Finally, the third hypothesis examined whether there are any differences in quality of care 
over time based on the amount of money Section 1109 hospitals received.  It sought to answer 
whether the amount of money a hospital receives is related to the quality of care provided. The 
findings were also inconsistent and we generally failed to reject the null hypothesis. The Pearson 
and Spearman correlations and the multiple linear regression model found that the higher the 
Section 1109 payment, the worse the AMI readmission rate became over time. However, based 
on the difference-in-differences model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is a 
difference in quality of care. In summary, there is no difference in the change in quality of care 
based on the amount of money received by the Section 1109 hospitals.   
When examining the statistical significance of the covariates across the hypotheses and 
statistical models, not all of the covariates based on the conceptual framework were associated 
with the quality of care indicators. Generally, a hospital’s case mix index appeared to influence 
the quality of care indicators where a higher case mix contributed to lower (or better) baseline 
readmission rates and mortality rates and greater improvement in the quality of care indicators 
over time. Hospitals with a higher case mix generally treat higher acuity or more complex 
patients, which may indicate a greater sophistication in treatment of care that can result in better 
outcomes.  Second, ownership status influenced the quality of care indicators where hospitals 
that are for-profit had higher (or worse) baseline quality of care indicators and showed less 
improvement or worsening in quality of care over time as compared to hospitals that were non-
profit or government owned. This could indicate that ownership structures of hospitals may 
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influence hospital decision-making on quality of care. Baseline performance on quality of care 
influenced the change in quality of care over time where higher (or worse) baseline readmission 
rates and mortality rates led to greater improvement over time, as there was greater opportunity 
to improve. The other covariates in the models were not as influential. Hospital margin was 
generally not statistically significant, which suggests that this financial indicator does not 
influence quality of care. Special Medicare payment hospital designations such as Medicare 
Dependent Hospital status and Sole Community Hospital status, which are given to hospitals that 
treat a high proportion of Medicare beneficiaries or are the only hospital serving an area, did not 
influence quality of care. These findings suggest that there are fewer hospital characteristics than 
originally determined or there are other characteristics not captured in this study that influence 
quality of care or changes in quality of care over time.  
Policy implications 
 This study can inform policymakers in several ways. First, the study provides some 
insight on the types of hospitals that are located in low Medicare spending areas. The descriptive 
statistics identify the types of hospitals that tend to be in counties with low Medicare spending 
and shows that hospitals in low spending areas tend to be rural, non-profit and have smaller 
number of beds and discharges. It also shows that low Medicare spending areas are distributed 
throughout the country and not limited to certain states or regions of the country. The results 
show that the hospitals located in low spending areas have lower readmission rates for AMI, 
heart failure and pneumonia and higher mortality rates for the same conditions compared to other 
hospitals, which indicates inconsistent quality of care. It can be of value to policymakers to show 
that hospitals in low spending areas may not provide high quality care. Furthermore, if the intent 
of the Section 1109 provision was to reward hospitals located in low spending areas, because it is 
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a goal of the Medicare program to reduce costs, the findings show that the bonus money under 
Section 1109 rewarded hospitals that may not provide the best quality of care.  
 Second, the findings show that there is not a relationship between hospitals receiving 
additional reimbursement and improvement on quality of care. If policymakers are seeking to 
find ways to improve quality of care, simply providing additional funding may not achieve such 
a goal.   
 If policymakers were to use a similar mechanism of providing additional funds to low 
cost hospitals to incentivize quality of care, they could create stronger incentives or requirements 
to ensure that the funding is used towards quality improvement. Policymakers could structure the 
policy in the following ways: 1) technical assistance to hospitals in conjunction with additional 
funding; 2) require hospitals to report on how they spent the additional funding, 3) provide 
requirements to hospitals on how  to use the funding, 4) tie additional funding to demonstration 
of quality improvement.  
First, as described earlier, a significant proportion of Section 1109 hospitals are rural, 
small bed hospitals that generally have limited staffing, expertise and infrastructure. These types 
of hospitals would greatly benefit from additional technical assistance on how to use additional 
funds most effectively for quality improvement initiatives. Technical assistance could include 
sharing information on evidence-based interventions for quality improvement, conducting 
assessments for the hospitals on what areas need quality improvement, helping hospitals 
implement quality improvement interventions, and aggregating data and tools for hospitals to use 
to continuously monitor quality improvement. If policymakers wanted to incentivize low per 
capita spending hospitals to improve quality of care, providing technical assistance in 
conjunction with additional funding may help to achieve such a policy goal. Another approach 
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that policymakers could use to incentivize hospital quality improvement would be to require 
hospitals to report on how they use additional funding and demonstrate that it was used towards 
quality improvement. Holding hospitals accountable by requiring them to report on how they use 
the additional funding could incentivize the hospitals to use that money towards quality 
improvement. Third, policymakers could be more prescriptive on how the low cost hospitals 
should use the additional funding, specifying that funding may only be used for certain activities 
directed towards quality improvement. If policymakers set the activities that the funding could be 
used towards, policymakers would be able to test the effectiveness of those quality improvement 
activities, and use those findings to inform future policies. Lastly, policymakers could tie funding 
to demonstrated quality improvement. Section 1109 distributed $400 million to hospitals through 
two allotments over two years. Policymakers could set a requirement to provide additional 
funding to these hospitals, but only provide the second allotment of funding if the hospital is able 
to demonstrate quality improvement on a specific set of measures that are a policy priority.  
Study strengths and limitations  
This study has several strengths and limitations. First, an advantage of this study design is 
that the data spans a long time frame, a six year timeframe, which allows us to measure quality 
of care prior to the Section 1109 hospitals receiving the bonus funding and after the Section 1109 
hospitals received the bonus funding, without overlap in time frames.  Second, the study includes 
the entire population of IPPS hospitals, and not a sample, which increases the validity and 
reliability of the study. A third strength of the study is that the dependent variables are objective 
measures. The study uses the CMS 30-day Medicare FFS condition specific readmission and 
mortality measures which are highly vetted, standardized measures that are used for public 
reporting and used for Medicare hospital quality payment programs. Furthermore, there is no 
testing effect in this analysis as the data used in the study are largely administrative data using 
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claims information to calculate the readmission and mortality rate health outcomes.  Fourth, the 
study utilizes a variety of statistical methods to evaluate each hypothesis, and the results are 
more reliable as several methodological approaches demonstrate consistent results. In summary, 
the strength of this study is the novelty of assessing whether a policy that provides for a one-time 
infusion of funding to low-cost hospitals contributes to improvements in quality of care using 
CMS quality of care indicators that span the duration of the policy.  
The study also presents several limitations. First, the generalizability of the study is 
limited because the study identifies hospitals located in low spending areas based on Medicare 
spending and uses quality of care measures for the Medicare population. Because the data are 
limited to Medicare health outcomes, the results of the study could not be applied to the 
treatment for other populations, as the elderly population has unique health characteristics that 
may not be applied to other age groups. However, it is worth noting that the study can be 
generalizable in some respect because the study uses a national data set for acute care hospitals.  
Second, while the study uses highly scrutinized quality measures and reflect quality of 
care for high cost and high volume conditions, the 30-day mortality and 30-day readmission rates 
measures have some limitations in that they do not represent the full spectrum of hospital care. 
As a result, the study may be limited in extrapolating the relationship between Medicare payment 
and quality of care.    
Third, historical or maturation events could affect the internal validity of this study. 
Historical events or other Medicare payment policies could affect study results if an event 
disproportionately affects the control group versus the test group or vice versa, thus biasing the 
outcomes. It is also possible that regional events could impact the dependent variables in this 
study. Because the hospitals’ quality of care measures are based on three years of claims data, a 
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specific event during that time period could affect the results of that measure. For example, a 
natural disaster could affect a hospital’s quality of care outcomes. In addition, an event could 
influence whether or not a hospital is included in the test group because a specific event could 
have resulted in a county having low Medicare spending allowing a hospital to qualify for a 
Section 1109 payment. However, the effect of maturation could be mitigated because the quality 
measures are based on three years of claims data.  In addition, the issue of maturation can be 
mitigated by the sample size of this study with respect to both the test group and the control 
group. 
Areas for Future Research 
 The study dataset presents opportunities for future research.  First, we can further assess 
if there are any unique characteristics among hospitals that are located in areas with low 
Medicare per capita spending.  This can provide insight on factors that contribute to low 
Medicare per capita spending. While the study showed that there are some differences in the 
Section 1109 hospitals and other hospitals, further research could be done in this area. 
 Second, the findings showed that there are generally no differences in changes in quality 
of care for Section 1109 hospitals compared to the comparison hospitals after the Section 1109 
hospitals received additional funding, future research could examine if there are certain 
characteristics or types of Section 1109 hospitals where quality improvement was observed after 
Section 1109 hospitals received funding. Furthermore, future research could examine whether 
there are other measures of quality, not just quality limited to improvement in readmission rates 
and mortality rates, where Section 1109 hospitals improved after receiving the funding.  
 Lastly, research could be conducted to identify what types of hospitals do provide high 
quality care with respect to readmission rates and mortality rates including what hospital 
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characteristics are associated with high and low quality. This research could help to inform if 
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Appendix A: Scatterplot of Baseline Dependent Variables Compared to Dependent 
Variables 
*The the Section 1109 hospitals, blue are the comparison hospitals 
* the x-axis is the baseline performance on the quality of care indicator and the y-axis the post-period 


















Appendix B: Pearson Correlation on Covariates and Dependent Variables 
























-0.18879* -0.25827* -0.09474* -0.18606* -0.09218* -0.11776 * 
Total 
margin 
-0.04928* -0.03499 -0.0491* -0.04719* 0.02956 -0.04449* 
Logarithm 
of Beds 




0.02174 -0.058* 0.10125* -0.18338* -0.10776* -0.10125* 








-0.08658* -0.04461* -0.08999* 0.0751* 0.1232* 0.08602* 
For Profit  0.02153 0.07982* 0.04189* 0.09129* -0.03794 0.03066 
Government  0.01831 0.02817 -0.00688 0.08421* 0.04123* 0.0991* 
*indicates statistically significant with p-value <0.05.  
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-0.16552* -0.2068* -0.07377* -0.13547* -0.0706* -0.1003* 
Total margin -0.04992 -0.0354 -0.04513 0.00267 0.01245 -0.0145 
Logarithm of 
Beds 




0.05955* -0.03477 0.10712* -0.11123* -0.14416* -0.05014* 








-0.05306* -0.03907 -0.06417* 0.03142 0.13002* 0.0847* 
For Profit 0.04359 0.06757* 0.04079* 0.04813* -0.02879 0.00499 
Government 0.04609 0.04258* 0.00292 0.07935* 0.04031 0.08175* 








Appendix C: Pearson Correlation of Independent Variables with Covariates and 
















Total Margin -0.0398 -0.0607 -0.0978 0.0910 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.7328 * 0.6531 * 0.9675 * -0.6499 * 
Logarithm of Beds 0.7771 * 0.3701 * 0.8522 * -0.7798 * 
Medicare Case Mix 0.5255 * 0.5499 * 0.5571 * -0.1359 * 
Baseline Pneumonia Discharges for Readmissions Measure 0.7480* 0.5361* 0.7158* -0.4397 * 
Baseline AMI Discharges for Readmissions Measure 0.8620* 0.5961* 0.7436* -0.3790 * 
Baseline Heart Failure Discharges for Readmissions Measure 0.8287* 0.5727* 0.7341* -0.4237 * 
Baseline AMI Readmission Rate  -0.1806 * -0.1650 * -0.1841 * 0.1048 
Baseline Heart Failure Readmission Rate  -0.1557 * -0.1971 * -0.1939 * 0.1277 * 
Baseline Pneumonia Readmission Rate  -0.0269 -0.0538 -0.0583 0.0169 
Baseline Heart Failure Discharges for Mortality Measure  0.8175 * 0.5602 * 0.7324 * -0.4302 * 
 Baseline Pneumonia Discharges for Mortality Measure  0.7377 * 0.5216 * 0.7103 * -0.4432 * 
Baseline AMI Discharges for Mortality Measure 0.8721 * 0.6020 * 0.7746 * -0.4038 * 
Baseline Heart Failure Mortality Rate  -0.0131 0.0059 0.0196 -0.0302 
Baseline Pneumonia Mortality Rate  -0.0574 -0.1325 -0.0867 0.0163 
Baseline AMI Mortality Rate  -0.2097 * -0.2074 * -0.2039 *  0.1315 * 
Post Period Pneumonia Discharges for Readmissions Measure  0.8053 * 0.5303 * 0.7651 * -0.4236 * 
Post Period Heart Failure Discharges for Readmissions Measure 0.8633 * 0.5536 * 0.7579 * -0.3877 * 
Post Period AMI Discharges for Readmissions Measure 0.8629 * 0.6127 * 0.7709 * -0.5731 * 
Post Period AMI Readmission Rate -0.0733 -0.0905 -0.1321 * 0.1220 
Post Period Heart Failure Readmission Rate -0.1624 * -0.2214 * -0.2202 * 0.1757 * 
Post Period Pneumonia Readmission Rate -0.0488 -0.1252 * -0.0646 -0.0122 
Post Period AMI Discharges for Mortality Measure  0.8358 * 0.5578 *  0.8005 * -0.5748 * 
Post Period Heart Failure Discharges for Mortality Measure 0.8317 * 0.5226 * 0.7429 * -0.5808 * 
Post Period Pneumonia Discharges for Mortality Measure 0.7094 * 0.4980 * 0.6782 * -0.5035 * 
Post Period AMI Mortality Rate  -0.0798 -0.0920 -0.0690 0.0473 
Post Period Heart Failure Mortality Rate  -0.0639 0.0031 0.0164 -0.0375 
Post Period Pneumonia Mortality Rate  -0.0831 0.0101 -0.0753 0.0770 
Change in AMI Readmission Rate  0.1390 * 0.1046 0.1155 -0.0456 
Change in Heart Failure Readmission Rate -0.0045 -0.0100 -0.0179 0.0450 
Change in Pneumonia Readmission Rate -0.0231 -0.0738 -0.0099 -0.0191 
Change in Heart Failure Mortality Rate -0.0358 -0.0202 -0.0049 -0.0231 
Change in Pneumonia Mortality Rate -0.0347 0.0984 -0.0111 0.0731 
Change in AMI Mortality Rate 0.1102 0.0973 0.1052 -0.0545 




Appendix D: Correlations of Dependent Variables 




















































































-0.04312 -0.05029* 0.04517* 0.30837* 0.38839* 1 







































































0.34585* 0.46145* 1 0.00257 -0.14567* 0.04832* 




























0.01026 0.00957 0.04832* 0.33306* 0.38796* 1 















































1 0.13141* 0.06885* 0.02906 0.03805 0.04909 





















0.06885* 0.17822* 1 0.01215 -0.01161 0.05675* 








0.02906 0.03696 0.01215 1 0.07327* 0.06179* 



















0.04909 -0.02817 0.05675* 0.06179* 0.09265* 1 









































































0.3311* 0.35741* 0.40803* -0.0223 -0.13214* 0.03374 




























-0.07627* -0.03922 -0.00634 0.27046* 0.38187* 0.44092* 
















Appendix E: Other Multivariate Linear Regression Models for Hypothesis 3 
Table 26A Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 16.0323 7.3000 <.0001 
Baseline Readmission Rate for AMI -0.0017 -2.3500 0.0196 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.8135 -19.3600 <.0001 
Medicare Case Mix -0.9655 -2.1400 0.0335 
Total Margin -0.0041 -0.5700 0.5680 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.4171 -1.6000 0.1122 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.0360 -0.1400 0.8914 
Rural -0.0357 -0.1800 0.8612 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.1697 -0.4900 0.6232 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.1245 0.5900 0.5539 
For Profit Ownership 0.7710 3.1600 0.0018 
Government Ownership -0.0125 -0.0500 0.9632 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 3.1000 0.0022 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 38.6000  <.0001 
R-squared 0.6963   
R-squared(adj) 0.6783   

















Table 26B Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as a 
dependent variable and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 14.1643 3.98 <.0001 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Heart Failure -0.0004 -0.48 0.6289 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.5597 -9.13 <.0001 
Case Mix -1.8679 -2.41 0.0168 
Total Margin -0.0044 -0.39 0.6940 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.4352 1.05 0.2959 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.3745 -0.8 0.4270 
Rural -0.1684 -0.52 0.6024 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 1.2792 2.31 0.0218 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.0448 0.13 0.8931 
For Profit Ownership 0.2405 0.61 0.5433 
Government Ownership 0.3268 0.77 0.4424 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 0.8 0.4270 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 8.78  <.0001 
R-squared 0.3428   
R-squared(adj) 0.3037   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 2.056   
Table 26C Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rate as a 
dependent variable and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 9.1042 2.88 0.0044 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia 0.0014 1.48 0.1393 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Pneumonia -0.5641 -7.9 <.0001 
Case Mix -0.9697 -1.44 0.1503 
Total Margin -0.0052 -0.51 0.6078 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.7976 2.2 0.0293 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.3607 -0.89 0.3733 
Rural -0.1614 -0.56 0.5757 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.9390 1.93 0.0556 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.0301 0.1 0.9191 
For Profit Ownership -0.0355 -0.1 0.9194 
Government Ownership 0.1137 0.3 0.7640 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 -1.37 0.1708 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 6.92  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2912   
R-squared(adj) 0.2491   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 1.725   
172 
 
Table 26D Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 5.1215 1.88 0.0619 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.0007 -0.85 0.3967 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Heart Failure -0.7724 -13.07 <.0001 
Case Mix 0.1581 0.26 0.7987 
Total Margin 0.0034 0.36 0.7156 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.1917 0.55 0.5812 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.5968 1.52 0.1293 
Rural -0.0751 -0.28 0.7814 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.2325 0.51 0.6137 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.1563 -0.56 0.5746 
For Profit Ownership -0.3703 -1.14 0.2557 
Government Ownership -0.9363 -2.62 0.0093 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 -2.11 0.0362 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 16.97  <.0001 
R-squared 0.5020   
R-squared(adj) 0.4724   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 2.086   
Table 26E Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 11.6847 2.98 0.0033 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia -0.0001 -0.11 0.9096 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Pneumonia -0.6134 -7.88 <.0001 
Case Mix 0.3845 0.44 0.6621 
Total Margin -0.0029 -0.22 0.8264 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.9843 -2.03 0.0440 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.6064 1.12 0.2625 
Rural -0.0593 -0.16 0.8770 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.2342 -0.36 0.7199 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.0036 0.01 0.9928 
For Profit Ownership 0.4696 1.02 0.3086 
Government Ownership -0.2675 -0.52 0.6016 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 0.01 0.9925 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 6.6  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2817   
R-squared(adj) 0.2390   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 2.038   
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Table 26F Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as a dependent variable 
and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 7.8521 3.11 0.0021 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.0017 -1.63 0.1047 
Baseline Mortality Rate for AMI -0.7815 -13.43 <.0001 
Case Mix -0.5340 -1.07 0.2874 
Total Margin -0.0108 -1.29 0.1974 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.0830 0.27 0.7900 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.4636 1.44 0.1525 
Rural -0.1529 -0.63 0.5313 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.7686 1.86 0.0650 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.1700 0.68 0.4996 
For Profit Ownership 0.0679 0.23 0.8173 
Government Ownership -0.0705 -0.22 0.8274 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 0.03 0.9728 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 17.31  <.0001 
R-squared 0.5070   
R-squared(adj) 0.4777   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 1.883   
Table 27A Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable and Section 1109 payment per bed as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 13.3822 6.71 <.0001 
Baseline Readmission Rate for AMI -0.0007 -1.15 0.2522 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.8101 -18.84 <.0001 
Case Mix -1.1870 -2.15 0.0330 
Total Margin -0.0014 -0.2 0.8411 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.4533 1.12 0.2636 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.2537 -0.65 0.5141 
Rural -0.0063 -0.03 0.9760 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.0239 0.07 0.9448 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.1216 0.57 0.5716 
For Profit Ownership 0.7544 3.04 0.0027 
Government Ownership 0.1753 0.66 0.5077 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0001 1.63 0.1055 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 36.77  <.0001 
R-squared 0.6860   
R-squared(adj) 0.6673   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 2.025   
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Table 27B Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as a 
dependent variable and Section 1109 payment per bed as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 12.7602 4.07 <.0001 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Heart Failure -0.0002 -0.2 0.8448 
Baseline Discharges for Heart Failure -0.5550 -9.08 <.0001 
Case Mix -1.7502 -1.98 0.0489 
Total Margin -0.0034 -0.3 0.7630 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.6866 1.11 0.2681 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.3936 -0.61 0.5413 
Rural -0.1633 -0.5 0.6153 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 1.3749 2.55 0.0116 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.0589 0.18 0.8606 
For Profit Ownership 0.2220 0.56 0.5750 
Government Ownership 0.3967 0.95 0.3417 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 0.22 0.8229 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 8.71  <.0001 
R-squared 0.3409   
R-squared(adj) 0.3017   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 2.067   
Table 27C Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rate as a 
dependent variable and Section 1109 payment per bed as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 11.6725 4.4 <.0001 
Baseline Cases for Pneumonia 0.0011 1.18 0.2402 
Baseline Readmission Rate for Pneumonia -0.5757 -8.07 <.0001 
Case Mix -1.1321 -1.46 0.1461 
Total Margin -0.0064 -0.63 0.5274 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.4604 0.83 0.4057 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges -0.4216 -0.74 0.4602 
Rural -0.1687 -0.58 0.5614 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.7904 1.66 0.0991 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.0213 0.07 0.9433 
For Profit Ownership -0.0086 -0.02 0.9804 
Government Ownership 0.0047 0.01 0.9899 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 -0.32 0.7455 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 6.71  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2849   
R-squared(adj) 0.2425   




Table 27D Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable and Section 1109 payment per bed as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 8.7596 3.62 0.0004 
Baseline Cases for Heart Failure -0.0014 -1.78 0.0767 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Heart Failure -0.7704 -12.9 <.0001 
Case Mix -0.3642 -0.51 0.6133 
Total Margin 0.0017 0.18 0.8607 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.0677 -0.13 0.8974 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.3485 0.64 0.5236 
Rural -0.0744 -0.27 0.7865 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.0148 0.03 0.9740 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.2046 -0.73 0.4691 
For Profit Ownership -0.3300 -1 0.3162 
Government Ownership -1.1365 -3.23 0.0014 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0000 0.1 0.9176 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 16.24  <.0001 
R-squared 0.4910   
R-squared(adj) 0.4608   
Durbin-Watson Coefficient 2.11   
Table 27E Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable and Section 1109 payment amount as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 13.1837 4 <.0001 
Baseline Discharges for Pneumonia -0.0002 -0.16 0.8764 
Baseline Mortality Rate for Pneumonia -0.6179 -7.94 <.0001 
Case Mix -0.1318 -0.13 0.8966 
Total Margin -0.0026 -0.2 0.8439 
Logarithm of Bed Count -0.4571 -0.62 0.5351 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.0953 0.13 0.9000 
Rural -0.0293 -0.08 0.9390 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status -0.2703 -0.43 0.6699 
Sole Community Hospital Status -0.0385 -0.1 0.9225 
For Profit Ownership 0.4970 1.08 0.2806 
Government Ownership -0.3176 -0.63 0.5275 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0001 0.9 0.3690 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 6.7  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2846   
R-squared(adj) 0.2421   




Table 27F Multiple Linear Regression Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as a dependent variable 
and Section 1109 payment per bed as the independent variable. 
  Unstandardized Coefficients T-Value P-Value 
(Constant) 8.5260 3.8 0.0002 
Baseline Discharges for AMI -0.0018 -1.98 0.0487 
Baseline Mortality Rate for AMI -0.7854 -13.49 <.0001 
Case Mix -0.8121 -1.35 0.1784 
Total Margin -0.0107 -1.29 0.1990 
Logarithm of Bed Count 0.3832 0.81 0.4184 
Logarithm of Medicare Discharges 0.1993 0.43 0.6659 
Rural -0.1353 -0.55 0.5805 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Status 0.7555 1.87 0.0628 
Sole Community Hospital Status 0.1469 0.58 0.5609 
For Profit Ownership 0.0829 0.28 0.7779 
Government Ownership -0.1071 -0.34 0.7315 
Section 1109 Payment 0.0001 0.78 0.4349 
Number of Observations 215   
F-value 17.41  <.0001 
R-squared 0.5085   
R-squared(adj) 0.4793   

















Appendix F: Other Difference in Differences Models for Hypothesis 3 
Table 28A Difference in Differences Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Mortality Rate as a dependent variable. 
 Independent Variable is Amount of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Logarithm 
of Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Section 





















-0.0022 -7.3600 <.0001 -0.0022 -7.2800 <.0001 -0.0021 -7.18 <.0001 
Medicare Case 
Mix 
-0.6452 -3.9700 <.0001 -0.6582 -4.0500 <.0001 -0.6807 -4.16 <.0001 
Total Margin -0.0024 -2.2200 0.0263 -0.0024 -2.2200 0.0266 -0.0024 -2.21 0.027 
Logarithm of 
Bed Count 




0.0653 0.6600 0.5103 0.0480 0.4800 0.6289 0.0343 0.34 0.732 








-0.0855 -0.8000 0.4220 -0.0858 -0.8100 0.4203 -0.0885 -0.83 0.406 
For Profit 
Ownership 
0.3886 4.6500 <.0001 0.3877 4.6400 <.0001 0.3907 4.67 <.0001 
Government 
Ownership 
0.2885 3.2200 0.0013 0.2909 3.2500 0.0012 0.2945 3.29 0.001 
Section 1109 
Hospital Status 
0.2153 2.3100 0.0209 0.2128 2.2900 0.0223 0.2220 2.38 0.017 
Difference-in-
Difference 
0.0000 2.4100 0.0162 0.2921 2.5900 0.0097 0.0001 1.85 0.064 
Year -1.6173 -10.1100 <.0001 -5.3977 -3.4500 0.0006 -1.8513 -6.39 <.0001 
Number of 
Observations 
2186         
F-value 30.90 
 
<.0001 30.98  <.0001 30.69  <.0001 
R-squared 0.1561 
  
0.1564   0.1552   
R-squared(adj) 0.1510 
  
0.1514   0.1501   
Durbin-Watson 1.881 
  











Table 28B Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 Independent Variable is Amount of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Logarithm of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Section 




















-0.0012 -5.5900 <.0001 -0.0012 -5.4600 <.0001 -0.0012 -5.51 <.0001 
Medicare 
Case Mix 
-0.1494 -0.9300 0.3531 -0.1533 -0.9500 0.3403 -0.1521 -0.94 0.347 
Total 
Margin 








0.3673 4.1000 <.0001 0.3459 3.8300 0.0001 0.3604 3.94 <.0001 










0.0249 0.2500 0.8011 0.0230 0.2300 0.8160 0.0249 0.25 0.801 
For Profit 
Ownership 
-0.1381 -1.7000 0.0888 -0.1378 -1.7000 0.0894 -0.1368 -1.69 0.092 
Government 
Ownership 








0.0000 1.0500 0.2923 0.1624 1.8700 0.0620 0.0000 0.49 0.622 
Year 0.3787 2.6500 0.0080 -1.7162 -1.4600 0.1442 0.3620 1.50 0.134 
Number of 
Observations 
2709   2709   2709   
F-value 26.21 
 
<.0001 26.42  <.0001 26.14  <.0001 
R-squared 0.1122 
  



















Table 28C Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Mortality Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 Independent Variable is Amount of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Logarithm 
of Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Section 
1109 Payment Per Bed  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 

















0.0001 0.4900 0.6268 0.0001 0.37 0.7126 -0.0012 -4.34 <.0001 
Medicare 
Case Mix 
-0.5566 -2.6700 0.0076 -0.5668 -2.72 0.0065 -1.8728 -9.80 <.0001 
Total 
Margin 








-0.1750 -1.7000 0.0888 -0.1737 -1.69 0.0913 0.1799 1.62 0.106 










-0.0808 -0.6900 0.4911 -0.0820 -0.70 0.4846 -0.2247 -1.74 0.082 
For Profit 
Ownership 
0.3047 3.1500 0.0017 0.3032 3.13 0.0018 0.1986 2.02 0.043 
Government 
Ownership 








0.0000 -0.4500 0.6493 0.0162 0.16 0.8717 0.0000 1.06 0.29 
Year 4.4837 26.6300 <.0001 4.2252 3.14 0.0017 -2.6550 -7.62 <.0001 
Number of 
Observations 
2736   2736   1939   
F-value 169.05 
 
<.0001 169.02  <.0001 81.47  <.0001 
R-squared 0.4467 
  



















Table 28D Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day AMI Readmission Rate as a dependent variable. 
 Independent Variable is Amount of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Logarithm 
of Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Section 


















-0.0012 -4.24 <.0001 -0.0012 -4.24 <.0001 -0.0007 -3.54 0.0004 
Medicare 
Case Mix 
-1.8500 -9.74 <.0001 -1.8445 -9.70 <.0001 -2.1117 -13.66 <.0001 
Total 
Margin 








0.2014 1.83 0.0667 0.2082 1.89 0.0586 0.4480 5.86 <.0001 










-0.2222 -1.72 0.0858 -0.2220 -1.72 0.0860 -0.1245 -1.40 0.1607 
For Profit 
Ownership 
0.2003 2.04 0.0414 0.2017 2.06 0.0400 0.2102 2.88 0.0040 
Government 
Ownership 








0.0000 -0.28 0.7803 -0.1179 -0.84 0.3987 -0.0001 -1.89 0.0587 
Year -2.2811 -11.86 <.0001 -0.6747 -0.35 0.7295 -0.8149 -3.74 0.0002 
Number of 
Observations 
1939   1939   2749   
F-value 81.34 
 
<.0001 81.42  <.0001 67.71  <.0001 
R-squared 0.3546 
  




















Table 28E Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Pneumonia Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 Independent Variable is Amount of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Logarithm 
of Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Section 






















-0.0007 -3.30 0.0010 -0.0007 -3.40 0.0007 -0.0007 -3.54 0.0004 
Medicare 
Case Mix 
-2.1252 -13.78 <.0001 -2.1190 -
13.75 
<.0001 -2.1117 -13.66 <.0001 
Total 
Margin 








0.4201 5.52 <.0001 0.4321 5.69 <.0001 0.4480 5.86 <.0001 










-0.1303 -1.47 0.1421 -0.1286 -1.45 0.1473 -0.1245 -1.40 0.1607 
For Profit 
Ownership 
0.2136 2.93 0.0035 0.2139 2.93 0.0034 0.2102 2.88 0.0040 
Government 
Ownership 








0.0000 -1.37 0.1693 -0.1406 -1.84 0.0662 -0.0001 -1.89 0.0587 
Year -1.0778 -8.46 <.0001 0.7013 0.68 0.4946 -0.8149 -3.74 0.0002 
Number of 
Observations 
2749   2749   2749   
F-value 67.54 
 
<.0001 67.69  <.0001 67.71  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2430 
  



















Table 28F Difference in Difference Model with Change in 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate as a dependent 
variable. 
 Independent Variable is Amount of 
Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Logarithm 
of Section 1109 Payment 
Independent Variable is Section 






















-0.0003 -1.2200 0.2230 -0.0003 -1.34 0.1806 -0.0003 -1.32 0.1868 
Medicare 
Case Mix 















0.2067 2.0800 0.0372 0.2228 2.23 0.0257 0.2222 2.20 0.0278 










-0.3052 -2.6700 0.0076 -0.3030 -2.65 0.0080 -0.3029 -2.65 0.0081 
For Profit 
Ownership 
0.3913 4.1900 <.0001 0.3908 4.18 <.0001 0.3897 4.17 <.0001 
Government 
Ownership 








0.0000 -1.1000 0.2727 -0.1647 -1.60 0.1107 0.0000 -0.95 0.3403 
Year -2.1950 -13.2300 <.0001 -0.0842 -0.06 0.9519 -2.0668 -7.37 <.0001 
Number of 
Observations 
2728   2728   2728   
F-value 118.72 
 
<.0001 118.88  <.0001 118.68  <.0001 
R-squared 0.3625 
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